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Preface 
 
In the autumn of 2011 after completing my graduate studies in the UK I returned to 
Bangladesh to join the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) as Researcher to the 
Chief Prosecutor. The renaissance styled architecture of the Old High Court building 
where the ICT was based added a sense grandeur to the proceedings. As I ploughed 
through the fifteen hour work days, the formal appointment as ‘Researcher’ I had 
been originally promised by the Bangladesh Government’s Ministry of Law Justice 
and Parliamentary Affairs never came. Thanks to the unqualified support of my 
parents, I ended up working for about a year without a shred of regret. Although I 
worked without pay, I knew there were countless others who would gladly volunteer 
to take the position that had been offered to me. I may have played the smallest of 
roles in the collective effort of delivering justice to the victims of the war of 1971, 
but the time I spent at the ICT will remain as the most challenging and rewarding 
experience of my life. 
  
Justice systems, whether they be national or international, are always subject to 
scrutiny and criticisms. Such criticisms are appreciated given that they are generally 
expressed for the purposes of improving an ongoing judicial process. I was conscious 
of many criticisms of the ICTs from before. However it was during my time as 
Researcher that I was fully exposed to the onslaught of criticisms directed at their 
standards of justice. In the past I had worked with Human Rights Watch (HRW) on 
multiple occasions on issues which were integrally related to fighting impunity in 
Bangladesh. This made reading HRW’s critical statements on the ICTs an 
uncomfortable and at times painful experience. It was this discomfort, among other 
 7 
reasons, that inspired me to start exploring these criticisms. I was determined to get 
to the bottom of it. As I dug deeper, several questions slowly began to take shape in 
my mind. I asked myself: what was the historical context behind Bangladesh’s 
struggle against impunity? In the ‘complementary’ system of justice created by the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where did the Bangladeshi 
ICTs fit in? Critics assessed the quality of the ICTs trials against international 
standards of justice. Was this right? If the objective of the principle of 
‘complementarity’ is to end impunity, how does the International Criminal Court 
balance this objective with the fair trial rights of individuals being tried at the 
domestic level? Of course, there were many criticisms, but what were the main ones 
that could not be ignored? Are the genuine weaknesses of the ICTs capable of 
delegitimising the whole justice process? Are the ICTs a site for show trials? These 
questions form the outer boundaries of this thesis. 
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Abstract 
  
Bangladesh’s place on the globe as a sovereign nation-state came at the expense of 
millions of victims who perished during the war of 1971. For the greater part of four 
decades an endemic culture of impunity deprived the surviving victims of justice. As 
the crimes of 1971 remained beyond the ratione temporis of the ICC, the Bangladesh 
Government established the first International Crimes Tribunal in 2010 under the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 for the purposes of detaining, prosecuting 
and punishing “persons responsible for committing genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law” in 1971. According 
to critics, the ICTs are a case of “complementarity gone bad” because they have failed 
to uphold international standards of justice. This thesis determines the legality and the 
legitimacy of the ICTs of Bangladesh. It does so by analysing the major criticisms 
directed towards the statutory provisions of the ICTA and the trial process of the ICTs 
through the prism of the principle of complementarity with particular reference to the 
“principles of due process recognized by international law”.  
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Introduction 
 
Overview of the thesis 
 
In December 2008, the Mohajote (Grand Alliance) led by Bangladesh Awami 
League (AL) secured a 75% majority in the 9th National Parliamentary Elections of 
Bangladesh. The voters rejected the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-
e-Islami (JI), a right-wing coalition that had been in power from 2001 to 2006.1 This 
‘fall from grace’ occurred for several reasons. But one reason that featured 
prominently was the popular support towards the electoral pledge made in the 
manifestos of the parties belonging to the Grand Alliance, that if elected to power, 
the trials of those who allegedly commited international crimes during Bangladesh’s 
“historic struggle for national liberation” would be arranged.2 Nearly four decades 
                                                
1 See, Bangladesh Election Commission Statistical Report 8th Jatiya Shangshad Election October 1, 
2001 (Election Commission Secretariat, 2002) 6 < 
http://www.ec.org.bd/MenuExternalFilesEng/124.pdf > accessed 1 March 2017; ‘Monitoring Report 
of the 9th Parliamentary Election 2008 in Bangladesh’ (Democracy Watch, February 2009) 24-25 < 
http://www.dwatch-bd.org/National%20Election%20Final%20Report-2008.pdf > accessed 1 March 
2017.  
2 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Preamble < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367 > accessed 1 February 2017; Julfikar Ali Manik, 
‘The Trial we are Still Waiting for’ (2009) 3(12) Forum  < 
http://archive.thedailystar.net/forum/2009/december/trial.htm > accessed 20 September 2017; 
Bangladesh Awami League, ‘Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League, 9th Parliamentary 
Election, 2008’ < https://www.albd.org/~parbonc/index.php/en/resources/articles/4070-election-
manifesto-of-bangladesh-awami-league,-9th-parliamentary-election,-2008 > accessed 1 February 
2017; Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dol, ‘Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dol-Jashod er Nirbachoni Ishtehar – 
Poribortoner Procheshta Effort for Change’ < 
http://www.jasod.org.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=26&lang= > 
accessed 1 February 2017; Nizam Ahmed, ‘Critical elections and democratic consolidation: the 2008 
parliamentary elections in Bangladesh’ (2011) 19 (2) Contemporary South Asia 137, 147, 150; 
Haroon Habib, ‘Landslide win’ (2009) 26 (2) Frontline < 
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2602/stories/20090130260205700.htm > accessed 1 February 
2017; Rounaq Jahan, ‘Political Parties in Bangladesh’ (2014) CPD-CMI Working Paper Series 8, 10 
< https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5229-political-parties-in-bangladesh.pdf > accessed 25 
February 2017; Henrik Alffram, Ignoring Executions and Torture Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security 
Forces (Human Rights Watch, 2009) < https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/18/ignoring-executions-
and-torture/impunity-bangladeshs-security-forces > accessed 3 March 2017; Sabir Mustafa, ‘Ghulam 
Azam: War crimes trial that exposed Bangladesh scars’ BBC News (17 July 2013) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23314457 > accessed 5 March 2019.  
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earlier in 1971, East Pakistan had seceded from West Pakistan and through one of 
the bloodiest conflicts of the 20th century Bangladesh had cemented its place on the 
global map as a sovereign nation-state.  
 
The judicial initiatives pursued immediately after the war in the early 1970s ended 
in failure and for the greater part of the next four decades Bangladesh was engulfed 
by a culture of impunity that left the victims of the most egregious crimes deprived 
of any form of acknowledgment or apology, let alone ‘justice’. This is why in the 
elections of December 2008 the ‘Grand Alliance’ swept into parliament by a 
landslide, while the Jamaat-e-Islami a political party that had believed and fought for 
a unified Pakistan and had assisted the Pakistan Army in the commission of atrocities 
in 1971, managed to secure only two out of the nationwide three hundred seats.3 
Unaddressed for nearly four decades, the scars and wounds of war had not healed 
and the voters had expressed their decisive and unequivocal support to the pledge of 
delivering justice through ‘war crimes trials’.4  
 
On 23 March 2010, Bangladesh ratified the Rome Statute.5 The crimes of 1971, 
however, remained beyond the ratione temporis of the ICC because of its prospective 
                                                
3 ‘Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament) Elections in 2008’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 27 
February 2017)  < http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2023_08.htm > accessed 27 February 
2017; Bangladesh Nirbachon Commission, Porishongkhan Protibedon, Nobom Jatiyo Songshod 
Nirbachon (Nirbachon Commission Shochibaloy 2012) < 
http://www.ecs.gov.bd/MenuExternalFilesEng/304.pdf > accessed 1 March 2017.  
4 Morten Bergsmo and Elisa Novic, ‘Justice after decades in Bangladesh: national trials for 
international crimes’ (2011) 13 Journal of Genocide Research 503; Philip Hensher, ‘The war 
Bangladesh can never forget’ Independent (19 February 2013) < 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-war-bangladesh-can-never-forget-8501636.html 
> accessed 26 February 2017; M Rafiqul Islam, ‘Trials for international crimes in Bangladesh – 
Prosecutorial strategies, defence arguments and judgments’ in Kirsten Sellars (ed), Trials for 
International Crimes in Asia (Cambridge University Press 2016) 303; ‘Bangladeshi tribunal upholds 
death sentence for 1971 crimes, journalist David Bergman brings more’ < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRHWanU2bu4 > accessed 26 February 2017.  
5 ‘Bangladesh Ratifies ICC Rome Statute’ (The Hague Justice Portal, 24 March 2010) < 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11564 > accessed 26 February 2017.  
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mandate. Two days later, following through on its electoral promise, the newly 
formed Bangladesh Government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced 
the constitution of the first International Crimes Tribunal (ICT-1) under the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (ICTA) for the purposes of the 
“detention, prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for committing 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international 
law” in 1971.6 Within the next few months the Tribunal framed its Rules of 
Procedure, which was published via an official Bangladesh Gazette notification on 
15 July, 2010. The second International Crimes Tribunal (ICT-2) was established on 
22 March, 2012 and after three and half years of operation was deactivated on 15 
September, 2015.7 The proceedings of ICT-1 continued until 13 July 2017 when its 
Chairman Justice Anwarul Haque succumbed to cancer.8 Although trial proceedings 
at ICT-1 are currently at a standstill, the Bangladesh Government has declared that 
the Tribunal is in the process of being reconstituted and will resume hearing cases 
soon.9 
                                                
6 ‘War crimes panel announced’ bdnews24 (Dhaka, 25 March 2010) < 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2010/03/25/war-crimes-trial-panel-announced > accessed 6 May 
2014; The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 [ACT NO. XIX OF 1973] < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=435 > accessed 6 May 2014.  
7 ‘International Crimes Tribunals Merged to One’ The Daily Ittefaq (Dhaka, 15 September 2015) < 
http://www.clickittefaq.com/international-crimes-tribunals-merged-to-one/ > accessed 6 May 2017; 
‘Bangladesh Keeps One 1971 War Crimes Tribunal in Operation’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 15 September 
2015) < http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/09/15/bangladesh-keeps-one-1971-war-crimes-
tribunal-in-operation > accessed 6 May 2017.  
8 Tuhin Shubhra Adhikary, ‘War Crimes Trial Stalled’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 1 September 2017) < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/war-crimes-trial-stalled-1457080 > accessed 15 September 
2017. 
9 ‘Reform in International Crimes Tribunal Soon’ Dhaka Tribune (Dhaka, 19 September 2017) < 
http://www.banglatribune.com/others/news/244015/%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%8D%
E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6
%BF%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6%85%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A7-
%E0%A6%9F%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%87%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7
%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B2-
%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%97%E0%A6
%A0%E0%A6%A8-
%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6
%87 > accessed 20 September 2017. 
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To date, the ICTs have delivered twenty-seven judgments through which a total of 
fifty-one accused have been tried and sentenced.10 The first ever judgment passed in 
absentia against Abul Kalam Azad was described by one commentator as a 
“watershed moment” in Bangladesh’s “tortuous” history.11 At the moment, nine 
cases are currently at the trial stage and twenty-two cases are at the pre-trial stage.12 
The death penalty has been passed against thirty-one of the accused. The Appellate 
Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court has so far heard the appeals filed by seven 
of the accused and has passed the death sentence against six of them.13 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court commuted the sentence passed against one accused from the 
death penalty to life imprisonment.14 The appeals filed by eighteen convicts are 
currently pending.15 For the purposes of this thesis, the ICT-1 and ICT-2 shall be 
collectively referred to as the ICTs.  
 
The opinions of stakeholders regarding the overall fairness of the trial process at the 
ICTs are highly polarized. The Bangladesh Government claims that the trials are at 
par with “international standards” and the ICTA adheres “to most of the rights of the 
                                                
10 The judgments of the International Crimes Tribunals No. 1 and 2 can be downloaded from < 
http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/judgments.php > and < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/judgments.php > 
accessed 6 May 2014.  
11 Sabir Mustafa, ‘Bangladesh's watershed war crimes moment’ BBC News (21 January 2013) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21133320 > accessed 6 May 2014.  
12 Tuhin Shubhra Adhikary, ‘War Crimes Trial Stalled’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 1 September 2017) < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/war-crimes-trial-stalled-1457080 > accessed 15 September 
2017.  
13 ‘Bangladesh Hangs Islamist Mir Quasem Ali for 1971 War Crimes’ BBC News (4 September 2016) 
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37268320 > accessed 15 September 2017.  
14 ‘Bangladesh Islamist Delwar Sayeedi Death Sentence Commuted’ BBC News (17 September 2014) 
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29233639 > accessed 15 September 2017.  
15 ‘7 Years of War Crimes Trial’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 25 March 2017) < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/supplements/7-years-war-crimes-trial-1381120 > accessed 15 September 
2017.  
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accused enshrined under Article 14 of the ICCPR”.16 According to several academics 
and justice forums, the governing statute and the rules of procedure of the ICTs 
uphold the “core tenets of the right to fair trial”.17 On the other hand, critics 
comprising of counsel defending the accused, academics, international lawyers, 
human rights and non-governmental organizations as well as foreign State agencies 
claim that the trials before the ICTs are “replete with violations of the right to a fair 
trial”18 and the justice standards adopted in them do not “comply with the norms and 
standards of international law”.19 The ICTs have been described as a case of 
“complementarity gone bad”.20 Calls have been issued to establish an 
“internationally supervised mechanism” by the United Nations that implements 
“recognised due process rights” and adopts “fair trial protections” guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and those international instruments to which Bangladesh 
                                                
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘A Position Paper on ICT-BD Trials and Execution of Verdict against 
Mr. Abdul Quader Molla on 12 December 2013’ (The Government of the people’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, 2013) 2, 8 < http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/position-paper-ict-bd-trials-and-execution-
verdict-against-mr-abdul-quader-molla > accessed 8 August 2017.   
17 Ridwanul Hoque, ‘War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Legal Analysis of Fair Trial Debates’ (2016) 
17 (1) Australian Journal of Asian Law 1, 16; See also, Islam (n 4) 306, 317; International Crimes 
Strategy Forum, ‘Stephen Rapp: Of misconceptions, unrealistic expectations and double standards’ 
bdnews24 (Dhaka, 22 May 2011) < http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2011/05/22/stephen-rapp-of-
misconceptions-unrealistic-expectations-and-double-standards/ > accessed 21 May 2017; 
International Crimes Strategy Forum, ‘Legal framework of ICT and fair trial attributes’ bdnews24 
(Dhaka, 28 March 2013) < http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/03/28/legal-framework-of-ict-and-
fair-trial-attributes/ > accessed 21 May 2017; Tureen Afroz (ed) Genocide, War Crimes & Crimes 
Against Humanity in Bangladesh: Trial under International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (Forum for 
Secular Bangladesh and Trial of War Criminals of 1971 2010).  
18 ‘Bangladesh: Halt Imminent War Crimes Executions Impose Immediate Moratorium on the Death 
Penalty’ (Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2016) < 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/01/bangladesh-halt-imminent-war-crimes-executions > accessed 
8 March 2017.  
19 Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh 
War of Liberation’ (2010) 21 (2) Criminal Law Forum 191; Abdus Samad, ‘The International Crimes 
Tribunal in Bangladesh and International Law’ (2016) 27 (3) Criminal Law Forum 257, 290; See also, 
Abdur Razzaq, ‘The tribunals in Bangladesh: Falling short of international standards’ in Kirsten 
Sellars (ed) Trials for International Crimes in Asia (Cambridge University Press 2016) 341-359.  
20 Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal (BICT): Complementarity Gone 
Bad’ (IntLawGrrls, 8 October 2014) < https://ilg2.org/2014/10/08/the-bangladesh-international-
crimes-tribunal-bict-complementarity-gone-bad/ > accessed 6 August 2017.  
 15 
is “obliged to observe” as a State Party.21 These criticisms have undermined the 
legality and legitimacy of the ICTs in the global arena.22 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the legality and the legitimacy of the ICTs of 
Bangladesh through the prism of the principle of complementarity with particular 
reference to the “principles of due process recognized by international law”.23 
Assessing the legality of judicial proceedings does not always have to necessarily be 
a painstaking exercise if performed through the formulas dictated by legal 
positivism.24 The most fundamental preconditions necessary to ensure the legality of 
any judicial process is to see whether the process is founded on a set of legal rules, 
whether those rules were framed by an entity having the authority to do so, and if 
those rules conform to relevant legal texts such as Constitutions, Charters etc. On the 
                                                
21 ‘International Legal Experts Express Concern Over the Lack of an Appropriate Accountability 
Mechanism in Bangladesh and Calls on the United Nations to Support an Internationally Supervised 
Mechanism’ (Toby Cadman, 31 May 2016) < http://tobycadman.com/international-legal-experts-
express-concern-over-the-lack-of-an-appropriate-accountability-mechanism-in-bangladesh-and-
calls-on-the-united-nations-to-support-an-internationally-supervised-mechanism/ > accessed 6 
August 2017; Desmond de Silva, ‘The Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal should be internationalised 
- for the sake of the nation’s future’ (No Peace Without Justice)  < 
http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Bangladesh-War-Crimes-Tribunal-should-be-internationalised-sake-
nation%E2%80%99s-future.html > accessed 6 August 2017.  
22 Mathias Holvoet and Paul de Hert, ‘International Criminal Law as Global Law: An Assessment of 
the Hybrid Tribunals’ in Shavana Musa and Eefje de Volder (eds), Reflections on Global Law (BRILL 
2013) 96, 107; Mary Kozlovski, ‘Bangladesh's way: Dhaka's controversial International Crimes 
Tribunal’ (International Bar Association, 4 July 2013) < 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=AA9E9993-62BA-4E44-A177-
DF51CA884C19 > accessed 6 August 2017; Beth Van Schaack, ‘Precipitating Politics Around The 
Revival of Prosecutions in Bangladesh’ (Intlawgrrls, 10 October 2014) < 
https://ilg2.org/tag/bangladesh/ > accessed 6 August 2017; Geoffrey Robertson, Report on the 
International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (International Forum for Democracy and Human Rights 
2015) 124; Samad (n 19) 262; Zakia Afrin, ‘The International War Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973 of 
Bangladesh’ [2009] Indian Yearbook of International Law and Policy 341, 346 < 
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=pubs > accessed 6 
August 2017; ‘International Legal Experts Express Concern Over the Lack of an Appropriate 
Accountability Mechanism in Bangladesh and Calls on the United Nations to Support an 
Internationally Supervised Mechanism’ (n 21).  
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 17(2).  
24 Vesselin Popovski, ‘Legality and Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals’ in Richard Falk, 
Mark Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 388. 
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other hand, assessing the legitimacy of a judicial proceeding is not so easy. While 
the search for legitimacy is a largely theoretical and academic exercise, the search 
itself is not an exact science. Legitimacy belongs to a higher order of intellectual 
appreciation originating from the school of natural law which merges law with 
ethics.25 This is why not all legal things are by default legitimate. In order for the 
‘legal’ to be ‘legitimate’ it must satisfy the ideas of what is understood as moral and 
fair. Quintessential examples include laws that allowed and perpetuated slavery or 
the per se ‘legal’ but ‘illegitimate’ laws passed against the Jews by the Nationalist 
Socialist Party in Germany after 1933.  
 
Even more interestingly, not all illegal acts are always interpreted as illegitimate. 
This is reflected in the broad interpretation of the NATO bombings of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. While most observers agree that the targets of the 
bombings were legitimate, lingering questions remained as to whether NATO had 
fulfilled all the laws of war or had operated within the boundaries of the United 
Nations Charter.26 Therefore, in order for a judicial process to be perceived as legal 
and legitimate, that process must not just be founded on laws or rules that are 
properly framed, those laws or rules must also be ethical and rational.27  
 
Legitimacy was perhaps best explained by Lon Fuller in 1958 when he wrote: “ when 
men are compelled to explain and justify their decisions, the effect will generally be 
to pull those decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards of ultimate goodness 
                                                
25 Popovski (n 24). 
26 Adam Roberts, ‘NATO’s 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo’ (1999) 41 (3) Survival 102, 114; Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much' Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International 
Law’ (2002) 65 (2) The Modern Law Review 159. 
27 Popovski (n 24) 389. 
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there are.”28 This pull towards ‘goodness’ is what necessitates the need to hold not 
just ‘legal’, but ‘fair’ trials. On this note, the legitimacy of a domestic trial process 
functioning within the ‘complementary’ system of justice is determined by assessing 
its judicial standards. This requires testing the extent to which the justice standards 
of that domestic process deviate from the “principles of due process recognized by 
international law” and determining whether that deviation can be accommodated 
within the need to respect “diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures” or not 
be accommodated because the “violations of the rights” of the accused which came 
about through those deviations were of the “egregious” kind.29  
 
With this in mind, this thesis carries out an assessment of the legality and legitimacy 
of the ICTs of Bangladesh during the period of 2010 to 2017. To this end, it conducts 
a detailed exploration of the historical context behind the ICTs and a comprehensive 
unpicking of the major areas of contention surrounding Bangladesh’s struggle 
against impunity. Due to constraints of space, it has been possible to only assess the 
major criticisms of the ICTA and the ICTs. What does and does not qualify as a 
major criticism was a decision taken on the basis of emphasis and importance given 
to them by critics, the availability and accessibility to necessary facts and documents, 
and finally whether a criticism had the potential to overthrow the principle of 
complementarity and delegitimise the whole justice process.  
 
                                                
28 Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71(4) Harvard 
Law Review 630, 636.  
29 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
(International Criminal Court, September 2003) 5 < https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-
de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf > accessed 24 September 2017; 
Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah 
Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”) ICC-O1/11-01/11OA6 (24 July 2014) [3] < 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF > accessed 24 September 2017. 
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The importance of the assessment this thesis aims to carry out is twofold. Firstly, 
unearthing those criticisms which are wanting in merit lend support to a key 
argument of this thesis that, while the ICC assesses domestic proceedings in terms 
of the “principles of due process recognized by international law”, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) should be receptive towards the “diversity of legal systems, 
traditions and cultures”, unless of course the deviation from the “principles of due 
process […]” results in “egregious” violations of the rights of the accused rendering 
a trial incapable of offering “any genuine form of justice” and “inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person to justice”.  
 
Secondly, placing a microscope over the ‘complementary’ system of justice within 
which Bangladesh’s struggle against impunity operates, reveals the genuine 
weaknesses which national criminal jurisdictions like the ICTs wrestle with when 
prosecuting international crimes. This in turn helps to identify some of the tension 
points of the principle of complementarity. The thesis, therefore, goes beyond testing 
whether the ICTs are compliant with a set of human rights. Rather, it unpicks a justice 
system in the context of complementarity, the aim of which is to end impunity.  
 
The Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis is arranged over seven chapters. Chapters I and II discuss the historical 
context of the ICTs. Chapter I examines the period between 1947 and 1971, outlining 
the circumstances leading up to Bangladesh’s struggle for national liberation and the 
international crimes committed during that time. It considers the events which led to 
the secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan resulting in the emergence of 
 19 
Bangladesh. It gives an account of the nature and scale of crimes committed by the 
Pakistan Army and its auxiliary forces against the Bengalis during the war of 1971. 
Finally, it sheds light on the criminal nature of the roles played by three auxiliaries, 
namely the Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams, many of whose members came from a 
political party known as Jamaat-e-Islami. 
 
Chapter II traces the post-independence years from 1972 to 2010 and examines two 
justice initiatives that were set in motion after the surrender of the Pakistan Army 
and its auxiliary forces. It explains why those initiatives failed and identifies the 
causes of a deeply rooted culture of impunity in Bangladesh, a culture which was 
challenged when the first ICT was established in 2010 after a campaign spanning 
nearly four decades.  
 
Chapter III then focuses on the principle of complementarity. It explores the travaux 
préparatoires and statutory provisions of the Rome Statute, policy papers published 
by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and relevant decisions handed down by 
the ICC for the purposes of identifying the ‘benchmark’ in terms of which the legality 
and legitimacy of judicial proceedings before a national criminal jurisdiction, such 
as the ICTs, ought to be assessed.  
 
In this context, Chapters IV, V, VI and VII proceed to analyse at length the most 
contentious criticisms of the statutory provisions of the ICTA and trial process of the 
ICTs that have managed to capture the narrative defining and undermining 
Bangladesh’s fight against impunity before the international community. On the 
basis of the ‘benchmark’ identified in Chapter III, this analysis is performed in terms 
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of the principle of complementarity and the “principles of due process recognized by 
international law”.  
 
Chapter IV critiques three specific provisions of the ICTA that critics allege are 
incompatible with the principle of legality, otherwise known as the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege. Because of the number of issues analysed, this Chapter (IV) 
is considerably longer than others. Firstly, it asks whether if Section 3(1) ICTA 
which empowers the ICTs to prosecute “any individual or group of individuals, […] 
whether before or after the commencement of this Act” violates Article 35(1) 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh which protects persons from 
facing retroactive prosecution of crimes by prohibiting ex post facto laws. Secondly, 
it probes whether the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ and the inclusion of  
‘political group’ as a protected group in the definition of ‘genocide’ reflected the 
state of customary international law in 1971 and if the variations in these definitions 
provided for in the ICTA fell within the boundaries of reasonable discretion 
exercised by a national legal system. Thirdly, it analyses whether the retroactive 
amendment of Section 21 ICTA allowing the Prosecution to appeal against the life 
sentence passed on Abdul Quader Molla (Molla) violated the principle of legality 
and if the Supreme Court of Bangladesh relied on established judicial principles and 
precedents while justifying the enhancement of Molla’s punishment on appeal from 
life imprisonment to the death penalty.  
 
Chapter V analyses whether the passing of the death penalty by the ICTs and the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh violates the principle of complementarity. It briefly 
traces the global movement for abolition of the death penalty and identifies the 
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categories of crimes against which the passing of the death penalty is still permissible 
under contemporary standards of international law. It then asks if the 
‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute) permits domestic courts of State Parties to apply the 
death penalty as punishment for international crimes.  
 
Chapters VI explores two key objections relating to the trial process of the ICT’s. 
Firstly, it asks whether Articles 47(3) and 47A of Bangladesh’s Constitution deprive 
those charged with international crimes of their fair trial rights and alter the ‘basic 
structure’ of the Constitution. Secondly, it examines the ICTs practice of limiting the 
number of defence witnesses and assesses the extent to which this practice has 
affected the rights of the accused.  
 
The analysis moves on to Chapter VII which asks whether the ‘complementary’ 
system of justice prohibits national criminal jurisdictions from trying alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes in their absence, provided that trials in absentia 
were used for objectively acceptable reasons. It goes on to analyse whether trials in 
absentia under the ICTs ensure the minimum safeguards, which are, notifying an 
accused of impending proceedings, ensuring that the State appoints and pays for 
legal counsel, and providing an absconding accused the right of appeal.  
 
Throughout the detailed examination in Chapters IV-VII, the recurring question 
remains to what extent any variation in application of fair trial standards (or breach 
thereof) renders a national process invalid from the perspective of the principle of 
complementarity.  
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Finally the Conclusion to the thesis restates the key propositions concerning the 
legality and legitimacy of the International Crimes Tribunals of Bangladesh. It also 
considers how the future scholarship of the principle of complementarity might 
develop in light of the thesis findings and by identifying some of the points of tension 
which were revealed while writing this thesis.
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Chapter I 
The Bengalis struggle from autonomy to independence and the 
international crimes of 1971 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the legality and the legitimacy of the 
International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) of Bangladesh through the prism of the 
principle of complementarity with particular reference to the “principles of due 
process recognized by international law”.1 In order to do so, some appreciation of the 
historical context of these initiatives is first required. This chapter examines the period 
between 1947 and 1971, outlining the circumstances leading up to Bangladesh’s 
struggle for national liberation and the international crimes committed during the war 
of 1971. Part I considers the events which led to the secession of East Pakistan from 
West Pakistan resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation State. 
Part II gives an account of the nature and scale of crimes committed by the Pakistan 
Army and its auxiliary forces against the Bengalis during the war of 1971. It also sheds 
light on the criminal nature of the roles played by local auxiliaries, namely the 
Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams, many of whose members came from a political party 
known as Jamaat-e-Islami. 
 
1. The State of Pakistan (1947 – 1971) 
 
                                                
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 17(2).  
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Going into the details of the partition of United India is not required for the purposes 
of this chapter because its focus is on the war of 1971 and the atrocities which were 
committed during that war. However, the results of partition do indicate a deeper 
significance that ultimately led to the catastrophic consequences of 1971. This part 
explains that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was an unnatural State from a 
geographical point of view from the very beginning. It then identifies the cultural and 
economic fault lines which caused resentment amongst the Bengalis of East Pakistan 
towards West Pakistan. Finally, it traces how the demands for autonomy transformed 
to a demand for all-out independence after the Pakistani military refused to transfer 
political power to the elected representatives of the Awami League which won a 
majority of seats in Pakistan’s first ever general elections in December 1970 and in an 
unprovoked attack applied an excessive use of force on the Bengalis on 25 March 
1971.  
 
1.1 Pakistan – East and West separated by a thousand miles   
 
Academics have described the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a “geographical 
anomaly”, a “double country” and an “anachronism” for its unusual makeup.2 
Although the partition of United India in 1947 resulted in the birth of Pakistan which 
was a union of the Muslim majority areas of the Indian subcontinent, its two wings, 
namely West Pakistan and East Pakistan were separated by a thousand miles of Indian 
territory.3 The idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India was envisioned 
                                                
2 Imran Ali, ‘The Punjab and the Retardation of Nationalism’ in D A Low (ed), Political Inheritance of 
Pakistan (Palgrave Macmillam 1991) 49; Richard V Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim 
Nation (D Van Nostrand Company 1964) 3; A F Salahuddin Ahmed, ‘Foreword’ in Ziaur Rahman (ed), 
Speeches of Sheikh Mujib in Pakistan Parliament (1955-56) (Vol-1, Hakkani Publishers 1990) iii. 
3 James A Michener, ‘A Lament For Pakistan’ The New York Times (9 January 1972); Salahuddin 
Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present (APH Publishing 2004) 306; Aparna Pande, Shefali Dhar and 
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as early as the 1930s, however on both occasions when the idea was floated, the 
‘homeland’ comprised of the Muslim majority provinces in the north-western regions 
of India.4 The demand for a separate territorial identity for the Muslims of the eastern 
region of India took shape from the Lahore Resolution of 1940, a political statement 
adopted by the All-India Muslim League.5 The All-India Muslim League, also known 
as the Muslim League was a political party that campaigned for the establishment of 
Pakistan, which would be a Muslim-majority nation-state.  The Resolution read: “[…] 
the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western 
and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in 
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”6 Although the Indian 
Congress strongly opposed the possibility of a divided India at the time, the Lahore 
Resolution nevertheless added momentum to the movement for Pakistan.  
 
In 1946 provincial elections were held throughout United India for the purposes of 
electing members of the legislative councils. In the provinces where Muslims were a 
majority, the Muslim League secured 439 out of the 494 seats.7 The elected legislators 
of the Muslim League met at a Convention following this overwhelming victory and 
amended the Lahore Resolution by replacing the word ‘states’ to ‘state’.8 Therefore, a 
year prior to the birth of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, it was envisioned as a ‘state’ 
with a federal structure comprising of two autonomous wings equal to each other. As 
the months passed and it became evident that power could not be transferred without 
                                                
Sidhanta Mehra, ‘Introduction’ in Aparna Pande (ed), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan 
(Taylor and Francis 2017) 2.  
4 L F R Williams, The State of Pakistan (Faber and Faber 1962) 23.  
5 M Rafiqul Islam, Bangladesh Liberation Movement: International Legal Implications (The University 
Press Limited 1987) 8. 
6 Cyril Henry Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947: Select Documents (Oxford 
University Press 1962) 354-355. 
7 Islam (n 5) 9. 
8 ibid. 
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partition, the Muslims of the eastern zone opted to join Pakistan.9 Although this 
decision was not backed by a referendum, the politicians representing the Bengali-
Muslim community that formed the majority of the eastern zone believed that the 
decision to merge with Pakistan would protect them from Indian Hindu domination.10 
The promises of political empowerment and fiscal autonomy in the Lahore Resolution 
were other important reasons that shaped this assessment. On 11 August, 1947 Quaid-
i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah shared his vision of a modern and secular Pakistan 
before the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan:  
 
You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go your 
mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with 
the business of the State. […] We are starting with the fundamental 
principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. […] Now, 
I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find 
that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims 
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the 
personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of 
the State.11 
 
Four days later on 14 August, 1947 the Islamic Republic of Pakistan comprising of 
“two racially, culturally and linguistically diverse wings” was born.”12 
                                                
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 Quaid-I-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-1948 
(Pakistan Publications 1963) 8-9; Ahmed, ‘Foreword’ (n 2) i-ii. 
12 Islam (n 5) 10.  
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1.2 The breakup of Pakistan: identifying the fault lines   
 
While it is true it was the physical distance that had caused the existence of historical 
and cultural differences between the people of these two regions,13 the veteran Indian 
journalist Kalyan K. Chaudhuri argues that what initially held the two regions together 
as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was the “spiritual and political exhilaration of a 
new [Islamic] nationalism”.14 However, as the months of togetherness turned into 
years the Bengalis of East Pakistan began to realize that the helms of power had merely 
shifted hands from the British to the Punjabis of West Pakistan.15  
 
Democratic institutions, processes and the parliamentary system of governance were 
compromised in the first decade of Pakistan. It was also during this time that 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his protégé Liquate Ali Khan created an all-powerful 
bureaucracy.16 The nature of power exercised reached such an extent that bureaucrats 
of the central secretariat, most of who came from West Pakistan, superseded the 
ministers of their department and reported directly to Jinnah.17 In fact, because there 
was not a single representative from the Bengalis of East Pakistan amongst the senior 
bureaucrats, important decisions relating to politics, defence, economy and diplomacy 
were taken by the “ruling elite composed of West Pakistani civil and military 
officers.”18 Even when it came to addressing issues at the provincial level, all key 
                                                
13 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Columbia University Press 1972) 10-23.  
14 Kalyan Chaudhuri, Genocide in Bangladesh (Orient Longman 1972) 2.  
15 Weekes (n 2) 9-11.  
16 Islam (n 5) 12.   
17 ibid 12-13.   
18 G W Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd 1974) 6; Philip 
Oldenburg, ‘The Breakup of Pakistan’ in Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph (eds), The Regional 
Imperative: The Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States Under Presidents 
Johnson and Nixon (Concept Publishing 1980) 143.  
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positions in the administration were occupied by West Pakistanis.19 Due to such 
significant underrepresentation of the Bengalis of the Eastern wing in the bureaucracy, 
they were by default unable to be a part of the executive power structure at the central 
and provincial level.20 The rise of the bureaucracy also meant compromising with 
democracy. This paved way for the Pakistan Army to intervene and assume the role 
of the “guardians of national interests and unity”21 during the second decade, which in 
effect facilitated the beginning of the end of united Pakistan. This was coupled with 
the perpetual attempt of the Punjabis of the West to culturally dominate and 
economically exploit the Bengalis of the East.22 The unifying strength of the Islamic 
nationalism was gradually eroding away and it was becoming incapable of preserving 
the union of two distant lands and cultures it had once brought together.  
 
A key indicator of this domination was the focus that was placed on which language 
would be the state language of Pakistan. It took eight years for ‘Bengali’ to be adopted 
as one of Pakistan’s state languages. On 25 February, 1948 Dhirendranath Datta, 
serving at the time as a member of the Constituent Assembly of newly independent 
Pakistan, moved an amendment with regard to the rules of procedure of the Assembly 
that if passed would allow for Bengali to be adopted as one of the official languages 
along with Urdu and English.23 The proposed amendment was rejected due to staunch 
opposition offered by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and others. From the Punjabi 
                                                
19 Choudhury (n 18) 6. 
20 Jahan (n 13) 96-100.  
21 Islam (n 5) 7.  
22 Weekes (n 2) 9; Jahan (n 13); Richard Nations, ‘The Economic Structure of Pakistan: Class and 
Colony’ (1971) I (68) New Left Review 3; Mussarat Jabeen, Amir Ali Chandio and Zarina Qasim, 
‘Language Controversy: Impacts on National Politics and Secession of East Pakistan’ (2010) 25 A 
Research Journal of South Asian Studies 99.  
23 M Waheeduzzaman Manik ‘Dhirendranath Datta: Glimpses of a Life’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 21 
February 2007) < http://archive.thedailystar.net/suppliments/2007/21stfeb/dhirendranath.htm > 
accessed 22 January 2014.  
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point of view, this was unsurprising. They believed that the glue that held together the 
unity of West and East Pakistan was the “Muslim” and “Pakistani” identity of the 
citizens of Pakistan, not their ethnic roots.24 The imposing of Urdu was perceived as 
the all-important tool to “Islamise” the people of East Pakistan who were in need of 
“purification” from Hindu influences.25 As a result, showing complete disregard to the 
reality that the majority of the people of Pakistan spoke Bengali and did not understand 
Urdu, Liaquat Ali Khan said: “Pakistan has been created on the demands of a hundred 
million Muslims in the sub-continent and the language of a hundred million Muslims 
is Urdu. […] Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have for its lingua franca, the 
language of the Muslim nation.”26 
 
Jinnah’s speeches also reveal that he was moving away from his earlier vision of 
Pakistan where “Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be 
Muslims”.27 On 19 March, 1948 at the Race Course Ground of Dhaka the capital city 
of East Pakistan, Jinnah declared: “The State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu 
and no other language.”28 Jinnah’s words were met with immediate protest from 
several hundred students present at the gathering.29 In another speech made a few days 
later, he argued that in order for a nation to “remain tied up solidly together and 
                                                
24 ‘Pakistan: Jinnah’s Fading Dream’ Time (15 March 1971) 97 (11) 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,904838,00.html> accessed 15 July 2015.   
25 William van Schendel, ‘The Pakistan Experiment and the Language Issue’ in Meghna Guhathakurta 
and William van Schendel (eds), The Bangladesh Reader: History, Culture, Politics (Duke University 
Press 2013) 180-181.  
26 Salil Tripathi, The Colonel Who Would Not Repent: The Bangladesh War and Its Unquiet Legacy 
(Yale University Press 2016) 36; See also, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (1st edn, Zed Press 
1979) 75-96.  
27 ‘On his Election as the First President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan’ in Quaid-I-Azam 
Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (n 11) 8-9.  
28 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, The Unfinished Memoirs (The University Press Limited 2012) 104.  
29 Mafizullah Kabir, Experiences of an Exile at Home: Life in Occupied Bangladesh (Asiatic Press 
1972) 3.  
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function” it needed “one State Language”.30 During his farewell message on his 
departure from East Pakistan on 28 March, Jinnah stood by his previous position to 
not grant anything beyond provincial status to the Bengali language and offered a few 
words of advice to the people of the province: 
 
What should be the official language of this province is for your 
representatives to decide. But this language controversy is really only one 
aspect of a bigger problem – that of provincialism. […] Pakistan is the 
embodiment of the unity of the Muslim nation and so it must remain. That 
unity we, as true Muslims, must jealously guard and preserve. If we begin 
to think of ourselves as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis etc. first and Muslims 
and Pakistanis only incidentally, then Pakistan is bound to disintegrate.31 
 
At the beginning of 1952 the Prime Minister of Pakistan Khwaja Nazimuddin 
reiterated that Urdu alone would be the state language of Pakistan, a position which 
the Bengali student community again rejected for being unfair.32 A ban was imposed 
on holding processions and on 21 February of that year thousands of students 
organized a protest rally in defiance of the order. The police opened fire. At least four 
students lost their lives. Salam, Barqat, Rafique and Jabbar, the names of the students 
who were killed roused nationalistic passions throughout East Pakistan. William van 
Schendel notes that the movement of 1952 represented a psychological break for many 
                                                
30 ‘National Consolidation’ in Quaid-I-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of 
Pakistan 1947-1948 (n 11) 86.  
31 ‘Farewell Message to East Pakistan’ in Quaid-I-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-
General of Pakistan 1947-1948 (n 11) 103-104.  
32 Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Books 
International Ltd 1975) 33.  
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Bengalis because it ruptured the dream of a Pakistan based on communal ties and 
sowed the seeds for the search of a secular alternative.33  
 
Only in the Constitution of Pakistan of 1956, was Bengali finally acknowledged 
alongside Urdu as one the two State languages of Pakistan.34 However, the 
“constitutional guarantee”35 granted to the Bengali language was again thrown into 
uncertainty after the military coup of 1958 through which General Ayub Khan 
emerged as dictator. This time, the Ayub government proposed to replace the Bengali 
script with the Roman script.36 In 1967, President Ayub Khan in his autobiography 
‘Friends Not Masters’ described the Bengalis of East Pakistan as an ethnic group that 
possessed the “inhibitions of down-trodden races”.37 Commenting that they had not 
psychologically adjusted to the “requirements of the new-born freedom”, Ayub Khan 
went on to say that the Bengalis also suffered from “popular complexes, exclusiveness, 
suspicion and sort of defensive aggressiveness”.38 He felt all these Bengali traits 
originated from “considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence” and the fact 
that Bengalis had always been ruled “either by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans, or 
the British”.39 
 
On the economic front there was a sharp disparity in wages and living conditions 
between the two parts of the country. Although the labour and resources of East 
Pakistan were employed for the benefit of Pakistan, the profits were not shared 
                                                
33 Schendel (n 25) 183.  
34 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1956, article 214(1).  
35 Dennis Kurzon, ‘Romanisation of Bengali and Other Indian Scripts’ (2010) 20 Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 61, 71-72.  
36 Maniruzzaman (n 32) 71-72. 
37 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, A Political Autobiography (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 1967) 187. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid.  
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equitably between the regions.40 In 1972, Kabir Uddin Ahmad, an economist trained 
at the London School of Economics shared his observations on the economically 
exploitative policies and actions of West Pakistan towards East Pakistan: 
 
[…] through various economic policies – the exchange rate, allocation of 
foreign exchanges, commercial and industrial import licences and the 
regional distribution of Central Government expenditures, the 
Government of Pakistan has not only given undue benefits to West 
Pakistan, but also has drained away real resources from East Bengal. […] 
these policies have done enormous damage to the economic future of East 
Bengal by keeping export process abnormally high in the outside world. 
The policy of tariff protection and the development of industries in the 
west wing has turned the eastern wing to its protected market.41 
 
In the same year Azizur Rahman Khan, another economist reached similar 
conclusions.42 These views drew support from the works produced from the late 1950s 
throughout the 1960s by Cambridge, Harvard and MIT trained economists of the likes 
of Rehman Sobhan, Nurul Islam, Md Anisur Rahman, M Akhlaqur Rahman and 
others.43 Ridiculed in the early 1960s by the Deputy Chairman of Pakistan’s Planning 
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Commission as the “mediocre minions of foreign power”44 the core argument 
advocated by these economists was that the economic disparity between West Pakistan 
and East Pakistan was “perpetuated”45 by the first, second and third Five Year Plans 
which had given preferential treatment to West Pakistan by allocating 
“disproportionately higher levels of development and non-development expenditure 
in the public sector of West Pakistan”.46 Economists from West Pakistan, however, 
attributed the ‘disparity’ to East Pakistan’s low level of economic development in 
1947 and also to the existence of a greater demand for the allocation of resources from 
West Pakistan which stemmed from the presence of the “bulk of migrant 
entrepreneurs” and the fact that Karachi was set up as the country’s capital.47 Rounaq 
Jahan has pointed out that the economic disparity, irrespective of its rationale, was 
“open for all to see”.48 On a similar note, Arthur K Blood concluded that “East 
Pakistan’s economic interests have been subordinated to those of the West” giving the 
East Pakistanis legitimate cause to “resent” that reality.49  
 
1.3 East Pakistan’s transformation into Bangladesh – from autonomy to 
independence  
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In the summer of 1949 a political party named the Awami Muslim League came into 
existence in East Pakistan. With Maulana Bhashani as President and the young Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman as the Organizing Secretary of its youth wing, the Awami Muslim 
League resurrected the original idea of ‘states’ under the Lahore Resolution of 1940. 
In the 42-point party manifesto issued by the Awami League, demands for regional 
autonomy for East Pakistan in the context of the Lahore Resolution and the recognition 
of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan stood out.50  
 
As the years passed, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman graduated up the ranks and was elected 
the President of the Awami League in 1963. Unlike his political predecessors who 
came from aristocratic backgrounds, Mujib came from humble beginnings which 
played an important role in helping him to maintain “closer links with the people” and 
possess “a better understanding of their feelings and aspirations.”51 In 1966, Mujib 
who had by then emerged as the undisputed leader of East Pakistan launched a mass 
movement founded on what he called the Six Points Programme. Zeroing in on 
attaining “full autonomy”, the programme was presented before the people as a 
“charter of survival”.52  The demands included, the reintroduction of a parliamentary 
form of government and universal adult franchise; establishing a federal form of 
government with only two departments – defence and foreign affairs – to be lodged 
with the central government and all residual powers to reside in the two states; creating 
separate currencies and state banks for the two states; reforming the taxation system 
so that all heads of taxation were under the states, with the central government 
dependent on a fixed levy from the states; ensuring the independence of the two states 
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in international trade; and the development of a militia or paramilitary force in East 
Pakistan.53  
 
As the movement took shape, representatives of the leading student organizations of 
East Pakistan, namely the Chhatro League and Chhatro Union, formed a Students’ 
Action Committee in 1969. The committee endorsed the Six Point Programme of 
Sheikh Mujib and produced a detailed Eleven Points Charter of demands.54 Kamal 
Hossain the first Law Minister and Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
of Bangladesh wrote: “Such a comprehensive charter of demands was significant on 
more counts than one. The inclusion of the substance of the Six Points Programme 
meant that not only were these demands made by one political party, but that having 
enlisted support from all the major student groups – who had divergent political 
affiliations – it had evolved into a national charter of political demands for East 
Bengal.”55  
 
The first general elections in the history of Pakistan were held on 07 December, 1970. 
This had been the result of mass movements and campaigning by the pro-democracy 
camp in Pakistan that demanded the initiation of the transfer of power from the 
military to the elected representatives of the people.56 In his memoirs published in 
December 1972, Mafizullah Kabir, Professor and Chair of the Department of History 
of Dhaka University recalled that “it was an irony of fate that before the general 
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elections of 1970 […] elections were held only once in East Pakistan in 1954 and 
never in West Pakistan” and that on both occasions “the popularly elected 
representatives were not allowed to function.”57  
 
The results of the elections came as a shock to the military establishment.58 With a 
nationwide voter turnout of 63.1%, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won 
167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan in a house of 313. Winning 83 seats out of 131 
seats allocated to West Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 
came in second.59 The driving force behind Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s election 
campaign had been the Six Points Programme and the Eleven Points Programme 
launched by the students which if implemented would have ensured a fairer and 
equitable system of governance between the two wings of Pakistan. And, as the newly 
elected leader of the majority party in the general elections, Sheikh Mujib was set to 
assume the Prime Ministership of Pakistan. On the other hand, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 
campaign included pledges of a strong central government, a powerful army and a 
“thousand year war with India”.60 Bhutto declared that Sindh and Punjab were the 
“bastions of power” and that a “majority alone does not count in national politics”.61 
Henry Kissinger in ‘The White House Years’ writes: “He [Yahya] expected a 
multiplicity of parties to emerge in both East and West Pakistan which would 
continually fight with each other in each wing of the country; the President would 
therefore remain the arbiter of Pakistan politics.62  
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Unprepared to concede General Yahya Khan who had replaced General Ayub Khan 
as Pakistan’s military strongman in 1969 ignored Mujib’s proposals for an early 
convening of the National Assembly. Yahya set 3 March, 1971 as the date for 
convening of the Assembly. With a very ‘real’ possibility of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
becoming the future Prime Minister of Pakistan and seeing through his political 
mandate, Bhutto responded to the situation by saying that his party would not attend 
the session of the National Assembly in the absence of an understanding for 
“compromise or adjustment” on the Six Points.63 In an abrupt move on 1 March, 1971, 
Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the session of the National Assembly. The 
reasoning behind the declaration was that the political leaders of Pakistan were yet to 
reach a consensus on the main provisions of the future Constitution of Pakistan. It 
became clear to the Bengalis that the ruling minority in West Pakistan was not 
prepared to accede to the aspirations of the Bengali majority.64 Many took to the 
streets. The curfew imposed by the military authorities was rejected and the army fired 
upon unarmed civilians. Sheikh Mujib announced a programme of strikes and non-
cooperation throughout the country.65 Curfews continued to be imposed and they were 
continually disobeyed. Firing upon the civilian population by the military continued. 
On 2 March, a statement by Mujib read: “It is the sacred duty of each and every 
Bengali in every walk of life including government officials, not to cooperate with 
anti-people forces and indeed to do everything in their power to foil the conspiracy 
against Bangladesh. […] representatives … elected by the people are the only 
legitimate source of authority. All authorities are expected to take note of this fact.”66 
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On the same day the Chhatra League organized a mass rally, which was also attended 
by Mujib. In his presence, the Bengali students hoisted the flag of Bangladesh.67 
Commenting on the nature of the non-cooperation movement, Maniruzzaman 
observed: “In an impressive display of unity, all of the employees in the government 
offices, including the judges of the High Court, absented themselves from their offices, 
and promised to continue to do so for as long as Mujib demanded. But General Yahya 
Khan showed an utter lack of empathy with the feelings aroused among the Bengalis, 
and ultimately he reacted in a desperate manner.”68  
 
On 7 March, 1971 Sheikh Mujib stood before “an incredible mass of humanity”69 and 
issued a call to the people of East Pakistan. He declared that it would not be possible 
for him and his party to attend any future session of the National Assembly without 
the withdrawing of Martial Law, returning of all military personnel to the barracks, 
conducting inquiries into the killings of unarmed civilians and most importantly, the 
transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Sheikh Mujib finished 
his speech by demanding independence. He said: “Our struggle now is for freedom, 
our struggle is now for independence.”70 Mujib’s call fell short of being a formal 
declaration. It was intentionally kept that way because the Pakistan Army had been 
mobilized to take up positions in multiple vantage points across Dhaka city.71 Closing 
all doors for political negotiation and issuing a unilateral declaration of independence 
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could invite a repressive and militant response from the army. It would also give 
Yahya Khan the opportunity to showcase Mujib as rash and secessionist.  
 
From 16 March, 1971 a series of meetings were held between Sheikh Mujib and Yahya 
Khan in Dhaka to reach a political settlement. As the meetings progressed it is now 
known that Yahya Khan directed his Generals to prepare the blueprint for a military 
crackdown to be effective all over East Pakistan on 25 March.72 Yahya brought in 
reinforcements of about 50,000 soldiers along with Army tanks, weapons and 
bombers.73 Air Marshall Noor Khan the former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan 
Air Force who was at the time staying at Dhaka’s Hotel Intercontinental informed Md 
Anisur Rahman and Rehman Sobhan that the Generals of West Pakistan were planning 
a “military crackdown” and that the negotiations were a “ploy to buy time for troops 
to move to East Pakistan.”74 Although this message was passed on to Sheikh Mujib, 
extensive talks were held over the next eight days and the Bengalis were given the 
impression by their counterparts from the West that an agreement on the basis of their 
demands could be met. That ‘agreement’ remained unrealized and on the night of 25 
March, 1971, the Pakistan Army with a view to crush any political aspirations of the 
Bengalis of East Pakistan initiated ‘Operation Searchlight’.75  
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The Pakistan Army in an attempt to coerce the Bengalis to subjugation applied an 
excessive use force on the ‘dark night’76 of 25 March.77 As the Pakistani troops 
ravaged Bengal, Yahya Khan flew back to Karachi. Appearing before the press, he 
condemned Sheikh Mujib as a ‘traitor’, banned the Awami League and claimed to 
‘have saved the unity of Pakistan’.78  Mujib was arrested soon after, but before his 
capture he issued a formal Declaration of Independence, which read:  
 
This may be my last message, from today Bangladesh is independent. I 
call upon the people of Bangladesh wherever you might be and with 
whatever you have, to resist the army of occupation to the last. Your fight 
must go on until the last soldier of the Pakistan occupation army is 
expelled from the soil of Bangladesh and final victory is achieved.79 
 
Members of the Awami League who had been elected to the National Assembly and 
the Provincial Assembly managed to escape and assemble in Calcutta, India. On 10 
April, 1971 the Members of the National and Provincial Assemblies formed 
themselves into a Constituent Assembly in exile and drafted the Proclamation of 
Independence.80 The Proclamation was read out on 17 April during a formal ceremony 
at Baidyanathtala of Meherpur, a district neighbouring India.81 The declaration gave 
recognition to the Declaration of Independence given by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 
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26 March, 1971 and proclaimed the Constituent Assembly as the supreme and 
sovereign authority of Bangladesh.82 The Assembly appointed Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman as the President of Bangladesh, and Tajuddin Ahmad, the General Secretary 
of the Awami League as the Prime Minister.83 In Mujib’s absence, Syed Nazrul Islam, 
a senior leader of the Awami League served as Acting President. The rationale 
supporting the Proclamation was that following the free elections held in Pakistan for 
the purposes of framing a Constitution the Assembly summoned was arbitrarily and 
illegally postponed for an indefinite period by Yahya Khan and instead of fulfilling 
the promises made, the Pakistan authorities imposed an unjust and treacherous war, 
leaving no choice for the representatives of Bangladesh to constitute themselves into 
a Constituent Assembly and declare independence.84 The fact that the elected 
representatives of East Pakistan had won an overwhelming landslide victory 
substantiated the claim that they represented the entire people of the region.85 The 
Proclamation of Independence was applied retroactively from 26 March, 1971 and 
played a pivotal role in establishing a chain of command that would lead the ensuing 
conflict. War had been thrust upon the Bengalis and in the following nine months they 
waged a war of liberation war against the Pakistan army. It was their success in this 
war that cemented the existence of Bangladesh as a nation-state.86  
 
2. The nature and scale of crimes committed against the Bengalis by the Pakistan 
Army and its auxiliary forces in 1971 
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From the very beginning of the war there were serious concerns that crimes were being 
committed by the Pakistan Army and its local auxiliaries. This part substantiates that 
crimes at the scale of international crimes were committed against the Bengalis during 
the war of 1971, confirming a genuine cause for seeking justice in Bangladesh. Groups 
that were particularly targeted included supporters of the Awami League, Bengali 
academics and Hindus. The sources supporting these claims in the first instance 
include eye-witness testimonies, newspaper reports authored by foreign 
correspondents who covered the war, reports of proceedings of legislative and judicial 
bodies of foreign States and reports published by international organisations. It notes 
that although the extent of crimes has been disputed in some quarters, this is not 
something that is seriously denied in academia. This part also identifies the Razakars, 
Al Badr and Al Shams, many of whose members came from the political party known 
as Jamaat-e-Islami, as the auxiliaries of the Pakistan Army.  
 
2.1 A reign of terror against the Bengalis  
 
Major Abu Taher, a Bengali officer and commando of the elite Special Services Group 
(SSG) of the Pakistan Army, who eventually escaped to command the largest sector 
of the Bangladesh forces during the war, was stranded in West Pakistan on the night 
of 25 March. He recalled: “The barbaric purpose of the Military Junta was not 
unknown to us who were in West Pakistan, when from General Headquarters of the 
Pakistan Army the message went out: ‘Burn everything, kill everyone in sight.”87 The 
first set of documents that recorded the atrocities of the Pakistan Army were a set of 
                                                
87 Lifschultz (n 26) 77.  
 43 
“dissenting cables” wired by Archer Blood, the then United States Consul General 
based in Dhaka, to the American government.88 The cable sent out on 28 March 1971 
the subject of which was “selective genocide” concisely described the nature of the 
atrocities. It read:  
 
Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by 
the Pak military. Evidence constitutes to mount that the MLA authorities 
have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically 
eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down. 
[…] Among those marked for extinction in addition to A.L. hierarchy, are 
student leaders and university faculty. […] Moreover, with support of Pak 
military, non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s 
quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. Streets of Dacca are aflood 
with Hindus and others seeking to get out of Dacca. […] Full horror of 
Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner or later.89 
 
In an attempt to prevent the news of atrocities from being communicated to the rest of 
the world, Pakistani military authorities rounded up all foreign journalists present at 
the time and confined them inside Dhaka’s Hotel Intercontinental before having them 
expelled from the country altogether on 27 March, 1971. Simon Dring, a reporter 
working with the Daily Telegraph had to hide in the lobby, kitchen and rooftop of the 
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Intercontinental for 32 hours to evade the roundup and expulsion.90 Accompanied by 
Michel Laurent a French war photographer working for the Associated Press, Dring 
roamed the streets of Dhaka and beyond and witnessed firsthand the brutalities that 
were taking place accounts of which were published by the Daily Telegraph on 30 
March, 1971. 91 Another report published on the same day read: 
 
Caught completely by surprise, some 200 students were killed in Iqbal 
Hall, headquarters of the militantly anti-government student’s union, I was 
told. Two days later, bodies were still smoldering in burnt-out rooms, 
others were scattered outside, more floated in a nearby lake, and an art 
student lay sprawled across his easel. The military removed many of the 
bodies, but the 30 bodies still there could never have accounted for all the 
blood in the corridors of Iqbal Hall. At another hall, reportedly, soldiers 
buried the dead in a hastily dug mass grave which was then bulldozed over 
by tanks.92 
 
Within the larger narrative of a ruthless military campaign, the Pakistan Army as 
depicted by Archer Blood systematically targeted Bengali students and academics, 
“candidates and all levels of leadership”93 of the banned Awami League and the Hindu 
religious minority. One of the first targets of the Pakistan army was Dhaka University 
- the intellectual hub of the region, which had been the haven of multiple student led 
movements against the oppressive policies and actions of the government in West 
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Pakistan.94 An American citizen, who for the purposes of keeping open the chance of 
being able to return to Bangladesh and wished to remain unnamed, was evacuated to 
Karachi on 4 April, 1971. Interviewed by journalist V.M. Nair, the American informed 
that he was carrying a 24-paged account of the massacre that was going on in 
Bangladesh.95 Residing in East Pakistan throughout the entire period of March 1971 
he confirmed the killings of at least thirty-two Professors and Heads of Department.96 
Some of them had been picked up from their homes and shot afterwards.97 Reuters 
correspondent Howard Whitten reported that members of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami 
League were shot like dogs.98 With regard to the targeting of Awami Leaguers a 
European based in Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh said, “You merely had to 
point someone as a suspect for him to be finished off and many old scores are 
repaid.”99  
 
Odhir Chandra Dey, a Hindu boy was seven years old on the night of 25 March, 1971. 
His whole family was murdered in cold-blood by the Pakistan Army because his 
Father, Modhushudon Dey owned a restaurant inside the Dhaka University campus 
where students gathered for “political discussions”.100 Scarred for life, Dey recalled: 
 
Six to seven soldiers had gotten into our house and they started destroying 
all our belongings. […] Ranjit-da rushed to the spot and said, “Rina! Rina! 
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Hold up your hands!” […] As soon as he said it, the soldiers turned back 
and shot him. […] The bullet pierced my brother’s chest and came out 
through his neck, and then hit the cheek of Ranu-didi. […] After that, the 
military shot my boudi. She was pregnant then. […] Then they snatched 
the earrings of my boudi from her ears. […] When the military aimed their 
gun to shoot my father, my mother ran to him and stood in front of him 
spreading her hands. She begged the military, “You have ruined me! You 
killed my son, my daughter-in-law. Don’t kill him, I beg for his life!” They 
did not pay heed to her appeal, and instead ordered to go away. They tried 
to drag her forcibly but failed. Lastly, out of rage, they cut both of her 
hands with a bayonet. Her hands got totally dispersed and were hanging 
just on the skin. Even after she died, they shot her body several times in 
front of my father. Father also got shot. Both bodies were wet with 
blood.101 
 
It was evident that the Pakistani military authorities were applying brute force to 
suppress the Bengali population into subjugation. The accounts of Henrik Van der 
Heijden an economist of the Pakistan Division of the IBRD were published in ‘A 
Thousand My Lais – World Bank Study on Bangladesh’. Heijden had toured 
Bangladesh in June 1971. Heijden described Khulna, a district located in the southwest 
region of Bangladesh felt like a town from the Second World War that had undergone 
strategic bomb attacks.102 Their ultimate goal, however, remained undisclosed until 
the publication of a four-paged articled titled ‘Genocide’ in The Sunday Times on July 
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13, 1971.103 Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani journalist who was treated as a guest 
by the army and with their assistance had toured East Pakistan to gather a picture of 
the ongoing military campaign, penned the report. ‘Genocide’ has been praised in the 
BBC as “one of the most influential pieces of South Asian journalism of the past half 
century”.104 In it, Mascarenhas succinctly summarized the policy that defined Yahya 
Khan’s strategy:  
 
The Pakistan Government’s policy for East Bengal was spelled out to me 
in the Eastern Command Headquarters at Dacca. It has 3 elements:  
 
(i)   the Bengalis had proved themselves ‘unreliable’ and must be 
ruled by West Pakistanis; 
(ii)   the Bengalis will have to be re-educated along proper Islamic 
lines. The ‘Islamisation of the masses’ – this is official jargon – is 
intended to eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide a strong 
religious bond with West Pakistan;  
(iii)   when the Hindus have been eliminated by death and flight their 
property will be utilized as a golden carrot to win over the base for 
erecting administrative and political structures in the future.105 
 
The superpowers of the world stood divided on the question of liberation of the 
Bengalis and the existence of an independent Bangladesh. While India and the Soviet 
                                                
103 Anthony Mascarenhas, ‘Genocide’ The Sunday Times (London, 13 June 1971) < 
http://tarekfatah.com/genocide-the-june-1971-article-about-pakistans-mass-murders-in-east-pakistan-
by-tony-mascarenhas-in-londons-sunday-times-that-woke-up-the-world/ > accessed 22 January 2014.   
104 Mark Dummett, ‘Bangladesh War: The Article that Changed History’ BBC News (London, 16 
December 2011) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16207201 > accessed 22 January 2014.  
105 Mascarenhas (n 103).   
 48 
Union recognised the political aspirations of the Bengalis, the United States came to 
the aid of Pakistan.106 Kalyan K. Chaudhuri has argued that although victory of the 
Bengalis was inevitable, had it not been for the direct military support of the Indian 
Government and the diplomatic support of the Soviet Union at the UN Security 
Council, the Bengalis struggle for liberation would have turned into a “long-drawn 
armed struggle”.107 In early December 1971, the Indian Army directly intervened in 
support of the Bengalis which catalysed the war to its conclusion on 16 December 
1971.108 This was marked by the surrender of 92,000 members of the Pakistan army 
to the joint command of the Bangladesh and Indian forces.109 The victory of the 
Bengalis is largely attributed to their overwhelming participation in the war and the 
support they received from the neighbouring Indian Army.110 In January 1972, all 
Pakistani POWs were transferred to war camps in India.111 During the course of the 
war 10 million people fled across the border into India as refugees.112 American 
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Senator William B Saxbe who visited the refugee camps during the war recalled: “You 
and I know when we visited these refugee camps, and I am sure Senator Kennedy saw 
the same thing. There were no young girls in those camps. You didn’t see one. And 
now the truth is that they were kidnapped, held in brothels, held in camps, that they 
were murdered, and the extent of this atrocity is not known to the world.”113 
 
Local newspapers reported on 21 December, 1971 that in a last ditch attempt to cripple 
of the Bangladesh economy, the Pakistan army had set fire to Rupees worth 100/- 
crore.114 The Pravda, on 3 January, 1972 reported the loss of three million lives at the 
hands of the Pakistan army.115 Reverend Kentaro Buma an Asian relief secretary for 
the World Council of Churches learned first-hand the state of affairs during a two-
week mission in war torn Bangladesh. Upon his return to Geneva, Buma on 17 
January, 1972 held a press conference where he informed 200,000 women had been 
raped by Pakistani soldiers and they were now being ostracized by the Bengali Muslim 
community.116 Buma further informed that the Mujib government was countering the 
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situation by glorifying the rape victims as national heroines and trying its best – albeit 
without much success - to break the age-old conservative tradition of not taking back 
a woman who had been touched by ‘another’ man.117 Although Reverend Buma had 
based his numbers on government estimates, in reality, how many females were 
sexually abused at the hands of the Pakistan military may never be known. A War 
Rehabilitation Organization led by Justice K.M. Sobhan was formed in war-torn 
Bangladesh. Malekha Khan, a social worker assisting the rehabilitation process 
informed that no lists of the raped women were prepared because of societal 
pressures.118 Maleka had herself read depositions of more than 5,000 women who had 
been sexually exploited.119 Geoffrey Davis, a medical graduate from Australia, arrived 
in Bangladesh in March 1972 under the auspices of International Planned Parenthood, 
the UNFPA and the WHO.120 Davis stayed in Bangladesh for six months during which 
he conducted numerous abortions and at the same time offered training on proper 
abortion procedures and techniques. His experiences led him to conclude that the 
government estimate of 200,000 rapes was a conservative one. Davis interviewed 
many Pakistani POWs who were behind bars at a prison in Comilla.121 These 
interviews revealed that they were under instructions from the top brass of the Pakistan 
army that a good Muslim was duty bound to fight anyone other than his father.122 This 
prompted them to impregnate as many Bengali women as they could so that there 
would be a whole generation of children in East Pakistan would be born with West 
Pakistani blood.123 A correspondent of the Times in ‘Pakistan: The Ravaging of 
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Golden Bengal’ quoted a US official admitting that what the Bengalis had endured 
was “the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland.”124 A 
recent publication has revealed the presence of at least 618 mass graves throughout 
Bangladesh resulting from the atrocities of the Pakistan army and its auxiliaries.125 
 
Therefore, while drawing clear lines between right and wrong may not be an easy task 
when interpreting modern day wars, many observers were able to take a clear position 
about the war that took place in 1971, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.126 
British MP Reg Prentice as a member of a parliamentary delegation visited both wings 
of Pakistan. In July 1971 urging that the time for “diplomatic niceties” was over, 
Prentice stressed the need to “stand up and be counted” by identifying with the 
“aspirations of the people of Bangladesh”.127 From 18-20 September, 1971, during a 
two-day international conference held in New Delhi, more than one hundred and fifty 
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delegates from twenty four countries gathered together to extend their support to the 
struggle for freedom of the Bengalis.128 On 25 January, 1972, the Berkeley South Asia 
Student Group issued a position paper titled ‘United States Policy in South Asia, 1971: 
A Tragic Failure’. The authors of the paper, Ralph H Retzlaff and Thomas A Metcalf, 
Professors of Political Science and History at Berkeley wrote: 
 
The Bengali populace as a whole was subjected to a virtual reign of terror. 
[…] Pakistan’s actions throughout this long and bloody period were 
repeatedly described as genocide – by news reporters from many nations, 
by leading members of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, 
and, it later developed, by the U.S. Consul General in Dacca at the time, 
Archer Blood. Whether the term “genocide” strictly appropriate to these 
events or not, there can be no doubt that the Pakistani authorities had 
embarked upon a carefully thought out plan of exterminating the 
intellectual and professional elite of East Bengal, and of cowing the 
remainder of the population by terror and intimidation.129 
 
The crimes of the Pakistan Army and its auxiliaries were elaborately discussed at the 
hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on 6-7 
March 1972. Echoing the Pravda and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Senator Edward 
Kennedy stated that up to three million lives had perished during the war.130 Some 
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academics have challenged the Bengali peoples claim to victimhood. Among them, 
Indian author Sarmila Bose in ‘Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh 
War’ offered an alternative narrative to mainstream historical accounts. Bose 
challenged the ‘criminal’ image and portrayed a humane side of the Pakistan Army.131 
She also placed emphasis on the acts of violence against Biharis by Bengalis and 
argued that the number of Bengali victims was much less than what has been 
claimed.132 Bose’s research methodology and findings have been described as “deeply 
problematic” and critiqued in the works of Srinath Raghavan, Nayanika Mookherjee 
and Naeem Mohaiemen.133 Arnold Zeitlin who served as the Bureau Chief of 
Associated Press (AP) in Pakistan during 1971 described Bose’s effort as “ingenuous 
- in terms of artless and naive” and that it was a distortion of history instead of being 
a revision of history.134 Within the words of Zeitlin and others, the grieving Bengalis 
whose pains and sacrifices the world seemed to have forgotten, found a distant yet 
assertive voice of acknowledgement and support. This, however, does not negate the 
fact that violence was committed against Biharis by Bengalis and vice versa during 
scattered but nevertheless real instances of communal riots, mob violence and 
reprisals.135 The International Commission of Jurists published a report in 1972 titled 
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‘The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 A Legal Study’. The report acknowledged the 
directives and efforts of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League in containing 
violence against the Bihari community during and after the war.136 In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, the Mujib Bahini137 was commended by the foreign press for its 
role in protecting the Biharis from reprisals.138 
 
With regard to the death toll, the report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission (HRC), 
a commission constituted in Pakistan claimed that the death toll of 3 million as alleged 
by Bangladesh was highly exaggerated, and the accurate number was approximately 
26,000.139 The Commission led by the Chief Justice of Pakistan had completed 
drafting its supplementary report in 1974. Among other things, the Commission 
recommended that the Pakistan government set up a high-powered court or 
commission of inquiry to investigate allegations and to hold trials of those “who 
indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to the Pakistan Army and alienated 
the sympathies of the local population by their acts of wanton cruelty and immorality 
against our own people.”140 The report was immediately shelved and classified.141 In 
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1998, Bangladeshi historian and Professor of Dhaka University Muntassir Mamoon 
visited Pakistan. Mamoon interviewed the top Pakistani officials of the military and 
civilian administration who were present in Dhaka during the 1971 war.142 Among 
them, the only one who condemned the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army 
was Syed Alamdar Raza.143 Raza, the last Pakistani Commissioner of Dhaka, had filed 
a writ petition before the Pakistan High Court petitioning the release of the Hamoodur 
Rahman Commission report and also seeking punishment for those who were 
responsible for stalling its publication.144 Finally in 2000, after nearly two and a half 
decades, the government of Pakistan declassified the HRC report.145  
 
2.2 Local collaborators – the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al Shams  
 
The liberation war of Bangladesh lasted nine months during which the Pakistan 
military authorities found an ally in a group of local Bengalis belonging mainly to a 
right-wing Islamist party known as East Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami.146 Despite 
commanding negligible popular support throughout the conflict zone,147 Jamaat 
contributed significantly in the formation of the Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams as 
auxiliary forces of the Pakistan Army.148 These auxiliary forces actively provided 
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local support to the Pakistan Army and collaborated with it in the commission of 
crimes throughout the nine month long war.149 It also played a key role in the 
formation of local ‘Peace Committees’ that facilitated the above-mentioned 
auxiliaires.150 
 
On 1 June, 1971, General Tikka Khan the Governor of East Pakistan issued the East 
Pakistan Razakars Ordinance, 1971 repealing the Ansars Act, 1948 with the view to 
provide for the constitution of a voluntary force called Razakars.151 By July 1971, the 
Pakistan army had recruited at least 5000 persons they believed to be “good chaps, 
good Muslims and loyal Pakistanis” into the Razakars.152 They were paid three rupees 
a day and received fifteen days training of learning how to shoot a police Lee-Enfield 
rifle.153 Several months later in September 1971, members of the Razakars were given 
enhanced powers comparable to members of the Pakistan Army through another 
Ordinance.154 The duties of the Razakars included but were not limited to performing 
“security checks” and guiding the Pakistani troops to the homes of supporters of the 
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Awami League.155 A ‘scorched earth policy’ was adopted during joint operations 
between the Pakistan military and the Razakars.156 Many members of the Razakars 
also came from the local Urdu speaking Bihari157 community in Bangladesh.158 In a 
letter by Badiul Alam, Secretary of the district Peace Committee of Chittagong during 
1971, addressed to the Pakistani military authorities, he wrote on how to “eliminate 
the miscreants and to stop the anti-state activities in the city”159 by involving the 
Razakars. The ‘miscreants’ referred to Alam’s letter were those who represented the 
general masses of East Pakistan fighting to liberate Bangladesh. Alam wrote, “[…] all 
doubtful houses and buildings of the whole city should be cordoned at a time from 
morning to night by organising the under mentioned patriotic forces … 1) Local 
Rezakars [sic] who were trained up (embodied or unembodied) […]”.160  
 
Ghulam Azam as the Ameer of the East Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami was one of the 
central figures offering key leadership to the auxiliaries. During a relentless yet 
ineffective campaign to sway the sentiments of the Bengali people against liberation, 
Azam and his cohorts argued that ‘Islam’ was being endangered through the Bengali 
struggle for liberation. During a press conference organized at the Jamaat-e-Islami 
office in Karachi, Ghulam Azam praised the role played by the Razakars. He said: “A 
good Muslim cannot be a supporter of the so called ‘Bangladesh movement’. The one-
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minded and patriotic citizens are working to eliminate the separatists of East Pakistan. 
The Razakars are also doing a very good job.”161 
 
The Razakars were divided into two wings, the Al Badr and the Al Shams.162 During 
the second week of December 1971 when victory of the Bengalis appeared to be 
inevitable, the Al Badr – whose recruits originated from the Islami Chatra Shangha 
(ICS) the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, went out on calculated killing missions 
targeting eminent Bengali intellectuals.163 The study conducted by the International 
Commission of Jurists in 1972 described the modus operandi of the Al Badr in the 
following manner:  
 
The Al Badr raids were carried out at night, the victims being led away 
blindfolded at gun point, never to return. Many were taken to the Dacca 
College of Physical Education building. A janitor at the College stated 
‘They brought in hundreds of people, all nicely dressed and tied up. We 
could hear the screaming all the time from the rooms.’ The victims were 
later taken in trucks to a deserted brickyard near Mohammedpur.164 
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before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate 92nd Congress, March 6 and 7, 1972’ 
(n 113) 30.  
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These killings crippled the Bengali intelligentsia. According to Ahmed Ziauddin the 
founder of the Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies, the Al Badr was “a Gestapo 
like organisation”.165  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter demonstrates that the cultural domination and economic exploitation 
suffered by the Bengalis of the eastern wing at the hands of the Punjabi dominated 
western wing finally led to calls for independence and a backlash by the West Pakistan 
military. It was during this conflict that the Pakistan Army and its local auxiliaries 
inflicted mass atrocities against the Bengali people, which though disputed in some 
quarters is not seriously denied. The commission of these atrocities resulted in State 
led initiatives immediately after the conclusion of the war to hold the perpetrators 
responsible for their crimes.  
 
The following chapter offers a legal and political history of the justice initiatives set 
in motion by the government of newly independent Bangladesh when it enacted the 
Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order in 1972 and the International 
Crimes (Tribunals) Act in 1973. By encompassing the political developments of the 
four following decades this chapter then goes on to explain how and why successive 
governments failed to sustain and complete the justice processes that were set in 
motion in the early 1970s. It was this failure that nurtured and in the end cemented a 
                                                
165 Ahmed (n 115) 95. 
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deeply ingrained culture of impunity in Bangladesh, which was challenged for the first 
time in 2010 with the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunal.
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Chapter II  
The search for justice and Bangladesh’s culture of impunity 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter, covering the period between 1947 and 1971, explained the 
circumstances leading to the “disintegration of Pakistan” and the birth of Bangladesh 
as a “nation state”.1 It offered an account of the nature and extent of the crimes 
committed by the Pakistan Army and their auxiliary forces2 during the war of 1971, 
crimes of a level that would qualify as international crimes by any standard. In two 
parts, this chapter traces a host of local and international factors which thwarted the 
implementation of any meaningful and effective judicial mechanism aimed at 
delivering justice to the victims for the greater part of four decades. It argues that if 
there is to be an end to impunity for the crimes committed, the International Crimes 
Tribunals (ICTs) most likely represent the last opportunity to deliver justice to victims 
of 1971. Part I examines two justice initiatives that were set in motion in the early 
1970s after the war. It explains why those initiatives failed and identifies the causes 
of a deeply rooted culture of impunity in Bangladesh. Part II gives an account of 
powerful civil society movements from the 1990s which gave voice to victims’ 
demands for justice and pin points the year 2010 as the moment when the culture of 
impunity in Bangladesh was challenged for the first time in nearly four decades with 
the establishment of the first ICT. 
 
                                                
1 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Columbia University Press 1972) Preface.  
2 The role played by the auxiliary forces comprising of the Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams had been 
discussed in Part 2.2 of Chapter I.   
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1. The search for justice after 1971  
 
This part gives an account of how the volatile situation which prevailed throughout 
Bangladesh during the months immediately following the surrender of the Pakistan 
Army was handled by the Bangladesh Government. It documents the demands of the 
Bengali people to try members of the Pakistan Army and their auxiliary forces and 
discusses the incomplete and unsuccessful justice initiatives set up through the 
Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 (Collaborators Order) and 
the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICTA).3 It identifies the amnesties and 
clemencies granted by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1973, the Tripartite Agreement 
between Bangladesh, India and Pakistan in 1974, the unconditional release of all 
serious offenders convicted under the Collaborators Order after December 1975 and 
the political rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-Islami by military dictators Ziaur Rahman and 
Hussain Muhammad Ershad and former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, as the 
four main causes of the culture of impunity in Bangladesh. 
 
1.1 Justice versus revenge in independent Bangladesh 
 
After the surrender of the Pakistan Army and its auxiliary forces, the “euphoric 
celebration”4 of the Bengali people was marred by the realization that their “liberation 
struggle” the ultimate achievement of which was the creation of an “independent, 
                                                
3 Muntassir Mamoon, ‘Collaborators Tribunal Order, 1972’ (Banglapedia, 26 May 2015) < 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Collaborators_Tribunal_Order,_1972 > accessed 15 March 
2017; The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 [ACT NO. XIX OF 1973] < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=435 > accessed 6 May 2014.  
4 ‘Dacca Reported Quiet’ New York Times (New York, 20 December 1971). 
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sovereign People’s Republic of Bangladesh”,5 had come at the expense of 
immeasurable human sacrifice and destruction.6 Demands to detain, try and punish the 
perpetrators of mass atrocities gained momentum. There were also well-grounded 
fears that local collaborators who had not surrendered or managed to flee would be 
victims of reprisals by Bengali mobs.7  
 
After the signing of the Instrument of Surrender on 16 December, 1971, the 
Bangladesh government faced a set of delicate and competing responsibilities. These 
included, among others, the prevention of reprisals against local collaborators of the 
Pakistan Army and the setting up of judicial systems to try persons responsible for the 
atrocities of 1971. Throughout the war, non-Bengali minority groups particularly the 
Biharis, had enlisted in the Razakars, actively collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 
its onslaught against the Bengali people and in some cases had taken over their 
property, businesses and jobs.8 Prior to the surrender of the Pakistan Army, there were 
legitimate fears that the Bengalis would take revenge on “non-Bengali ‘Quislings’, 
stray West Pakistan soldiers and pro-Government ‘Razakar’ militia men”.9 This 
necessitated the signing of a pact between the governments of Bangladesh and India 
                                                
5 Bangladesh Awami League, ‘Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at a Press Conference in London’ 
(20 November 2013) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Gi5VkMxLsA > accessed 15 March 2017. 
6 Anthony Lewis, ‘After Freedom Flight to London Mujibur Due in Dacca Today; Appeals for 
Recognition, Aid’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on Bangladesh Liberation War (Amader 
Bangla Press 1989) 404; Aubrey Menen, ‘The Rapes of Bangladesh’ New York Times (New York, 23 
July 1972).  
7 James P Sterba, ‘Dacca at War: Mixture of Calm and Confusion’ New York Times (New York, 11 
December 1971); ‘Bangladesh Now’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A 
Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin Publications 1999) 589; ‘The Aftermath of 
War’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen by the 
World Press (Momin Publications 1999) 617.   
8 Gary J Bass, The Blood Telegram – Nixon, Kissinger and A Forgotten Genocide (Knopf Publishing 
Group 2013) 84; Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose, War and Secession – Pakistan, India, and the 
Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press 1990) 163 & 165.  
9 ‘Bangladesh Pact Signed’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on Bangladesh Liberation War 
(Amader Bangla Press 1989) 369; Sydney H Schanberg, ‘Two Men at a Table’ New York Times (New 
York, 17 December 1971).  
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allowing Indian troops to work in concert with the Mukti Bahini10 and the Bangladesh 
Army to “restore conditions of normalcy” and protect everyone in the areas under their 
control from “mob violence”.11 Leaders of Bangladesh’s Provisional Government 
made repeated appeals to the Bengali people not to take the law into their own hands, 
and pledged that a “special war tribunal” would be established to try “traitors and 
Pakistani collaborators”.12 On 13 December, 1971, the Cabinet of the Provisional 
Government authorized local authorities to arrange for the “immediate arrest and safe 
custody of collaborators pending trial”.13 The Inter-Continental Hotel, Holy Family 
Hospital and Notre Dame College were designated as “neutral areas” in Dhaka where 
officials of the former East Pakistani administration who had allegedly collaborated 
with the Pakistan Army were kept for their protection.14 Determined to prevent 
“summary executions and bloody reprisals” the Instrument of Surrender signed 
between the Pakistan, Indian and Bangladesh Forces on 16 December, 1971 gave a 
“solemn assurance” that all Pakistani military and paramilitary forces who surrendered 
would be “treated with dignity and respect […] in accordance with the provisions of 
the Geneva Convention” and their “safety and well-being” would be guaranteed.15 
                                                
10 The Mukti Bahini was the name given to the forces of Bangladesh which fought against the Pakistan 
Army and its auxiliaries in 1971. See, Helal Uddin Ahmed, ‘Mukti Bahini’ (Banglapedia) < 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Mukti_Bahini > accessed 23 September 2017. 
11 ‘Bangladesh Pact Signed’ (n 9) 369.  
12 Peter Gill, ‘Independent Bangladesh Government Takes Over in Jessore – Drive to Restore Law and 
Order First Priority’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on Bangladesh Liberation War (Amader 
Bangla Press 1989) 372; ‘Appeal Against Reprisals’ New York Times (New York, 28 December 1971).  
13 ‘Appendix Dha – Extracts from the Minutes and Decisions of the Cabinet Meeting held on December 
13, 1971’ in Muyeedul Hasan, Muldhara ’71 (University Press Limited 2012) 291.  
14 ‘India in Red Cross Accord’ New York Times (New York, 15 December 1971); Fox Butterfield, ‘India 
Weighs Bengali Plea To try Pakistani Officials’ New York Times (New York, 27 December 1971); 
‘Dacca Reported Quiet’ (n 2); John Humphreys, ‘The Last Days of Dacca’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), 
Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin Publications, 
1999) 717-718.  
15 Charles Mohr, ‘Dacca Captured – Guns Quiet in Bengali Area but War Goes On at Western Front’ 
New York Times (New York, 17 December 1971); ‘Text of Instrument of Surrender’ in Hasan Hafizur 
Rahman (ed), History of Bangladesh War of Independence: Documents (Vol 7, Ministry of Information 
– Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1984) 290. 
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Protection was also pledged to “foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of 
West Pakistan origin”.16  
 
After the surrender ceremony, Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora the General 
Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and Bangladesh Forces voiced his 
concerns about the volatile mood that prevailed in Bangladesh. Aurora said: “[The 
security of the Pakistani prisoners of war] has now become my responsibility. We will 
move them into India as soon as we can. It is the local populace, not the Mukti Bahini, 
that I am worried about.”17 Although Bangladesh was not at the time a Party to the 
Geneva Conventions, its Provisional Government declared with immediate effect that 
it would honour the Conventions relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and 
civilians and all principles of the United Nations Charter.18 Similar assurances came 
from the Mukti Bahini and orders to ensure the protection of prisoners of war were 
issued to its forces.19  
 
While the governments of Bangladesh and India had assured to protect “foreign 
nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of West Pakistan origin” as well as members 
of Pakistan’s military and para-military forces who surrendered, they did not want to 
be accused of “harboring men” who had committed “horrendous crimes”.20 The 
assurances of safety ran parallel with the reality that the Bengalis held feelings of deep 
                                                
16 ‘Text of Instrument of Surrender’ (n 15) 290. 
17 Henry Stanhope, ‘India and Pakistan – Pakistan Strategy at Fault, Says Gen. Aurora’ in Maudood 
Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin 
Publications 1999) 606.  
18 ‘Bangladesh to Observe Geneva Convention’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on Bangladesh 
Liberation War (Amader Bangla Press 1989) 383-384; ‘Pledge on Preventing Reprisals’ in Maudood 
Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin 
Publications 1999) 595-596. 
19 ‘Pledge on Preventing Reprisals’ ibid 596. 
20 ‘Text of Instrument of Surrender’ (n 15) 290; Fox Butterfield, ‘India Weighs Bengali Plea To Try 
Pakistani Officials’ (n 14).  
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resentment against not just the Pakistan Army but also its local collaborators.21 
Although the war was officially over, armed members from the Razakars, Al Badr and 
the Bihari community had entrenched themselves particularly in two suburbs of Dhaka 
and continued to fire upon Bengalis till March 1972. 22 This problem was compounded 
within a week of signing the Instrument of Surrender when mass graves were 
discovered throughout the country and bodies of several hundred Bengali intellectuals 
who had been “bayoneted, choked or shot” by the Pakistan Army and the Al Badr 
were found dumped in ditches.23 Bengalis started to take part in reprisals and revenge 
killings “despite India’s restraining military presence” and pacifying their unstable 
and violent mood was by no means an easy task.24  
 
One of the worst incidents of this kind took place on 18 December, 1971 when a 
Bengali guerilla leader and self-styled “General” named Abdul Kader Siddique and 
                                                
21 A report published in The Times on December 22, 1971 read: “Mr Sarin [correspondent of the Indian 
Express] quoted one Bengali woman as saying: “India may be bound by the Geneva Convention, but 
the people of Bangladesh have no such obligations. Our wounds are still too deep and our thirst for the 
enemy’s blood has yet to be quenched. Mr Sarin said that the signs of revenge were “unmistakable” 
and there had been quite a few incidents in Dacca during the past 48 hours.” – See, ‘Guerillas Join 
Hunt for the ‘Tiger’’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as 
Seen by the World Press (Momin Publications 1999) 665; Khushwant Singh, ‘Homecoming in 
Bangladesh – Some Hindus say: “If you have been bitten by a snake you are scared by a rope”’ The 
New York Times (New York, 30 January 1972).   
22 Sydney H Schanberg, ‘Bengalis Put Casualties At 100 in Dacca Fighting’ New York Times (New 
York, 3 February 1972); ‘Dacca Suburb Site of Sporadic Fighting’ New York Times (New York, 4 
February 1972); ‘Toll in a Bengali-Bihari Clash Is Put at 200 Killed or Injured’ New York Times (New 
York, 14 March 1972); Sydney H Schanberg, ‘Bengalis Ashamed Of Burst of Revenge Against the 
Biharis’ New York Times (New York, 17 March 1972); ‘Bengali Backlash’ New York Times (New York, 
19 March 1972); Sohul Ahmed, ‘Zahir Raihan: Nikhoj o Opekkhar Hajar Bochor’ bdnews24 (Dhaka, 
20 August 2016) < http://opinion.bdnews24.com/bangla/archives/38705 > accessed 9 April 2017. 
23 Eastern News Agency, ‘Bangladesh 1971 Intellectual Killings Trauma’ (8 February 2015) < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hEVjiQ0X_8 > accessed 6 April 2017; Fox Butterfield, ‘A 
Journalist Is Linked To Murder of Bengalis’ New York Times (New York, 3 January 1972); ‘Dacca 
Murders Exposed – Bengal’s Elite Dead in a Ditch’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on 
Bangladesh Liberation War (Amader Bangla Press 1989) 393; ‘125 Slain in Dacca Area Believed Elite 
of Bengal’ New York Times (New York, 19 December 1971).  
24 David Loshak, ‘How India Won 14-Day War’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – 
A Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin Publications, 1999) 655; ‘Bangladesh: 
Peril of Delay’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen 
by the World Press (Momin Publications 1999) 660; Sydney H Schanberg, ‘Bengalis Land a Vast 
Cemetery’ New York Times (New York, 24 January 1972).  
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several men under his command bayoneted four alleged collaborators to death at a 
public rally in Dhaka in front of thousands of people and foreign journalists.25 
Moments earlier, Siddique had urged the attendees of the rally “to preserve calm and 
discipline and not to take the law into their own hands” but changed his position after 
being swayed by the “popular demand” for revenge.26 Following calls for his 
immediate arrest by the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini, a “look alike” of Siddique 
was detained while the real Siddique escaped and took refuge amongst 16,000 guerilla 
fighters under his command in Tangail where he had fought during the war.27 After 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh in January 1972, Siddique was 
pardoned and he re-emerged free as a “hero of the freedom movement”.28 
Nevertheless, in the months following the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, most 
independent observers concluded that the Bengalis did not engage in “widespread 
revenge killing” and that the scale of violence against Biharis had been “relatively 
minor” and far less than many expected.29 This came as a direct consequence of the 
protection offered to the Biharis by the armies of India and Bangladesh, Mukti Bahini 
and the Mujib Bahini as well as the adoption of unconventional measures to ensure 
                                                
25 ‘The Kaderia Incident and Formal Surrender on 19th Dec’ (21 May 2012) < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y__EoP5lM_8 > accessed 10 April, 2017; Horst Faas and Michel 
Laurent, ‘4 Tortured, Slain at Dacca Rally’ New York Times (New York, 20 December 1971); ‘India 
Censors Execution Photos As Harmful to ‘National Interest’’ New York Times (New York, 21 
December 1971); Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (1st edn, Zed Press 
1979) 64.  
26 Faas and Laurent (n 25); Horst Faas and Michel Laurent, ‘Torture and Execution After Bangla Desh 
War’ Chicago Tribune (20 December 1971); James Yuenger, ‘Indians Protect Pakistanis from 
Reprisals’ Chicago Tribune (20 December 1971); H S Kler, 12 Days to Dacca (Deejay Kler 2015) 73; 
Yasmin Saikia, Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971 (Duke University 
Press 2011) 257-258. 
27 H S Kler, 12 Days to Dacca (Deejay Kler 2015) 73. 
28 ibid.  
29 Schanberg, ‘Bengalis Ashamed Of Burst of Revenge Against the Biharis’ (n 22); Indira Gandhi, ‘A 
Word to America’ in Indira Gandhi (ed), India and Bangladesh – Selected Speeches and Statements 
March to December 1971 (Orient Longman 1972) 160; Gary J Bass, ‘Bargaining Away Justice – India, 
Pakistan, and the International Politics of Impunity for the Bangladesh Genocide’ (2016) 41 (2) 
International Security 140, 156. 
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their safety, which included housing Bihari families inside jails throughout 
Bangladesh.30 
 
As the reprisals and private acts of retribution began to subside, the demand for formal 
trials of members of the Pakistan military and their local collaborators gained 
momentum.31 The decision to arrange for trials of local collaborators was taken by the 
Cabinet of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh several days prior to the end of 
the war on 13 December, 1971.32 It was proposed that a committee of jurists and legal 
experts constituted under the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs would advise 
the government as to whether or not there existed the need to draft a new law in order 
for the trials to move forward.33 On 23 December, 1971, the Cabinet decided to arrest 
several categories of people, which included among others, “political leaders who 
collaborated with the enemy to suppress the people’s liberation war”, “individuals 
who committed crimes against humanity in collaboration with the enemy”, “members 
of such organization as ‘Al-Badr’ and ‘Al-Shams’” etc.34 The first arrests took place 
the following day with the detention of Abdul Mutaleb Malik the former governor of 
                                                
30 The Mujib Bahini was an armed guerrilla force that fought alongside the Mukti Bahini. It was 
comprised of political activists of the Awami League and its student front the Chhatra League. For 
further information on the Mujib Bahini, see, Helal Uddin Ahmed, ‘Mujib Bahini’ (Banglapedia, 4 
March 2015) < http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Mujib_Bahini > accessed 6 April 2017; 
James P Sterba, ‘Joy and Marigolds’ New York Times (New York, 17 December 1971); ‘Mujib’s Road 
from Prison to Power’ in Maudood Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events 
as Seen by the World Press (Momin Publications 1999) 692. 
31 Fox Butterfield, ‘Demands for trials: India Weighs Bengali Plea To Try Pakistani Officials’ New 
York Times (New York, 27 December 1971); Eastern News Agency, ‘Dalalder Shompotti Bajeyapto 
Korar Dabi’ Doinik Bangla (Dhaka, 1 January 1972) 3, 2. 
32 ‘Appendix Dha – Extracts from the Minutes and Decisions of the Cabinet Meeting held on December 
13, 1971’ in Muyeedul Hasan, Muldhara ’71 (University Press Limited 2012) 291.  
33 ibid.  
34 ‘Appendix Naw – Extract from the Decision of the Cabinet Meeting held on 23.12.1971 at Dacca in 
the Bangabhaban’ (n 32) 292; AB Musa, ‘Bangladesh Government Prepares for New Era’ in Maudood 
Elahi (ed), Assignment Bangladesh ’71 – A Chronology of Events as Seen by the World Press (Momin 
Publications 1999) 609; ‘Dacca Hails Bangladesh Leaders’ in M D Husain (ed), International Press on 
Bangladesh Liberation War (Amader Bangla Press 1989) 398; ‘Bengali Tribunals Set’ New York Times 
(New York, 25 December 1971).  
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East Pakistan and eight members of his cabinet.35 By the end of December 1971, the 
Bangladesh authorities had arrested at least 30 of the top Pakistani civilian officials.36  
 
Alongside the trials of local collaborators, demands were made to prosecute Pakistani 
military personnel for “heinous crimes” committed outside the performance of their 
duty.37 With the transfer underway of thousands of members of the Pakistan Army to 
prisoner of war camps in India, the Indian authorities initially approached this demand 
with caution. Durga Prasad Dhar, at the time serving as Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi’s Special Envoy to Bangladesh, best described the Indian position. He said: 
“India wants to uphold its solemn obligations to protect its prisoners under the Geneva 
Convention. But at the same time, India does not want to be accused by the Bengalis 
of harboring men who have been proved to be guilty of ‘horrendous crimes’”.38 Indira 
Gandhi subsequently clarified that the decision whether to establish a ‘war crimes 
tribunal’ to try members of the Pakistan Army for committing international crimes 
would be taken by the Bangladesh Government.39  
 
On 8 January, 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was freed from imprisonment in 
Pakistan and flown to London. During his first exchange with the international press 
in over nine months Mujib expressed the need to hold “some sort of trial for mass 
murderers.”40 Two days later Mujib made his homecoming speech in liberated 
                                                
35 Sydney H Schanberg, ‘Long Occupation of East Pakistan Foreseen in India’ New York Times (New 
York, 26 December 1971).  
36 Fox Butterfield (n 31).  
37 Sydney H Schanberg, ‘India Says She is Weighing Trials of Pakistani Troops’ New York Times (New 
York, 28 December 1971).  
38 Fox Butterfield (n 31); Fox Butterfield, ‘Pact To Disarm Bengali Rebels Reported’ New York Times 
(New York, 28 December 1971); Omi Rahman Pial, ‘Situation Dhaka and DP Dhar Interview’ (1 
August 2010) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hCqWCq28ZYE > accessed 17 April 2017.  
39 ‘Juddho Oporadh Tribunal Gothon Proshonge – Bangladesh Shorkar e Shiddhanto Neben: Indira’ 
Doinik Bangla (Dacca, 2 January 1972) 2.  
40 Nicholas Carroll, ‘Dawn Landing Drama’ The Sunday Times (9 January 1972). 
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Bangladesh. He reiterated his pledge to try and punish collaborators before an 
“independent court” and appealed to the United Nations to conduct an enquiry “to 
determine the extent of genocide committed in Bangladesh by the Pakistan Army.”41 
The Bangladesh Government had already set up a twelve-member Inquiry Committee 
led by the Deputy Inspector General of Police subsequent to which four casualty 
surveys were initiated to ascertain the exact extent of loss of life and property resulting 
from the atrocities of Pakistan army.42  
 
On 18 January, 1972 during an interview with Sir David Frost, Sheikh Mujib referring 
back to the precedent of Nuremberg, said: “I always believe in forgive and forget, but 
it is impossible on my part to forgive and forget because these are cold-blooded 
murders [committed] in a planned way, a genocide to kill my people. Do you think 
any human being can tolerate these killings? These people must be punished. There is 
no question about it.”43 As a response to the victims demands for justice and to assuage 
their “passion for revenge”, two separate and formal processes of ‘justice’ were set in 
motion.44 The first initiative involved the setting up of Special Tribunals under the 
                                                
41 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said “[...] However, those who have collaborated, those who have entered 
the homes of my people and killed them, they shall be tried and punished. Hand them over to the 
independent government of Bengal. Not a single person will be pardoned. However, I want that we try 
and punish them [in Bangladesh] as an independent State as independent citizens before an independent 
court. […] Forgive me, my brothers, forgive me. I don’t hold feelings of vengeance against any one 
today. Please do not say anything to a single person. Those who have wronged will be punished. Do 
not take law into your own hands.” See, Sumon Mahmud, ‘BONGOBONDHU SPEECH_10th January, 
1972’ (6 March 2014) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SD6_uLXV0VE > accessed 17 April 
2017; Niall Macdermot, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in Bangladesh’ (1973) 7 (2) International Lawyer 
476, 479; ‘Gonohottar Todontey Antorjatik Commission Gothon Korun: Samad’ Dainik Bangla 
(Dacca, 21 January 1972) 1.  
42 Nurul Momen, Bangladesh The First Four Years – From 16 December 1971 to 15 December 1975 
(Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs 1980) 10; ‘Four Casualty Surveys Initiated’ The 
Bangladesh Observer (Dacca, 23 January 1972).  
43 ‘Transcript of Interview in the David Frost Show, WNEW-TV, New York’ in Sheelendra Kumar et 
al (eds), Bangladesh Documents: Volume Two (The University Press Limited 1999) 626; Omi Rahman 
Pial, ‘Mujib with David Frost 2’ (20 November 2009) < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXZahA8D7JE > accessed 17 April 2017.  
44 ‘Genocide Trials Planned’ New York Times (23 February 1972) < https://nyti.ms/2oP08pZ > accessed 
17 April 2017; ‘Bangladesh Will Try 1,100 Pakistanis’ New York Times (30 March 1972) < 
https://nyti.ms/2ptlN5h > accessed 17 April 2017.  
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Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 and the second initiative 
strove to establish the International Crimes Tribunal under the International Crimes 
(Tribunals) Act 1973 to try Pakistani prisoners of war.  
 
1.2 Trials under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 
 
The Collaborators Order was promulgated by the President of Bangladesh on the 
advice of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 24 January, 1972 for the 
purposes of trying collaborators of the Pakistan Armed Forces accused of murder, 
rape, plunder and other offences.45 The Order created sixty-five offences most of 
which originated from the Bangladesh Penal Code, 1860. These offences acquired the 
status of “aggravated offences” carrying punishments more severe than the Penal Code 
because they were carried out by a “collaborator”.46 The Collaborators Order was not 
a complete code in itself. Its procedure was governed by the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898 and its rules relating evidence came from the Evidence Act, 1872.47  
 
The justice process created by the Collaborators Order was welcomed by the majority 
of the people of Bangladesh.48 It was warmly received by the Bengalis because it 
created a judicial mechanism which promised to punish those who had wronged them 
during the 1971 war. The Biharis and other collaborators took the Order as a “great 
blessing” because it saved them from a “wrath of reprisals”.49 After the promulgation, 
the Bangladesh government summoned 15 political personalities known to have 
                                                
45 Mamoon (n 3) 
46 Naziruddin Ahmad, Trial of Collaborators (Book Society 1972) i & 1.    
47 ibid i.  
48 Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (The University Press Limited 1983) 
50-51.  
49 ibid.  
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collaborated with the Pakistan Army to appear before Sub-divisional Magistrates.50 
By April 1972, nearly 10,000 suspected collaborators from the Jamaat-e-Islami, other 
right-wing Islamist parties, the Razakars, Al Badr and Al Shams were awaiting trial 
under the Collaborators Order.51 The number of arrestees rose to 42,000 by October 
1972.52  
 
The Collaborators Order was not free from criticism. Specific provisions were 
condemned by international and domestic quarters for being unfair towards the 
accused, while others were critiqued for safeguarding them. The International 
Commission of Jurists criticized the Order’s “retroactive” nature and demanded the 
release of those detained under it.53 The excessive powers given to police officers to 
arrest anyone without a warrant, the suspension of habeas corpus in ‘collaboration’ 
cases, the wide definition of “collaborator”,54 the power to detain an accused for the 
first six months, trials in absentia, the right to confiscate the property belonging to 
wanted suspects or persons who had been arrested and the denial of the right to bail 
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were perceived as provisions which could lead to miscarriages of justice.55 Amnesty 
International expressed concern over the widespread arrests of alleged collaborators 
and requested that international observers be present at the trials of those charged as 
war criminals.56 A prominent lawyer from Singapore investigating on behalf of 
Amnesty in July 1972 reported that the scope of the Collaborators Order was very 
wide because it simultaneously covered “cases of grave criminal offences and 
atrocities, as well as simple co-operation with the then government during the months 
after March 1971.”57 The Supreme Court Bar Association of Bangladesh described 
the Collaborators Order as “the most unethical law contrary to all established 
principles of jurisprudence and fundamental rights as recognized throughout the 
civilized world” for being “harsh and vindictive” and displaying a lack of confidence 
in Bangladesh’s judicial system.58  
 
In August 1972, Martin Ennals of Amnesty International pressed Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman to grant amnesty to prisoners detained under the Order. Ataur Rahman Khan 
the former Chief Minister of East Pakistan and one of the founders of the Awami 
League was another advocate for granting an amnesty. Khan argued that the decision 
to prosecute a wide category of collaborators including those who held different 
political views but had not committed ‘crimes’ would impede “national 
reconstruction” and further divide the nation instead of forging of a “national unity”.59 
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He alleged that many people who had opposed the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971 now held high positions in the Government and that the Awami League was 
using the Collaborators Order as a shield to imprison “political, social, family and 
economic rivals.”60 In the years immediately following independence, the government 
led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman employed an inconsistent policy where a large section 
of collaborators belonging to the anti-independence camp were either prosecuted or 
punished, but others from the same camp were not. For instance, while 53 bureaucrats 
were identified as ‘collaborators’ and removed from employment in 1972, there were 
glaring instances where ‘anti-independence’ personalities some known for their 
criminal activities in 1971 were appointed to positions of power.61  
 
The Collaborators Order was critiqued not just for being unfair towards the accused. 
On 23 July, 1972, a Bangladeshi newspaper named the Dainak Bangla ran a front page 
editorial calling for amendments to the law.62 It argued that the provision in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which applied to the Order, empowering the Officer-in-
Charge of Police Stations to investigate charges of collaboration was an impediment 
to justice because of the disproportionately low number of police personnel in the 
country.63 The atrocities of 1971 were committed during war time, and the decision to 
utilize stringent rules of evidence usually applicable during times of peace was 
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questioned.64 It was further argued that the highly technical rules of evidence as 
enshrined in the Evidence Act, 1872 were barriers to the ends of justice because they 
“safeguarded” perpetrators from convictions.65  
 
Various shortcomings of the justice process under the Collaborators Order were 
addressed by the government of Bangladesh and the Supreme Court. To reduce the 
filing of frivolous cases, the government introduced amendments to the Order 
empowering the Special Tribunals and Magistrates to punish persons who filed false 
charges with imprisonment for a period of up to three years or fine or both.66 The 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh intervened in multiple instances to enhance the rights 
of the accused and set important precedents that improved the overall fairness of trials 
under the Order.67  
 
By 1973 the Government of Bangladesh was actively considering the “question of 
granting clemency to persons convicted for or accused of offences” under the 
Collaborators Order.68 The first act of clemency for certain categories of collaborators 
was declared on 17 May, 1973. It did not extend to persons convicted for or charged 
with serious offences such as waging or attempting to wage war against Bangladesh, 
sedition, murder, rape, robbery, arson etc.69 On 30 November, 1973, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman declared a general amnesty towards those who were being tried under the 
Collaborators Order, excepting those who were charged or convicted of murder, 
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culpable homicide not amounting to “murder”, “rape”, “mischief by fire or explosive 
substance”, “mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house”  or 
“mischief by fire or explosive substance to destroy any vessel”.70 Although the 
amnesty was ‘conditional’, it was allegedly subjected to abuse through “corruption, 
favouritism and misuse of powers” resulting in the release of prominent collaborators 
to whom the amnesty did not apply.71 Sheikh Mujib’s amnesty was an expression of 
his magnanimity and genuine belief that such a decision would facilitate national 
reconciliation.72 The war-torn administration of Bangladesh was severely strained in 
possessing the bare minimum resources to continue trying thousands of accused who 
had been arrested under the Order. Organizations like Amnesty International and the 
International Commission of Jurists had been urging Mujib to “initiate a policy of 
reconciliation, enabling the Bangladesh government to harness the potential of those 
now in prison who at the time believed or acquiesced in the continuance of the status 
quo.”73 Mujib’s general amnesty was praised by the International Commission of 
Jurists as “a generous act of statesmanship”.74 Amnesty International sent a telegram 
warmly congratulating Mujib on his decision. According to Ziauddin Ahmed, the 
amnesty was legally flawed because the Constitution of Bangladesh empowers the 
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President to grant pardons only to persons who have been ‘convicted’, not accused 
whose trials are ongoing.75  
 
Statistics regarding the Collaborators Oder show that by 31 October, 1973, out of 
37,471 accused the trials of 2,848 persons were completed.76 752 persons were 
convicted and sentenced to varying degrees of punishment and the remaining 2,096 
persons received acquittals.77 One person received the death penalty.78  
 
1.3 The failed attempt to try Pakistani prisoners of war under the International 
Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICTA) 
 
After the signing of the Instrument of Surrender on December 16, 1971, demands were 
made to put the Pakistani POWs on trial for international crimes. As these demands 
were made, the POWs were transferred from Bangladesh to camps in India – a process 
that began on 28 December, 1971.79 According to J N Dixit, India’s first Head of 
Mission in Bangladesh, it was Sheikh Mujib who proactively supported such a transfer 
because Bangladesh was financially unable to maintain them.80 Dixit stated that with 
the prisoners of war remaining in the safe custody of India, Bangladesh believed it 
would be in a position to use them as leverage to gain recognition of statehood from 
Pakistan and extract compensation for the economic losses it had incurred during the 
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war.81 The plan was that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would demand the return of POWs 
when the necessary evidence against them had been gathered.82 A ‘Joint Declaration’ 
by India and Bangladesh was issued on 19 March, 1972 where India expressed full 
support towards the proposed war crimes trials. The declaration read: “The Prime 
Minister of India assured the Prime Minister of Bangla Desh that the Government of 
India will fully co-operate with the Government of Bangla Desh in bringing those 
guilty persons to justice who are responsible for the worst genocide in recent times. 
At the same time, the two Prime Ministers agree that seriously sick and wounded 
prisoners of war, who are not guilty of war crimes, will be repatriated to Pakistan as a 
matter of priority by mutual consent.”83 In the following months the Bangladesh 
government reduced its initial list of Pakistani POWs triable for international crimes 
from 1,100 to 195.84 The list was prepared by Bengali prosecutors and investigators 
working under the guidance and leadership of Bangladesh’s Law Minister Kamal 
Hossain, who gathered and examined evidence of the atrocities committed by 
prisoners of war.85  
 
On 17 April, 1973, the Bangladesh Government declared its intent to put the POWs 
on trial “for serious crimes, which include genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, breaches of article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, murder, rape, and arson”.86 
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Niall Macdermot Q.C. a British Labor Party politician and Secretary General of the 
International Commission of Jurists tried to persuade the Bangladesh authorities to 
allow the envisioned trials to be held under international penal law. Macdermot, 
however, acknowledged that there was a considerable body of opinion from the 
Western world against the holding of such trials.87 There were hardly any states 
capable and willing to set up an “international tribunal” of the kind Sheikh Mujib 
demanded after his return to Bangladesh. Critiquing the status quo Macdermot argued 
that there were “too many governments with too many skeletons for them to agree to 
any effective enforcement machinery for human rights.”88 He proposed that 
Bangladesh government themselves constitute an international court along the lines 
adopted by the victorious allied forces in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second 
World War. The Tribunal would be led by a majority of neutral judges and would try 
persons charged under international penal law as opposed to domestic law.89 Two 
reasons were identified as to why such a proposal would resonate with the views of 
the international community. First of all, it did not require the passing of a retroactive 
law, which according to Macdermot was to be the only way of persuading world 
opinion that the trial was an act of justice not vengeance.90 Secondly, by engaging the 
process of international enforcement of human rights, Bangladesh would be making 
legal history.91 
 
                                                
of the Supreme Court. The trials will be held in accordance with universally recognized judicial norms. 
Eminent international jurists will be invited to observe the trials. The accused will be afforded facilities 
to arrange for their defence and to engage counsel of their own choice, including foreign counsel. A 
comprehensive law providing for the constitution of the Tribunal, the procedure to be adopted and other 
necessary materials is expected to be passed this month. The accused are expected to be produced before 
the Tribunal by the end of May, 1973.”  
87 Macdermot (n 41) 476. 
88 ibid 484. 
89 ibid 484.  
90 ibid 484.  
91 ibid 484. 
 80 
Under these circumstances Bangladesh proceeded to enact domestic legislation 
incorporating international crimes to try Pakistani prisoners of war. To ensure added 
protection to the upcoming law, the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill was passed 
by the Parliament on 14 July, 1973.92 The amendment added a third clause to Article 
47 of the Constitution which allowed for the prosecution of any person accused of 
“genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international 
law”.93 A completely new Article (47A) was introduced which stipulated that the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 31, 35(1), 35(3) and 44 of the Constitution 
would not be applicable to persons on trial for international crimes under Article 47(3). 
Such persons also lost their right to move the Supreme Court for any of the remedies 
offered by the Constitution.94 According to Amir-ul Islam, a member of the committee 
that drafted Bangladesh’s Constitution, the amendment served “to remove any doubt 
whatsoever or eradicate any foreseeable controversy in the future as to its applicability 
in identifying as well as investigating and trying such offences whenever and wherever 
it is committed.”95 
 
The International Crimes (Tribunals) Bill was placed for consideration before the 
Bangladesh Parliament on 17 July, 1973, and after three days of debate, the 
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International Crimes (Tribunals) Act was passed to detain, prosecute and punish the 
perpetrators of international crimes committed during Bangladesh’s “historic struggle 
for national liberation” so that the conscience of humanity could be cleared.96 The 
necessity of passing the ICTA was explained by Serajul Huq during the parliamentary 
debates:  
 
If we were revengeful on them we could bring 70,000 for trial but only 
195 persons will be tried only to vindicate our sense of justice. “The rarer 
action is in virtue than in vengeance”. Mr. Speaker, we believe that we are 
going to bring these people into punishment not because they devastated 
our land but because we have a responsibility towards suffering humanity 
and the entire population of the world is looking to us.97 
 
The ICTA was the end result of efforts by Bangladeshi parliamentarians, eminent 
academics, lawyers, and civil servants. Among them were German Professors Otto 
Triffterer and Hans-Heinrich Jescheck.98 The draft legislation underwent further 
scrutiny at a symposium organized by the Bangladesh Institute of Law and 
International Affairs (BILIA) and a conference on international criminal law held in 
Bellagio, Italy.99 Upon evaluation American law Professors Jordan Paust and Albert 
Blaustein concluded that the statutory provisions of the ICTA “adequately accorded 
the accused the full guarantees of international due process to which they are entitled” 
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and trials under it would be fairly and public heard “by an independent and impartial 
Tribunal.”100 Paust and Blaustein were approached by the Bangladesh Government to 
prepare a memorandum on relevant provisions of the ICTA.101 The purpose of the 
memorandum was that it would be received by the Tribunal as a “friend of the court” 
communication from the authors who were also representatives of the International 
League for the Rights of Man (subsequently known as International League for Human 
Rights).102 It was agreed that Paust and Blaustein as observers of the trials would “use 
the memorandum as a basis for their observation” and subsequently offer comments 
on their proceedings and outcomes.103  
 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s determination to prosecute Pakistani POWs in Bangladesh 
prompted the government of Pakistan to file an application at the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in 1973 seeking an interim injunction preventing India from 
transferring the POWs to the Bangladesh authorities.104 As time passed and India’s 
exhaustion over having to support thousands of prisoners of war began to take its toll, 
the doors of negotiation reopened and Pakistan filed another application before ICJ 
requesting it to postpone considering the injunction application.105 Declassified 
documents of the United States Government reveal that in 1973, the US Secretary of 
State during a meeting with Bangladesh’s Finance Minister Tajuddin, had observed 
that the “preventive effect of war crimes trials was questionable”.106 Instead, the 
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Secretary of State emphasised on reconciliation by referring to the example set by 
President Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria who directly proceeded to a “constructive policy 
of reconciliation” after the Nigerian civil war despite the existence of widespread 
evidence of atrocities”.107 
 
In the end, the goal of bringing Pakistani prisoners of war before a justice initiative in 
Bangladesh remained unrealized. On 10 April, 1974, a tripartite agreement was signed 
by representatives of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan under which the 195 prisoners 
of war were repatriated to Pakistan without any trials. During the 1971 war, Bengalis 
were killed in racial riots in the Landi Mabimabad and Musa colony of Karachi in 
West Pakistan. Their houses were burned and their bank accounts were frozen.108 After 
independence the Bangladesh government faced the issue of bringing back over 
200,000 Bengalis hostages stranded in Pakistan and who had “ominous crosses 
chalked on their houses.”109 Bengalis were being assaulted and some even killed by 
Pakistanis and their belongings were being confiscated, while families were separated 
and sent to concentration camps.110 By December 1972, over 2000 Bengalis were 
imprisoned without charge in Pakistan and “harassment and discrimination” had 
become a part of their everyday life.111 As Bangladesh mounted pressure to try POWs, 
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the Pakistani authorities threatened to try “Bengalis in Pakistan against whom there 
[was] evidence of the commission of such acts as subversion, espionage and high 
treason”.112 After independence, Bangladesh’s commitment to try the prisoners of war 
for international crimes was demonstrated through strongly worded statements and the 
passing of the ICTA. As a ‘new-born’ state it was initially successful in manoeuvring 
itself through the games of diplomacy by quickly gaining membership in the 
Commonwealth and attaining recognition from over one hundred countries. 
Ultimately, Bangladesh was diplomatically coerced into retracting the claim on the 
Pakistani POWs, in order to pave way for the repatriation of Bangladeshi citizens 
stranded in Pakistan and also to ensure its membership in the United Nations, both of 
which were directly dependent upon the cooperation of Pakistan.113 In exchange a 
conditional apology by Pakistan was incorporated in the text of the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1974 which read: “The Minister of State for Defence and Foreign 
Affairs of the Government of Pakistan said that his Government condemned and 
deeply regretted any crimes that may have been committed.”114 According to Kamal 
Hossain, after the signing of the Agreement the Foreign Minister of Pakistan pledged 
at a subsequent press conference that the prisoners of war would be tried on Pakistani 
soil if supporting evidence was found.115 On a previous occasion, although Pakistan 
had opposed trials of POWs in Bangladesh and pledged “to constitute a judicial 
tribunal of such character and composition as will inspire international confidence”, 
no such trials ever took place.116 
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Sheikh Mujbur Rahman promised the Bengali people that he would deliver justice. 
With the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, not only did Sheikh Mujib swallow his 
own words, but he also granted ‘clemency’ to 195 Pakistani prisoners of war against 
whom there were serious allegations of committing atrocities. On 25 September, 1974, 
Mujib made the following declaration at the twenty-ninth session of the United 
Nations General Assembly:  
 
We have spared no effort to liquidate the legacies of the past, and made 
our ultimate contribution by granting clemency even to those 195 
prisoners of war against whom there was overwhelming evidence of their 
having committed grave crimes, including crimes against humanity. This 
was our investment towards the opening of a new chapter and towards the 
building of a future of peace and stability in our tormented subcontinent. 
In doing this we insisted on no pre-conditions, nor did we seek to strike 
any bargain, for we were influenced only by the vision of a better future 
for all our peoples.117 
 
Common sense dictates that if the Bangladesh Government possessed the intent to put 
Pakistani prisoners of war on trial, it would have been appropriate to continue 
detaining them in Bangladesh instead of transferring them to India. It has been alleged 
that the Bangladesh Government was not expeditious when it came to gathering 
evidence or preparing case documents surrounding the 195 POWs.118 According to J 
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N Dixit, Sheikh Mujib had told P N Haksar the Principal Secretary Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, that in light of the difficulties of gathering evidence, he was 
disinterested in holding war crimes trials because they were a “waste of energy and 
time”.119 Bangladesh, despite possessing initial zeal had no doubt struggled and 
faltered as it crossed swords with the culture of impunity.  
 
The year 1975 marked the beginning political assassinations of politico-military 
personalities who had given leadership to the war of liberation. On 15 August, 1975 
martial law was declared throughout the country after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and 
eighteen members of his family were murdered by a section of the Bangladesh Army 
acting in concert with a section of Mujib’s own party, the Awami League. The 
Collaborators Order was completely repealed on 31 December, 1975, the same day 
General Ziaur Rahman became the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Bangladesh.120 
Chikon Ali, the only person against whom a death penalty had been passed and others 
serving time or were undergoing trial under the Order for crimes beyond the purview 
of the general amnesty were released from prison.121 Under what legal framework 
these persons were released remains unanswered.  
 
As a State, Bangladesh embraced nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy 
as its guiding ideologies. By resorting to past lessons, a ban was imposed on politics 
based on religion.122 The Jamaat-e-Islami was barred from taking part in active 
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politics. For a country with an overwhelming majority of Muslim inhabitants, the 
political course Bangladesh had chosen for itself was ‘progressive’. From 1975 to 
1990, military dictators Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Mohammad Ershad usurped the 
secular and progressive nature of the Constitution and rehabilitated parties like 
Jamaat-e-Islami back into the mainstream political arena.123 According to David 
Lewis the military governments during this period built links with political Islam “in 
an attempt to consolidate support for their unelected regimes”.124 In 1988 General 
Ershad, a former collaborator from 1971,125 changed the non-communal nature of the 
Constitution by illegally inserting Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh. After 
failing to rally popular electoral support on its own, Jamaat-e-Islami forged a political 
alliance with Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a party founded by General Ziaur 
Rahman.  
 
In the final analysis, the decision to grant amnesties to local collaborators and 
clemency to Pakistani prisoners of war was insensitive to the needs of the victims of 
1971 atrocities and deprived them of their right to justice.126 As a direct consequence, 
a “cleavage” was created within Bangladesh between those who continued to demand 
justice for the atrocities of 1971 and others who were beneficiaries of Mujib’s 
amnesties and had been rehabilitated back into society by Zia and Ershad.127 The 
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amnesties coupled with the unconditional release of all accused charged and convicted 
of serious offences under the Collaborators Order after 1975 and the political 
rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-Islami during the regimes led by Ziaur Rahman, Hussain 
Muhammad Ershad and Begum Khaleda Zia created an endemic culture of impunity 
in Bangladesh.  
 
2. Resurgence of the demand for justice – civil society movements of the 1990s  
 
By the time Bangladesh finished experiencing two consecutive military dictatorships, 
the quest for justice for the atrocities of 1971 had come to a complete standstill. 
Politicians belonging to the BNP who led the government in the early 1990s were 
uninterested in reviving any justice process because of their alliances with Jamaat-e-
Islami. However, the trauma left by the war of 1971 had been transmitted from one 
generation to the next.128 On 29 December , 1991 the wounds from these traumas came 
out into the open when Ghulam Azam was made Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami. Common 
citizens came out to the streets protesting this development. The premise of these 
protests was that a person who had campaigned against the independence of 
Bangladesh and was known to have given leadership to organizations that collaborated 
with the Pakistan Army had no moral authority to lead a political party functioning 
inside the country. The movement culminated in the formation of the Ekattorer Ghatak 
Dalal Nirmul Committee under the leadership of the Jahanara Imam, whose eldest son 
had been captured and tortured to death by local collaborators in 1971.129 Within three 
weeks a ‘National Coordination Committee for the Implementation of the Spirit of the 
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Liberation War and Resisting Killers and Collaborators of 1971’ comprising of all 
pro-liberation political, social, cultural bodies was formed.130 The committee received 
widespread support from a cross-section of the Bengali populace. A symbolic People’s 
Court was set up under the direction of the committee and on 26 March, 1992 Ghulam 
Azam was found guilty for committing international crimes during Bangladesh’s 
liberation war. Before a mass rally, a death sentence on Azam was read out at the 
Suhrawardy Uddyan.131 The then Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia 
retaliated by imposing a blackout on all news relating to the People’s Court and filed 
a sedition case against its twenty-four organizers.132 On 16 April, 1992, the movement 
for justice gained political traction when Sheikh Hasina the daughter of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and the then Leader of the Opposition expressed her support to the 
People’s Court and demanded formal trials under the International Crimes (Tribunals) 
Act, 1973.133 In 1993, a ‘National People’s Inquiry Commission’ was set up for the 
purpose of collecting evidence of crimes committed by fifteen prominent 
collaborators.134 Led by Sufia Kamal, a leading poet of Bangladesh, the Commission 
over the next few years published extensive and incriminating reports on these 
persons. An important finding was that even after the passage of two and a half 
decades since the war, people in certain areas where the accused continued to reside 
suffered from fear and insecurity.  
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These events in Bangladesh drew global attention. In a resolution adopted in 1994, the 
European Parliament called upon the Government of Bangladesh “to refrain from 
taking repressive measures taken against representatives of the Nirmul Committee, 
headed by the writer Jahanara Imam” and supported the call to put “Ghulam Azam 
and other representatives of Islamic organizations on trial for the massacres they 
committed during the period from March until December 1971.”135 Channel 4 
commissioned investigations into several British nationals of Bangladeshi origin who 
had allegedly committed serious crimes relating to abduction, torture and murder in 
1971.136 In 1995, a documentary called “The War Crimes File” was aired on British 
television.137 The evidence collected by the team that produced the documentary was 
shared with Scotland Yard raising hopes that the British government would prosecute 
the accused under the Geneva Conventions Act, 1957.138  
 
Following Jahanara Imam’s demise in 1994 after a hard fought battle with cancer, 
other civil society organizations and activist forums including the ‘Ghatak Dalal 
Nirmul Committee’, ‘Bangladesh Muktijoddha Sangsad’, ‘Liberation War Museum’, 
‘Sammilito Sangskritik Jote’, ‘Prajanma ’71’, ‘War Crimes Facts Finding 
Committee’, and the ‘International Crimes Strategy Forum’ shared the responsibilities 
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of collecting evidence and campaigning for trials of the war criminals of 1971. Prior 
to the general elections of 2008, the Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh 
Hasina pledged justice to the victims of 1971 in its electoral campaign and swept into 
Parliament with a 3/4th majority. The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 was 
set in motion for the first time since its inception and the first ICT was established in 
March 2010. The Bangladesh government approached the United Nations for 
assistance with regard to the trials. Following strong objections by Pakistan, United 
States and France, the possibility of any UN involvement came to an end.139 One of 
the world’s largest lobbying firms was hired to advocate in favour one of the Jamaat-
e-Islami leaders on trial and against the ICTA.140  
 
Conclusion 
 
The thirty eight year preceding the establishment of the International Crimes Tribunals 
was marked by the failure of successive civilian and military governments to deliver 
justice to the victims of mass atrocities committed in 1971 and the political 
rehabilitation of the perpetrators of those atrocities. This chapter traced the post-
independence years from 1972 to 2010 and examined the justice initiatives that were 
set in motion through the Collaborators Order and the ICTA. The failure of those 
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initiatives which came about through the amnesties of 1973, the Tripartite Agreement 
of 1974, the unconditional release of all serious offenders convicted under the 
Collaborators Order after December 1975 and the political rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-
Islami, caused of a deeply ingrained culture of impunity in Bangladesh, a ‘culture’ 
was challenged for the first time in 2010 when the first ICT was established after a 
long drawn campaign for justice. Taking into consideration the past failures to 
prosecute, the increasing age of perpetrators and the limited availability of and 
accessibility to witnesses and credible evidence, the ICTs represent Bangladesh’s last 
realistic opportunity to detain, prosecute and convict persons who were involved in 
the commission of serious crimes in 1971. 
 
Over the years the legality and legitimacy of the ICTs have been questioned for 
allegedly failing to uphold international standards of justice.141 The following Chapter 
(III) focuses on the principle of complementarity. It explores the travaux 
préparatoires and statutory provisions of the Rome Statute, policy papers published 
by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and relevant decisions handed down by 
the ICC for the purposes of identifying the ‘benchmark’ in terms of which the legality 
and legitimacy of judicial proceedings before a national criminal jurisdiction, such as 
the ICTs, ought to be assessed.
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Chapter III 
The Principle of Complementarity and the tolerance of diversity and 
intolerance of egregious fair trial violations 
 
Introduction 
 
In the justice regime created by international criminal law, the modus operandi of 
ending impunity is ‘complementarity’, a principle which creates a system where the 
primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting international crimes rests upon 
national justice systems. The International Criminal Court (ICC) takes up the role of 
a court of ‘last resort’ that intervenes only when a State is genuinely ‘unwilling’ or 
‘unable’ to investigate or prosecute. Bangladesh was the first South Asian state to 
ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 23 
March 2010, two days prior to the establishment of the first ICT.1 The prospective 
nature of the Rome Statute precludes the ICC from trying the international crimes 
committed by the Pakistan Army and its auxiliary forces in 1971. Therefore, 
Bangladesh despite being a State Party to the Rome Statute had to initiate prosecutions 
against the alleged perpetrators of international crimes in 1971 through its own 
domestic legislation, i.e. the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICTA).  
 
This Chapter identifies the principle of complementarity and the “principles of due 
process recognized by international law” as the standards against which the legality 
and legitimacy of national criminal jurisdictions like the ICTs should be assessed. To 
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this end, this Chapter is structured into two parts. Part I traces the development and 
historical evolution of complementarity and unearths the motivations behind adopting 
the principle as the operative “cornerstone”2 of the Rome Statute. Part II demonstrates 
that the ICC when assessing the ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘manner’ of a 
national proceeding for the purposes of determining the admissibility of a case, should 
be receptive towards the “diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures”, but must 
ensure that “violations of the rights” of the accused that are of “egregious” nature are 
not permitted in the name of ‘diversity’.3 The benefits of such an exercise are twofold. 
Firstly, it sets the stage for the subsequent chapters of this thesis which determine the 
legality and legitimacy of the ICTs by analysing its major areas of contention. 
Secondly, it enhances the general understanding of the principle of complementarity 
by identifying some of its points of ‘tension’.  
 
1. Understanding the principle of complementarity 
 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute emphasizes “the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” and creates a 
“complementary” relationship between the International Criminal Court and national 
criminal jurisdictions where the former may prosecute only when the latter are 
“unwilling or unable genuinely” to do so.4 This part explains that the struggle to end 
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impunity was not always strategized in this way and it took the greater portion of a 
century for a majority of States to reach a consensus that the principle of 
‘complementarity’ would be the modus operandi of prosecuting the worst kinds of 
large scale crimes. Drawing from the debates leading up to the framing of the 
‘principle’ in the Rome Statute, it shows that there is a duality in the nature of 
complementarity, where on the one hand, complementarity ensures the primacy of 
national courts over the ICC, but also ushers an end to the “unfettered prerogative” of 
States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over international crimes.5 Finally, it relies on 
the principled and practical motivations behind adopting complementarity to argue 
that delegating the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute the most serious 
crimes to national courts was the only principled, practicable, efficient and politically 
acceptable way to convince State Parties to unite and establish a permanent 
international criminal court. 
 
1.1 From Leipzig to Rome: tracing complementarity’s evolutionary journey  
 
Complementarity can be traced back to trials proposed after the First World War. 
Although Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles granted the “Allies and Associated 
Powers” the right to try Germans before their own military courts, they subsequently 
agreed not to interfere as long as the trials held in Germany were administered in good 
faith and a fair punishment was imposed on the guilty.6 The end results were just over 
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a dozen convictions, none of the accused serving their sentences, several prisoners 
escaping, the German public hailing the prison wardens for allowing them to do so, 
and when the Allies demanded “proper” second trials, the German public responding 
with outrage. The Leipzig trials were a testament to “the absence of a genuine will to 
investigate alleged war crimes charges”7 and have since been described as a “poor 
precedent”8 and a “glaring demonstration of non-implementation”9 of justice.10 
Similarly, prior to the Treaty of Sevres which contained provisions much like the 
Treaty of Versailles, thirty-four persons were convicted by a Turkish Military Tribunal 
while forty-one prisoners were released by the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire 
as a response to public opinion. When Britain requested the transfer of the remaining 
detainees to British custody, the Turkish Government objected on the grounds that 
such a transfer “would be in direct contradiction with its sovereign rights”.11 
 
The failure of these justice initiatives following the First World War instilled a fear 
within Allied and occupied European governments during and after the Second World 
War that they would not be in charge of impending justice processes. Nevertheless, in 
a “defining statement”12 that came out of the Moscow Conference in 1943, it was 
declared that the “German officers and men and members of the Nazi party” involved 
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in the commission of mass atrocities would be “sent back to the countries in which 
their abominable deeds were done” for the purposes of being “judged and punished 
according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments”.13 This 
view was further tempered in the ‘Memorandum to President Roosevelt and Justice 
Jackson's Report to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes’ in 1945 which 
pledged that local governments would be allowed to perform local justice while the 
Nazi leadership responsible for crimes having “no particular geographical 
localization”14 as part of the “Hitlerite conspiracy”15 would be tried separately before 
an “international military commission or military court”16. This is why at the end of 
the Second World War, in addition to the trials of major war criminals in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, thousands of so-called minor war criminals were tried by national courts 
in the European and Far Eastern Theatres applying local codes of law, thereby laying 
the groundwork for complementarity.17  
 
In the following decades until the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, 
nation States and the international community as a whole did not make substantial 
progress in the cause for prosecuting and suppressing the most serious core 
international crimes.18 Prosecutions, albeit rarely, did take place from time to time at 
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the national level. Germany continued to prosecute perpetrators of crimes from the 
Second World War.19 The court-martial of Second Lieutenant William L Calley, Jr. 
for his involvement in the murdering of South Vietnamese civilians during the My Lai 
massacre is another example.20 Other instances of prosecutions at the national level or 
attempts to do so include Bangladesh’s efforts to prosecute local collaborators of the 
Pakistan Army through the Collaborators Order and the enactment of the ICTA. 
 
The “years of silence”21 came to an end in the 1990s when the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) emerged as the first ‘international’ courts after Nuremberg to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes. Their establishment was possible 
because of multiple reasons all more or less related to the end of the Cold War. This 
ushered in an era of improvement in the relationship between States divided by 
capitalist and communist lines, a convergence in the views of the permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, and an enhanced appreciation of the need to enforce 
human rights.22 Created by the UN Security Council, the ICTY and ICTR were ad hoc 
responses to two distinct but serious conflicts. Their establishment tilted the 
responsibility of prosecuting international crimes in favour of international judicial 
bodies.23 Both Tribunals were initially perceived as substitutes for national courts at a 
time when local judicial institutions had undergone extreme levels of disruption and 
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were considered ill equipped to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes.24 This perception was reflected in the governing Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR which provided the Tribunals with “primacy”25 over national 
courts.  
 
Bartram Brown described this arrangement as the “high-water mark”26 of the trend of 
prioritizing the ‘international’ over the ‘national’. Even in this ‘arrangement’, traces 
of a complementary relationship are clearly visible in some of their statutory 
provisions. Although the Tribunals possessed ‘primacy’ over national courts, the latter 
held “concurrent” jurisdiction with the former in the effort to “prosecute persons for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law”.27 A decade after the 
establishment of the ICTY, the Tribunal’s judges devised a plan known as the 
‘completion strategy’ to ensure the “successful” and “timely” completion of its 
mission “in coordination with domestic legal systems in the former Yugoslavia”.28 
This plan was endorsed by the UN Security Council, and as the years progressed, 
national courts became indispensable components in the ‘completion strategy’ of both 
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Zeidy, ‘From Primacy to Complementarity and Backwards: (Re)-Visiting Rule 11 Bis of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ (2008) 57 (2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 403, 409 & 415. 
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Tribunals and the relationship that was originally based on ‘primacy’ transformed into 
being more ‘complementary’.29 For instance, the War Crimes Chamber of the Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC) was established in 2005 to prosecute crimes 
committed during the 1992-1995 conflict in “conjunction” with and at the same time 
“complement” the proceedings at the ICTY.30 Similarly, the national courts in Rwanda 
including the Gacaca assisted the ICTR in delivering justice to thousands of victims.31 
In the final report of the ICTR to the UN Security Council, President Judge Vagn 
Joensen explicitly stated that by referring cases to national jurisdictions for trial, the 
Tribunal had given “practical effect to the principle of complementarity” and ensured 
the filling of a potential “gap in impunity”.32  
 
In addition to the above, Article 10(2)(b) of the ICTY Statute sets out that a person 
who had been tried by a national court may be subsequently tried by the Tribunal if it 
is evident that the national proceedings lacked “impartiality” or “independence” or 
were “designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility” or the 
                                                
29 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Complementarity in 
Action: Lessons Learned from the ICTR Prosecutor's Referral of International Criminal Cases to 
National Jurisdictions for Trial’ (ICTR, 2015) 6 < 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf > 
accessed 7 May 2016; Philomena Cleobury, ‘The Evolution of the Mandates of International Tribunals, 
Including a Move Towards Complementarity’ (Legacy Website of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda) 3 & 6 < http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/publications/compendium-
documents/vi.%20The%20Evolution%20of%20the%20Mandates%20of%20the%20International%20
Tribunals,%20Including%20a%20Move%20Towards%20Complementarity%20%5BCLEOBURY%5
D.pdf > accessed 7 May 2016.  
30 Louis Mallinder, ‘War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ in Lavinia Stan and 
Nadya Nedelsky (eds), Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, Volume 3 (Cambridge University Press 
2013) 484; Bogdan Ivanišević, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Hybrid to 
Domestic Court (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2008) 1.  
31 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Complementarity in 
Action: Lessons Learned from the ICTR Prosecutor's Referral of International Criminal Cases to 
National Jurisdictions for Trial’ (ICTR, 2015) 5 < 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf > 
accessed 25 July 2016.   
32 President of the ICTR, ‘Report on the Completion of the Mandate of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda as at 15 November 2015’ (17 November 2015) UN Doc S/2015/884, 16 < 
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/151117_ictr_final_report_en.pdf > accessed 
15 May 2016.  
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case was not prosecuted with “diligence”.33 On the basis of the same grounds, Rule 
9(ii) allowed a Prosecutor to propose that a formal request be placed so that a court 
defers to the competence of the ICTY.34 There are similarities between these 
provisions and those charting ‘complementarity’ in the Rome Statute because both 
sets of provisions permit ‘international’ courts to exercise jurisdiction as a response to 
flawed domestic proceedings.  
 
The ad hoc tribunals reinvigorated the fight against impunity, but their selective nature 
and narrow mandate were criticized for being uneven, unfair and unequal.35 Although 
judgments of the ICTY convicted persons belonging to all parties to the conflict, the 
majority of cases before the Tribunal have dealt with international crimes committed 
by Serbs and Bosnian Serbs resulting in persistent claims that the justice process is 
biased.36 Similarly, the ICTR has been critiqued for not investigating and prosecuting 
crimes committed by Tutsi and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).37 Some of these 
criticisms were remedied in the Treaty inclusive of the Statute for the International 
                                                
33 (n 25) article 10 (2)(b).  
34 ICTY Rules of Procedure, rule 9 (ii).  
35 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 11, 59-60; Brown 
(n 5) 386. 
36 ‘About the ICTY’ (United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) < 
http://www.icty.org/en/about > accessed 24 September 2017; Dan Saxon, ‘Exporting Justice: 
Perceptions of the ICTY among the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim Communities in the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (2005) 4 Journal of Human Rights 559; Marija Ristic, ‘Serbia Slams Hague Tribunal at 
UN Debate’ (Balkan Transitional Justice, 11 April 2013) < 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/un-debate-turns-as-criticism-of-the-icty > accessed 15 March 
2017; Zorana Suvakovic, ‘The Politics of Justice at the Hague’ Al Jazeera Opinion (28 January 2014) 
< http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/politics-justice-at-hague-
2014121141359532592.html > accessed 15 March 2017; Marko Milanovic, ‘Understanding the ICTY’s 
Impact in the Former Yugoslavia’ (EJIL: Talk, 11 April 2016) < 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/understanding-the-ictys-impact-in-the-former-yugoslavia/ > accessed 15 
March 2017. 
37 Klaus Bachmann and Aleksandar Fatić, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: Transition 
Without Justice? (Routledge 2015) xi.  
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Criminal Court which was adopted at the end of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1998.38  
 
On  18 July, 1998 at the ‘Opening for Signature of the Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, M Cherif Bassiouni claimed that 
the world would “never be the same”.39 But Bassiouni qualified that the ICC would 
“not bring all perpetrators of major crimes to justice”, only “some” of them.40 The 
answer to why the ICC would try ‘some’ as opposed to ‘all’ perpetrators of the most 
egregious crimes rests partly in practicalities (a central court pursuing all international 
crimes being deemed patently impossible) and partly in the principle of 
complementarity – the operative cornerstone of the set of beliefs that define the 
relationship between the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions and gives shape to 
one of the most important judicial mechanisms functioning to end impunity. 
 
The advent of complementarity set in place a framework where, national criminal 
jurisdictions were given “primacy”41 over the ICC, together sharing a ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship based on mutual trust, dependency and cooperation.42 Its emergence also 
acknowledged the readiness and maturity of States occupying a vital space within the 
international community to accept a permanent international criminal jurisdiction.43 
In 1998, while seven countries including the United States and China voted against 
                                                
38 Michael Scharf, ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court’ (ASIL Insights, 
11 August 1998) < https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/3/issue/10/results-rome-conference-
international-criminal-court > accessed 25 September 2016.  
39 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Opening Statement’ (UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome 15 June – 17 July 1998) < http://mcherifbassiouni.com/wp-
content/uploads/MCB-Rome-Speech-18_July_1998.pdf > accessed 25 September 2016.   
40 ibid. 
41 Payam Akhavan, ‘Complementarity’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 90.   
42 Cassese and Gaeta (n 22) 303-308. 
43 Tallgren (n 6) 109 & 111. 
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the Treaty and twenty-one countries abstained from taking a side, an overwhelming 
majority of States, one hundred and twenty, voted in favour of creating a ‘permanent’ 
court that would give true meaning to the unfulfilled oath of “never again” made after 
the Holocaust.44 The ICC was established four years later in 2002, and has since 
functioned to hold to account the perpetrators of international crimes within its 
jurisdiction and in the process worked towards fulfilling its mandate of mounting a 
formidable challenge to what Michael Scharf has described as the “golden age of 
impunity”.45  
 
1.2 Framing the principle of complementarity within the Rome Statute 
 
One of the main issues of contention during the debates preceding the establishment 
of the ICC was how to frame the exact nature of the prospective relationship between 
the ICC and national courts of State Parties. In particular, parties held divergent views 
about what ought to be the balance of power between the ‘national’ and ‘international’, 
and there was an absence of clarity in the circumstances that would permit the 
‘international’ to exercise jurisdiction over cases.  
 
A close reading of the reports of the ‘Working Group on the Question of an 
International Criminal Jurisdiction and the Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ reveal that there were two broad 
                                                
44 The United States of America has not ratified the Rome Statute. Following the initial ‘no’ vote in 
1998, President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000. See, Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, ‘Overview of the United States Opposition to the International Criminal 
Court’ < http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_US_Opposition_to_ICC_11Dec06_final.pdf > 
accessed 5 June 2017; Alan M Dershowitz, ‘The Mixed Legacy of Nuremberg’ (Gatestone Institute, 4 
May 2016) < https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7983/nuremberg-legacy > accessed 25 September 
2016. 
45 Scharf (n 38). 
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strands of arguments which were identified by Immi Tallgren. The first strand, which 
Tallgren calls “the Butler ICC interpretation,” viewed complementarity as an 
expression of the primacy of national courts and a means to restrict the scope of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction to exceptional circumstances.46 Butler proposed that the Court 
should act as someone who remains “in the background and coordinates a scene just 
by his mere existence,” entering only “when it is necessary”.47 Tallgren’s Butler 
interpretation is similar to Bartram Brown’s “simple complementarity” which 
advocated that the jurisdiction of the ICC be “fully subordinate” to that of national 
courts.48 The second strand, known as “the Master ICC interpretation”, placed 
confidence on the enhanced capacity of the ICC to adjudicate impartially as a 
“supranational” court.49 It argued that the primary responsibility of prosecuting 
international crimes rested with the international community and advocated the using 
of complementarity as a tool to enforce the independence and authority of the 
proposed ICC.50  
 
Proponents of the Butler thesis therefore called for clear provisions in the Rome 
Statute on complementarity that would ensure the primacy of States to investigate and 
prosecute core international crimes.51 This view was opposed by the supporters of the 
Master thesis who argued for explicit provisions on complementarity, but those that 
would give the ICC a ‘flexible’ mandate and set out the minimum situations where it 
would have jurisdiction.52 A “crime-specific” approach represented the third strand 
                                                
46 Tallgren (n 6) 124; Zeidy (n 6) 890.  
47 Tallgren (n 6) 124.   
48 Brown (n 5) 423. 
49 Tallgren (n 6) 130; Dickner and Duffy (n 2) 58; Zeidy (n 6) 890.  
50 Tallgren (n 6) 124.  
51 Tallgren (n 6) 126.   
52 Tallgren (n 6) 126.  
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which argued that the ICC would assert inherent and primary jurisdiction over a core 
set of crimes which included ‘genocide’, ‘crimes against humanity’, ‘war crimes’, 
‘serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict’ etc., while 
“non-core” crimes related to terrorism, drugs etc. would fall within the jurisdiction of 
national courts.53 Ultimately, the Tallgren and Brown’s versions of Butler and simple 
complementarity which ensured the primacy of national courts over the ICC was 
preferred over the ICC having ‘primacy’ or enjoying inherent jurisdiction over a 
specific list of crimes.54 
 
Although the initial differences in the views of what kind of relationship the ICC and 
national courts would share with each other while fighting impunity, a dearth of clarity 
remained in the provisions relating to complementarity in the ILC’s Draft Statute 
adopted in 1994. The first provision encapsulating ‘complementarity’ in this draft was 
the third paragraph of the Preamble which stated that the ICC would be 
“complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial 
procedures may not be available or may be ineffective”.55 The meanings of the 
‘unavailability’ and ‘ineffectiveness’ of trial procedures were not stated. Delegates 
pointed out that the standards necessary to determine the ‘effectiveness’ of a domestic 
court were absent.56  
 
                                                
53 Brown (n 5) 420-426. 
54 ibid 423-427.  
55 ‘Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court with Commentaries’ (1994) vol II (2) Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 3 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1994.pdf> accessed 15 March 
2016.  
56 UNGA ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
General Assembly Official Records’ UN GAOR 50th Session Supp No 22 UN Doc A/50/22 (1995) para 
41 <https://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc21168.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016.  
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The second provision, namely draft Article 35 identified three scenarios where the 
ICC would be unable to initiate proceedings against an accused, firstly, where a State 
with jurisdiction had investigated the case and decided not to prosecute on “well 
founded” reasons, secondly, where a national investigation was ongoing and there 
were no reasons for the ICC to intervene in any way, and thirdly, the concerned case 
was not of “sufficient gravity” to justify the court’s action.57 Here again, explanations 
as to what constituted ‘well founded’ reasons or ‘sufficient gravity’ were not offered. 
These absences were acknowledged in a discussion paper drafted by the United 
Kingdom in 1996, which stated that the meaning of ‘complementarity’ as expressed 
in the draft statute was prone to “uncertainty and dispute”.58 The discussion paper 
proposed that the principle of complementarity meant the ICC respecting and not 
taking action with regards to “proper decisions” of national courts.59 The irony here is 
that no explanations were offered as to what was meant by a ‘proper decision’. 
 
In the course of the negotiations, the language depicting ‘complementarity’ underwent 
further changes. While a ‘complementary’ relationship reflected the general will of 
the delegates, there were two outstanding concerns which needed to be addressed. 
Representatives of New Zealand, Jamaica and Georgia feared that the ICC would 
become “merely residual” to national jurisdictions.60 Furthermore, the lingering 
possibility of ‘sham trials’ being conducted at the national level also remained. As a 
response to these concerns, the Preparatory Committee debates called for the need to 
                                                
57 UK Discussion Paper on Complementarity (29 March 1996) para 2 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/UKPaperComplementarity.pdf> accessed 15 March 2016.  
58 Tallgren (n 6) 130; UK Discussion Paper on Complementarity (n 57) para 7 
59 UK Discussion Paper on Complementarity (n 57) para 10  
60 ‘Jurisdiction of Proposed International Criminal Court Discussed in Preparatory Committee on its 
Establishment’ UN Press Release (2 April 1996) 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/1996/19960402.l2772.html> accessed 15 March 2016; Oscar Solera, 
‘Complementary Jurisdiction and International Criminal Justice’ (2002) 84 International Review of the 
Red Cross 145, 157. 
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set out basic and clearer conditions relating to national investigations and trials.61 In 
the final form of the Rome Statute, the ICC was empowered to assess whether it can 
exercise jurisdiction over a case being investigated or prosecuted at the national level. 
Furthermore, the delegates of the Preparatory Committee session of August 1997 
rejected ‘effectiveness’ on the grounds of vagueness, and agreed upon the word 
“genuinely” as the most appropriate criteria that would give the ICC a “large degree 
of flexibility” in making a subjective assessment of whether a State is “unwilling or 
unable” “genuinely” to investigate or prosecute.62  
 
Howsoever the Rome Statute draft was conceived, the theoretical underpinnings of 
complementarity originate from the principles of jurisdiction based on ‘territory’ and 
‘nationality’.63 The former maintains that States have jurisdiction over crimes 
perpetrated in their own geographical territory, while according to the latter, States 
have jurisdiction to prosecute its own nationals even with respect to crimes committed 
beyond its territory.64 According to Mohamed M El Zeidy, States have consistently 
and exclusively exercised jurisdiction based on territoriality and have conceded that 
right only in exceptional circumstances.65 Complementarity enshrined in various 
provisions of the Rome Statute is no different. Although the word ‘complementarity’ 
is absent from the text of the Rome Statute, it is strongly embedded as a principle 
                                                
61 ‘UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’ (17 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/10 (Vol II) 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf> accessed 15 March 
2016. 
62 Newton (n 5) 54.   
63 At the 4th plenary meeting held on Tuesday, 16 June 1998 and presided over by Mr. Conso of Italy, 
the representative of the Indian delegation Mr Lahiri stated that the principle of complementarity was 
“in conformity with the principles of territorial jurisdiction and the sovereignty of States.” See, ‘UN 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’  
(n 61) 86 para [49]; Zeidy (n 6) 870. 
64 Brown (n 5) 391. 
65 Zeidy (n 6) 870.  
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throughout its statutory provisions.66 The role played by the ICC in relation to national 
criminal jurisdictions, and the importance of the latter within the complementarity 
system is abundantly clear from the texts of the fourth, sixth and tenth paragraphs of 
the Preamble along with Article 1 of the Rome Statute. Paragraph four affirms that the 
effective prosecution of the most serious crimes must be ensured at the national level 
and by enhancing international cooperation.67 This is followed by the sixth paragraph 
which acknowledges that it is the duty of every State to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over such crimes.68 Paragraph ten and Article 1 states that the permanent International 
Criminal Court is mandated to play a role that is “complementary”69 to the national 
courts of State Parties.  
 
This role is further elucidated in Article 17 which specifies the circumstances in which 
a case becomes admissible before the ICC. The statutory provisions relating to 
complementarity relevant for the purposes of this chapter and the overall thesis are 
Articles 17(1)(a) and 17(2)(c). The former states that the ICC can admit a case if the 
concerned State “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution”. According to the latter provision, the ICC shall determine 
“unwillingness” by “having regard to the principles of due process recognized by 
international law” to see if the proceedings in question are not being “conducted 
independently or impartially” and are being “conducted in a manner which […] is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”. Therefore, the 
essence of complementarity is that in the global effort of ending impunity, the ICC 
                                                
66 Particularly in Paragraphs 4, 6 and 10 of the Preamble, and as well as Articles 1, 11, 15 17, 18, 19 
and 80. 
67 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Preamble, para 4.  
68 ibid Preamble, para 6. 
69 ibid article 1.  
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shall complement national criminal jurisdictions and possess the jurisdiction to try 
cases at a “subsidiary level”70 when the concerned State that exercised jurisdiction is 
“unwilling or unable genuinely”71 to proceed with an investigation or prosecution.  
 
Overall, these statutory provisions reveal a ‘duality’ in the nature of complementarity. 
While on the one hand, complementarity ensures the primacy of national courts over 
the ICC, it also ushered an end to the “unfettered prerogative” of States to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over international crimes.72 This ‘end’ was cemented the moment 
when State Parties sacrificed a degree of their sovereignty by empowering the ICC to 
determine the ‘unwillingness’ of States to investigate and prosecute by considering 
the “principles of due process recognized by international law”.73 This 
acknowledgement of the existence of a body of ‘due process’ standards recognized by 
international law in turn assumed the existence of a civitas maxima. It may be argued, 
therefore, that complementarity is a ‘compromise’ between the need to respect 
national sovereignty and to establish a permanent international court that would act as 
a failsafe in case the national criminal jurisdictions functioning under the shelter of 
‘national sovereignty’ did not genuinely investigate or prosecute.74 
 
1.3 The principled and practical motivations behind adopting complementarity   
 
                                                
70 Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press 2001) 
85. 
71 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 67) article 17.   
72 Newton (n 5) 26-27; Brown (n 5) 430. 
73 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 67) article 17(2); See the comments of Mr M V 
Raditapole, Delegate of the Kingdom of Lesotho and Mr. Chung Tae-ik the Delegate representing the 
Republic of Korea at the 2nd plenary meeting held on Monday, 15 June 1998, 69 paras 70 & 84 
<http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf> accessed 15 March 
2016. 
74 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
637, 648 
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Under the ICC’s complementarity regime, national criminal jurisdictions were 
expected to lead the first line of attack in the struggle against impunity because of 
principled as well as practical reasons. The principled reasons revolved mainly around 
the issues of sovereignty and the beneficial aspects of States actively engaged in 
fighting impunity, whereas the practical reasons took root in the need to deliver justice 
in an efficient manner.  
 
Sovereignty over territory is perceived as one of the most important aspects of 
statehood.75 It guarantees the right of States to exercise ‘sovereign’ will to create their 
own system of laws based on their cultural norms and values and set up judicial bodies 
to ensure that those laws are enforced. The powers of policing through criminal laws 
have traditionally been viewed as a prerogative of the State.76 This is why an 
international judicial forum exercising authority and jurisdiction over crimes 
committed within a State’s territory is generally perceived as an instance where the 
sovereignty of that State has been threatened and diminished.77 The principle of 
‘complementarity’ was a means of tempering the fears of States that the ICC would 
emerge as a “supranational entity” and preserving the integrity of individual criminal 
justice systems and the sovereignty of the States those systems belonged to.78  
 
                                                
75 Robert Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?’ (2005) 16 
European Journal of International Law 979; Markus Benzing, ‘The Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight 
against Impunity’ (2003) 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 591; Federica Gioia, ‘State 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the 
International Criminal Court’ (2006) Leiden Journal of International Law 1095; Webb and Bergsmo (n 
28); Brown (n 5) 393. 
76 Tallgren (n 6) 111; Brown (n 5) 424. 
77 Brown (n 5) 404. 
78 Leila Sadat Wexler, ‘Committee Report of Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and Complementarity’ 
(1996) 25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 221, 232; Rodney Dixon, Karim A A Khan 
and Richard May (eds), Archbold International Criminal Courts - Practice, Procedure & Evidence 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 30.  
 111 
It is argued that local justice also honours that need for justice to be seen to be done 
in the presence of victims generally in the region where the crimes were committed. 
This fits in with the notion that an accused should not be removed from his “natural 
judge”.79 The idea of domestically prosecuting international crimes is also perceived 
to be in alignment with the principle of jus de non evocando. This principle, generally 
featured in the constitutions of civil law jurisdictions, favours the prosecution of an 
accused before “regular domestic criminal courts” instead of “politically inspired ad 
hoc criminal tribunals” or local “extraordinary courts” constituted to try political 
crimes during crimes of unrest devoid of the fair trial rights applicable in ordinary 
courts.80 According to Michel Newton domestic prosecution not only assists in 
alleviating the wounds of a nation engulfed by mass atrocity, it also instils a sense of 
confidence and ownership over a judicial process aimed at undoing grave wrongs.81  
 
Just as it is true that one of the reasons prompting the creation of the ICC was the 
lethargy of States to exercise jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes, it is also a historical fact that the majority of prosecutions for violations of 
international humanitarian law, however limited, have been conducted not in 
international courts or tribunals but domestic ones.82 The traditional expectation 
regarding nation States is that they are much better equipped at mounting an effective 
challenge to impunity because their courts would be founded on familiar precedents 
                                                
79 Kenneth S Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 337. 
80 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Rwanda's Genocide the Politics of Global Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 
2005) 47; Virginia Morris, ‘Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on Jurisdiction. Case No. ICTR-96-
15-T’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 66, 68; Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 500.  
81 D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles’ 
(2004) 92 Georgetown Law Journal 1057, 1132.  
82 Newton (n 5) 38.  
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and rules and have much better access to evidence and witnesses and also resources.83 
In fact when the Rome Statute was being framed, the Committee of the International 
Law Association on a Permanent International Criminal Court acknowledged that 
domestic courts were at that point in time better equipped to prosecute core 
international crimes.84 
 
Furthermore, given the limited resources and political capital of the ICC,85 it does not 
make sense that one judicial body will be entrusted with the responsibility of 
effectively trying all perpetrators of international crimes. Granting primacy to the ICC, 
as was done in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR, might have ensured a stable and 
more coherent delivery of justice especially in situations where there were doubts 
about the “effectiveness and impartiality of national courts”, the possibility of “sham 
trials” or even the absence of the necessary judicial structures at the domestic level.86 
Also, if the ICC were to enjoy primacy over national courts, the observance of 
“minimum standards of justice” would ensure “uniformity in the legal process”.87 On 
the other hand, ‘primacy’ would “erode” not just the responsibility of individual states 
to prosecute but also the sovereignty of those States.88 It was also perceived as 
impractical in terms of adequately tackling the voluminous task of combatting 
impunity. This is why, under the ‘complementarity’ system of justice, national courts 
are obliged to play a much more significant role in the prosecution of international 
crimes.89 It is argued that creating a system permitting an enhanced role of national 
                                                
83 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 18) 153.  
84 Wexler (n 78) 231; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 18) 153. 
85 Newton (n 5) 38. 
86 Zeidy (n 28) 406; Jennifer Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International 
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court 
Prosecutions’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law Journal 574. 
87 Brown (n 5) 398 & 408.  
88 Solera (n 60) 147.  
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criminal jurisdictions would preserve sovereignty without compromising the goal of 
ending impunity. In addition, it would also encourage States to improve the standards 
of investigation and trial.90  
 
The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute marks a clear shift away from 
the notion that the responsibility to fight “the battle against impunity” rests on 
“international treaties and tribunals” and “national courts having no competence in 
such matters”.91 It reveals the presence of a persistent dialectical tension between the 
need to respect “national sovereignty” and the “universality of human rights” in the 
battle against impunity, but does not explicitly state what constitutes the principles of 
due process recognized by international law or what it means to genuinely carry out 
an investigation or prosecution.92 In an unideal world where the rate at which 
perpetrators commit the most serious crimes is far greater than the rate at which they 
are held accountable, delegating the primary responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes to national criminal jurisdictions complementarity was 
the only principled, practicable, efficient and politically acceptable way to convince 
State Parties to unite and establish a permanent international criminal court.  
 
2. Application of the principle of complementarity   
 
This Part looks at several judgments of the ICC which explains further the phrase 
“unwilling […] genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” enshrined in 
                                                
90 Dixon, Khan and May (eds) (n 78) 30.  
91 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 
[2002] ICJ Rep 3, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Bergenthal [51] 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8136.pdf > accessed 28 September 2016. 
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the principle of complementarity. It acknowledges that a strict reading of Article 17 
does not allow the ICC to hold that a State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution because due process rights of the accused were 
not respected. It relies on the ICC Appeals Chamber’s (AC) ‘Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi’, travaux préparatoires and 
statutory provisions of the Rome Statute and a policy paper published by the OTP to 
demonstrate that the ICC when assessing the ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and 
‘manner’ of a national proceeding for the purposes of determining the admissibility of 
that case, should be receptive towards the “diversity of legal systems, traditions and 
cultures”, but must ensure that “violations of the rights” of the accused that are of 
“egregious” nature do not take place in the name of ‘diversity’.93 
 
2.1 Understanding “unwilling […] genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution” through ICC case law 
 
Statutory provisions relating to complementarity in the Rome Statute were subject to 
minimal judicial examination during the initial years of the ICC’s operation.94 This 
stemmed from the understandable reluctance on the part of the ICC to “make 
determinations on unwillingness or inability” because such an exercise would 
potentially place “an entire judicial system on trial”.95 Nevertheless since 2009, 
several judgments by the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the ICC have contributed to laying 
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the “foundations for our understanding of the principle of complementarity”.96 Several 
important principles can be derived from these judgments, which offer limited but 
nevertheless important guidance on how to interpret the phrase: “[…] unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”. 
 
In order to assess ‘unwillingness or inability’, the ICC must first check whether if there 
are ongoing judicial proceedings at the domestic level. If the answer to this assessment 
is affirmative, the ICC must then for the purposes of evaluation take into consideration 
the on-going domestic proceedings or domestic proceedings that have already been 
concluded. As part of the ‘same person/same conduct’ test, the concerned domestic 
proceeding must be tied to the “same individual and substantially the same conduct”97 
in order for a case to be inadmissible before the ICC.98 In Prosecutor v Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (‘Katanga’), the AC found that the question of 
unwillingness or inability of a State having jurisdiction can be considered only when 
at the time of an admissibility challenge there are ongoing domestic investigations or 
prosecutions or there have been such investigations subsequent to which the concerned 
State decided not to prosecute.99 To search for ‘unwillingness or inability’ without 
first seeing whether there are ongoing investigations or proceedings or if 
investigations had been conducted in the past would be to “put the cart before the 
horse”.100  
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In Katanga the AC also found that the question of ‘unwillingness or inability’ did not 
arise when a State with jurisdiction was inactive, and that such ‘inaction’ rendered a 
case admissible before the Court under Article 17(1)(d).101 The AC stressed that 
complementarity meant striking a balance between protecting the primacy of domestic 
proceedings vis-à-vis the ICC on the one hand, and the Rome Statute’s goal of ending 
impunity on the other.102 This is why the ICC, where necessary, will be able to “step 
in” when a State does not or cannot investigate.103  
 
The issue of ‘investigations’ at the national level arose in Prosecutor v William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang. Here the AC distinguished 
between the task of determining the existence of an investigation and the task of 
assessing whether the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation”, and found that the former task preceded the latter when resolving the 
admissibility of a case.104 The AC clarified that when assessing whether a State is truly 
investigating, merely asserting that investigations are ongoing would not suffice. 
Instead, the State must provide specific evidence bearing probative value 
demonstrating that it is indeed investigating the case.105 Once the State adequately 
proved that investigations were ongoing, their ‘genuineness’ should be put to the test. 
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The three situations covered by Article 17(2) where a State may be found “unwilling 
[…] genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” include, national court 
proceedings “shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility”, 
proceedings subjected to “unjustified delay” which is “inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person concerned to justice” and finally, proceedings smeared with a lack of 
independence or impartiality which are being conducted in a manner that is 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice”.106 It is worth 
taking note that although Article 17 clearly anticipates “irresponsible states”107 that 
are not conducting proceedings “independently or impartially” because they do not 
have the intention of bringing the accused to justice or are trying to shield the accused 
from criminal responsibility, it does not appear to envision situations where national 
courts are conducting proceedings with a view to prosecute an accused but are doing 
so under conditions where the due process rights of the accused are not observed. In 
other words, these statutory provisions appear to address only circumstances that 
benefit the accused, not those that prejudice his or her rights.108 In 2006, Kevin Jon 
Heller described this as the “shadow side of complementarity”.109 
 
This interpretation had led academics to argue that Article 17 does not envisage the 
possibility of States being found “unwilling” because its national proceedings failed 
to uphold the “principles of due process recognized by international law” protecting 
the accused.110 In the words of Jennifer Trahan, the complementarity regime does not 
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address “overzealous” national prosecutions lacking in due process.111 Not only is this 
evidenced by the absence of any statutory provisions indicating otherwise, the travaux 
preparatoires of the Rome Statute reveal that Italy’s proposal to make the absence of 
“full respect for the fundamental rights of the accused” a ground for admissibility was 
defeated.112 According to Kevin Heller, the ICC is empowered to find that a State is 
‘unwilling or unable’ “only if its legal proceedings are designed to made a defendant 
more difficult to convict”.113 Therefore, it is argued that where the accused’s right to 
a fair trial has been violated, attributing the task of ‘supervising’ domestic courts to 
the ICC would contravene the spirit and purpose of the Rome Statute.114  
 
Not all academics, however, subscribe to this interpretation.115 The Office of the 
Prosecutor’s Informal Expert Paper titled “The Principle of Complementarity in 
Practice” in 2003 suggested that while the ICC was not a “human rights monitoring 
body” and it was not meant to play the role of ensuring “perfect procedures and 
compliance with all international standards”, information pertaining to the “legal 
regime of due process standards, rights of accused, procedures” may be gathered 
among a list of other things “to inform an admissibility assessment” under the 
branches of ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’.116 Proponents of this “due process thesis”117 
maintain that the process of bringing a “person […] to justice” under Articles 17(2)(b)-
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(c) does not merely encapsulate apprehending someone and trying that person before 
a court of law, but doing so in a manner that is ‘fair’. This argument is then extended 
along the lines that failing to ensure ‘fairness’ in domestic proceedings would infer 
that the concerned State is ‘unwilling’ “genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution”.118 This argument is rationalized on the belief that the process of bringing 
an accused to “justice” under Article 17(2)(c) cannot “disregard the principles of the 
criminal process”, i.e. delivering justice to victims does not preclude the responsibility 
of ensuring a fair trial.119  
 
Furthermore, it is also argued that a national judicial system becomes competent to 
“genuinely” investigate or prosecute international crimes when it incorporates 
procedural rights guaranteed to the accused by the Rome Statute.120 This position is 
rebutted by the likes of Sarah Nouwen and Jennifer Trahan who assert that the ICC is 
not statutorily permitted to apply its own procedural standards as benchmarks to 
determine the ‘genuineness’ of domestic judicial proceedings.121 The absence of 
statutory provisions tackling “overzealous” domestic prosecutions is, therefore, a 
potential ‘blind-spot’ in the complementarity system of justice installed by the Rome 
Statute. Kevin Heller fears that the ICC turning a blind eye to unfair national 
proceedings, would allow States to “replace one kind of impunity with another”.122  
 
This is why he called for the incorporation of the ‘due process thesis’ in the Rome 
Statute in 2009 when State Parties would be able to propose amendments, but at the 
                                                
118 Nouwen (n 110) 68; Heller (n 109) 282.  
119 Frédéric Mégret Marika Giles Samson, ‘Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya’(2013) 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 571, 585-586; Tedeschini (n 108) 80.  
120 Gioia (n 75) 1113. 
121 Trahan (n 86) 586; Nouwen (n 110) 67. 
122 Heller (n 109) 297.  
 120 
same time expressed his preference towards a “court-initiated solution”.123 There is 
scope to suggest that Heller’s wishes for a solution initiated by the court may have 
been answered to an extent in 2014 in the case Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi.124  
 
In the admissibility challenge involving Abdullah Al-Senussi, the issue of how fair 
trial breaches within a national criminal jurisdiction effected the ICC’s assessment of 
‘unwillingness’ was touched upon.125 In the judgment handed down following the 
appeal of Abdullah Al-Senussi against the admissibility decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, the AC rejected the argument advocated by the Defence that if a State does not 
respect the fair trial rights of the accused per se, then that State must be found 
“unwilling genuinely to carry out investigation or prosecution”.126 It reiterated once 
again that for a State to be found “unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute” 
under Article 17(2)(c), it must be shown that the proceedings were not or had not been 
conducted independently or impartially and had been conducted in a manner which 
was inconsistent with the intent of bringing the accused to justice.127 It went on to say 
that the process of making such a determination did not involve an assessment of 
whether the due process rights of the accused had been breached per se and that 
proceedings “being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice” should generally be interpreted 
as proceedings designed not to establish a suspect’s criminal responsibility but allow 
him or her to evade justice.128 In one of the Separate Opinions, Judge Anita Ušacka 
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explained that Libya did not have the “burden of showing that the proceedings are 
being conducted independently, impartially and fairly and with the intention of 
bringing Mr. Al-Senussi to justice”.129 Ušacka added that the “human right to a fair 
trial” despite its importance, “cannot play a central role in the determination of the 
admissibility of a case.”130 Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber found that despite the 
above-mentioned principles, there may be circumstances where violations of the rights 
of an accused in domestic proceedings are so “egregious” that they cannot be regarded 
as capable of providing “any genuine form of justice” to the accused, and as a 
consequence should be deemed “inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to 
justice”.131 Although the Appeals Chamber did not explicitly define what constitutes 
“egregious” violations of the accused’s rights, it did offer some guidance. For instance, 
judicial proceedings that are nothing more than a “predetermined prelude to an 
execution” would go against the “most basic understanding of justice”, necessitating 
intervention by the ICC.132  With specific regards to the Al-Senussi case, the Appeals 
Chamber found that the lack of access to a lawyer during the investigation stage of the 
proceedings was not a violation that would reach the “high threshold for finding that 
Libya is unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute” the accused.133 However, 
supporting the position of the Pre-Trial Chamber the AC clarified that “alleged 
violations of the accused's procedural rights” would not amount to being “per se 
grounds for a finding of unwillingness or inability under article 17 of the Statute.”134 
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2.2 Complementarity and the tolerance of ‘diversity’ in national approaches to 
justice 
 
The complementarity system in the Rome Statute creates a range of obligations on 
State Parties, which include among others the duty to cooperate with the ICC’s 
investigation and prosecution under Article 86, and the need to ensure the availability 
of procedures under national law to facilitate such cooperation under Article 88.135 
However, statutory provisions on complementarity or other provisions of the Rome 
Statute do not explicitly impose an obligation on State Parties to enact laws at the 
national level enabling the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.136 
Contrary to the position of Jann Kleffner,137 there is no ‘ambiguity’ on this issue. 
Kleffner, however, offers compelling reasons to accept that such an ‘obligation’ is 
implied in the preamble of the Rome Statute.138 In the fourth paragraph of the 
preamble, State Parties affirm that the “most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation”. This is followed by the fifth and sixth paragraphs which 
express the determination “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes” and affirm “the duty 
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”. In light of the complementarity system of justice where the ICC 
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‘complements’ national courts which are entrusted with the primary responsibility of 
tackling international crimes, the fact that States will set up domestic legislative 
frameworks to investigate and prosecute such crimes is no more than a natural 
consequence that gives meaning to the preambular mandates of the Rome Statute. 
This is precisely why scholars predicted early on that in the absence of comprehensive 
penal legislation capable of adequately covering the “ratione materiae” of the Rome 
Statute, it would not be possible to reap the benefits of complementarity and leave 
open the possibility for the ICC to determine that a State is ‘unable’ to ‘genuinely’ 
investigate and prosecute core international crimes.139 This is why many States have 
enacted implementing legislation because national legal systems implementing the 
substantial provisions of the Rome Statute serve the cause of strengthening the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility, upgrading relevant provisions of 
domestic criminal laws, and enhancing the consciousness of citizens regarding the 
responsibility of States to prosecute international crimes.140   
 
The existence of this ‘implied’ obligation to enact comprehensive domestic legislation 
does not mean that States must replicate the standards of justice emanating from the 
Rome Statute in their national laws. It should be recalled that the ICC complements 
national criminal jurisdictions and complementarity functions to preserve and protect 
the notion of state sovereignty. During the plenary meetings of the UN Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries held in June 1998, many delegates spoke on the 
proposed relationship between the ICC and national courts. During those meetings, 
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the ICC was not identified as an end in itself, but rather the means to an end – ensuring 
the end of impunity. Among others, James Crawford stated that as a consequence of 
the principle of complementarity, the ICC “would be integrated with the existing 
system of international criminal cooperation” and that “it was not intended to displace 
existing national systems that were capable of working properly”.141 This was 
reiterated by the delegates of Pakistan, Ghana, Brunei Darussalam, Ireland, India, 
China and other countries.142  
 
Soon after its establishment, scholars acknowledged that the ICC was the culmination 
of efforts of a “diverse coalition of States from North and South”.143 As a result, the 
text of the Statute symbolized a merger of traditions from both ‘common’ and ‘civil’ 
systems of law.144 A State exerts its sovereign will by enacting its own set of laws that 
are applied and enforced within its legal system. Since complementarity confirms that 
the “primacy” to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators international 
crimes belongs to nation States with jurisdiction,145 it is unrealistic to expect that they 
will adopt an identical set of laws and procedures to accomplish this. This was 
acknowledged in the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor” 
in 2003 which read: 
 
A major part of the external relations and outreach strategy of the Office 
of the Prosecutor will be to encourage and facilitate States to carry out 
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their primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes. In 
any assessment of these efforts, the Office will take into consideration the 
need to respect the diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures.146 
 
An important characteristic of the Rome Statute is that it employs the phrase “for the 
purposes of” several times, thereby clarifying that the standards of justice adopted for 
the purposes of the Statute are not meant to be applied beyond the proceedings of the 
International Criminal Court, unless States apply their sovereign will and incorporate 
them in their own national laws. A couple of other provisions reinforce this 
understanding. The Preamble of the Rome Statute recalls that “it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”.147 It 
is clear that this provision did not distinguish between States that had ratified the Rome 
Statute and States that had not, and left room for the element of diversity in the laws 
governing national criminal jurisdictions irrespective of whether they belonged to 
States that are party to the Rome Statute.148 Furthermore, Article 80 clarifies that the 
penalties the ICC is entitled to inflict do not affect “the application by States of 
penalties prescribed by their national law, nor the law of States which do not provide 
for penalties prescribed in the statute.”    
 
Embracing diverse standards of justice of national criminal jurisdictions does not 
empower States to sacrifice the enforcement of due process norms “on the altar of 
state sovereignty”.149 States are bound by the confines of their constitutions, other laws 
and international obligations to guarantee that judicial process functioning to end 
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impunity is fair, impartial and independent. Prosecuting perpetrators of international 
crimes is not just in the interests of nation States, but is equally a matter of concern 
for the international community. Therefore, even when a domestic court conducts an 
investigation or decides to prosecute, there will invariably be some tension while 
balancing the interests of state sovereignty and the interests of the international 
community which find expression in the “principles of due process recognized by 
international law”. Unless this ‘balance’ is treated with care, there is always the 
possibility that the ICC may admit a case on the basis that the proceedings in question 
are not being conducted with the purpose of bringing a perpetrator to justice. Not only 
does this take away the right of States to exercise national jurisdiction over 
international crimes, it also throws into question the legality and legitimacy of their 
own legal systems.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The ICC’s prospective mandate prevents it from exercising jurisdiction over the 
crimes being tried by the ICTs. It is not in a position to determine the ‘willingness’ of 
the ICTs to ‘genuinely’ investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of international 
crimes in light of the “principles of due process recognized by international law”.150 
This is why the Bangladeshi ICTs and the ICC share a unique relationship within the 
‘complementarity’ system. While it may appear that the relationship the ICTs share 
with the ICC bears no real importance, using Bangladesh as a case study will assist 
the ICC and any other entity having an interest in the ‘complementarity’ system to 
make better sense of situations that may arise in the future where a State has allegedly 
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failed to uphold its side of the bargain to independently and impartially impart justice, 
resulting in the need for the ICC to assess whether if the concerned State prosecuting 
accused for international crimes is ‘genuinely able’ to do so in light of the “principles 
of due process recognized by international law”.151 Furthermore, the lessons and 
experiences gained from the ICTs become relevant for the purposes of identifying 
some of complementarity’s points of ‘tension’ if, hypothetically speaking, any State 
Party chooses to investigate or prosecute perpetrators of international crimes that were 
committed after the adoption of the Rome Statute with legislation similar to that of the 
ICTA and through a judicial forum bearing resemblance with the ICTs. Of course, 
these benefits are in addition to the core aim of this thesis, i.e. to determine the legality 
and the legitimacy of the ICTs of Bangladesh through the prism of the principle of 
complementarity with particular reference to the “principles of due process recognized 
by international law”.152 
 
In March 2010, when Bangladesh decided to establish the first ICT under the ICTA, 
it went against the general tide of non-prosecution at the state level and emerged as a 
‘living’ example of the ‘first line of attack’ against the perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes. Bangladesh’s assertion of domestic jurisdiction over international crimes 
committed during the war of 1971 sent a strong message to the international 
community about its intention to implement the ethos of the Rome Statute, i.e. put an 
end to the culture of impunity. This effort has nevertheless been a ‘precarious’ one 
because critics have questioned the legality and legitimacy of the ICTs because they 
have been prosecuting international crimes at the expense of ‘international standards’. 
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This Chapter has shown the principle of complementarity ensures the primacy of 
national courts over the ICC, but also ushers an end to the “unfettered prerogative” of 
States to exercise criminal jurisdiction over international crimes.153 This ‘end’ was 
cemented the moment when State Parties sacrificed a degree of their sovereignty by 
empowering the ICC to determine the ‘unwillingness’ of States to investigate and 
prosecute by considering the “principles of due process recognized by international 
law”.154 In light of statutory provisions and travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute, 
policy papers published by the OTP and relevant decisions handed down by the ICC, 
this Chapter has demonstrated that national criminal jurisdictions while prosecuting 
the most serious crimes do not need to mirror the standards of justice adopted in the 
Rome Statute. The passing of the ICC Appeals Chamber’s (AC) ‘Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi’ has not eliminated the 
possibility of States to prosecute without observing the fair trial rights of an accused, 
but it has imposed restrictions on that possibility. This is why when assessing the 
‘independence’ or ‘impartiality’, or in other words the ‘fairness’ of any domestic 
justice mechanism prosecuting international crimes, the ICC should be receptive 
towards the “diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures”, but also ensure that 
“violations of the rights” of the accused that are of “egregious” nature are not 
permitted in the name of ‘diversity’.155 If egregious violations of the rights of an 
accused take place in a case being tried before a national criminal jurisdiction, the ICC 
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may intervene on the grounds that the case is incapable of providing “any genuine 
form of justice” and is “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice” under 
Article 17(2)(c) of the Rome Statute.156  
 
The forgoing discussions have laid the foundations for the next four chapters of this 
thesis which evaluate the main areas of contention surrounding the Bangladeshi ICTs 
through the prism of the principle of complementarity with particular reference to the 
“principles of due process recognized by international law”.157 The following Chapter 
(IV) analyses the major criticisms of the ICTA relating to the principle of legality, also 
known as the rule against ex post facto or retroactive law.
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Chapter IV 
Analysing the major criticisms of the ICTA (I) 
 
Introduction 
 
On 25 March, 2010 after a delay of thirty-seven years, the first International Crimes 
Tribunal (ICT) was established to detain, prosecute and punish “persons for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law”1 
committed in 1971 during Bangladesh’s “historic struggle for national liberation”.2 
The opinions of stakeholders regarding the overall fairness of the trial process applied 
in the ICTs are highly polarized. On multiple occasions, Ministries and other 
representatives of the Bangladesh Government have claimed that the trials are in 
accordance with “international standards” and the ICTA adheres “to most of the rights 
of the accused enshrined under Article 14 of the ICCPR”.3 In several of their own 
judgments, the ICTs have observed that the statutory provisions of the International 
Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICTA) are “broadly and fairly compatible with current 
international standards”.4 According to several academics and justice forums, the 
                                                
1 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 [ACT NO. XIX OF 1973], Preamble < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=435 > accessed 6 May 2014.  
2 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Preamble; Julfikar Ali Manik and Hasan 
Jahid Tusher, ‘Stage Set for War Trial’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 26 March 2010) 
<http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-131639> accessed 06 August 2017.  
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘A Position Paper on ICT-BD Trials and Execution of Verdict against 
Mr. Abdul Quader Molla on 12 December 2013’ (The Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, 2013) 2, 8 <http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/position-paper-ict-bd-trials-and-execution-
verdict-against-mr-abdul-quader-molla> accessed 8 August 2017; ‘Int'l Crimes Tribunal Fair’ The 
Daily Star (Dhaka, 17 January 2012) <http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-218712> accessed 7 
August 2017; ‘Shafique Dismisses Controversies Over War Crimes Trial’ Ittefaq (Dhaka, 29 April 
2013) <http://www.clickittefaq.com/shafique-dismisses-controversies-over-war-crimes-trial/> 
accessed 7 August 2017; ‘War Trial Appreciated Abroad: Qamrul’ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha 
(Dhaka, 7 December 2013) <http://www.bssnews.net/newsDetails.php?cat=0&id=375416$date=2013-
12-07&dateCurrent=2013-12-14> accessed 8 August 2017.  
4 The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (Judgment) ICT-1 (28 February 2013) ICT-BD 
Case No. 01 of 2011 [32] <http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/sayeedi_full_verdict.pdf> 
accessed 21 May 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury (Judgment) ICT-1 (1 
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governing statute and the rules of procedure of the ICTs uphold the “core tenets of the 
right to fair trial”.5 At the other end of the spectrum, critics ranging from counsel 
defending the accused, academics, international lawyers, human rights organizations 
to foreign State agencies claim that the domestic judicial process established by the 
ICTA is a case of “complementarity gone bad”6 because it does not “comply with the 
norms and standards of international law”7 and trials before the ICTs are “replete with 
violations of the right to a fair trial”.8 Toby Cadman, one of the foreign counsel 
defending the accused stressed as early as December 2011 that it was the responsibility 
of the international community to intervene if the Bangladesh Government was “either 
unwilling or unable to meet its international obligations.”9 This transformed into a 
direct call for intervention in December 2013 when Cadman demanded the 
establishment of an “internationally-supervised tribunal” that would serve as a bridge 
                                                
October 2013) ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 2011 [38] <http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT-
BD%20Case%20No.%2002%20of%202011%20Delivery%20of%20judgment%20final.pdf> accessed 
21 May 2017.  
5 Ridwanul Hoque, ‘War Crimes Trial in Bangladesh: A Legal Analysis of Fair Trial Debates’ (2016) 
17 Australian Journal of Asian Law 1, 16; See also, M Rafiqul Islam, ‘Trials for International Crimes 
in Bangladesh: Prosecutorial Strategies, Defence Arguments and Judgments’ in Kirsten Sellars (ed), 
Trials for International Crimes in Asia (Cambridge University Press 2016) 306 & 317; International 
Crimes Strategy Forum, ‘Stephen Rapp: of Misconceptions, Unrealistic Expectations and Double 
Standards’ bdnews24 (Dhaka, 22 May 2011) <http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2011/05/22/stephen-rapp-
of-misconceptions-unrealistic-expectations-and-double-standards/> accessed 21 May 2017; 
International Crimes Strategy Forum, ‘Legal Framework of ICT and Fair Trial Attributes’ bdnews24 
(Dhaka, 28 March 2013) <http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/03/28/legal-framework-of-ict-and-fair-
trial-attributes/> accessed 21 May 2017; Tureen Afroz (ed), Genocide, War Crimes & Crimes Against 
Humanity in Bangladesh: Trial under International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (Forum for Secular 
Bangladesh and Trial of War Criminals of 1971 2010). 
6 Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal (BICT): Complementarity Gone 
Bad’(IntLawGrrls, 8 October 2014) <https://ilg2.org/2014/10/08/the-bangladesh-international-crimes-
tribunal-bict-complementarity-gone-bad/> accessed 6 August 2017. 
7 Abdus Samad, ‘The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh and International Law’ (2016) 27 
Criminal Law Forum 257, 290; See also, Abdur Razzaq, ‘The Tribunals in Bangladesh: Falling Short 
of International Standards’ in Kirsten Sellars (ed), Trials for International Crimes in Asia (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 341-359; Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the 
Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 191.  
8 ‘Bangladesh: Halt Imminent War Crimes Executions Impose Immediate Moratorium on the Death 
Penalty’ (Human Rights Watch, 1 September 2016) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/01/bangladesh-halt-imminent-war-crimes-executions> accessed 
8 March 2017. 
9 Toby M Cadman, ‘The International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh: International Standards and 
Fundamental Freedoms’ (9 Bedford Row International, 12 December 2011) 9 
<http://tobycadman.com/files/ICT_BD_Memorandum2.pdf> accessed 7 August 2017. 
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between the conflicting camps seeking “prosecution of persons accused of atrocities” 
and those arguing that the judicial mechanism set in place in Bangladesh is “inherently 
flawed”.10 This view was echoed by several experts of international law in March 2016 
when they recommended the staying of ongoing trials and unexecuted sentences 
“pending an independent international review” and the establishment of an 
“internationally supervised mechanism” by the United Nations that implements 
“recognised due process rights” and adopts “fair trial protections” guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and those international instruments to which Bangladesh 
is “obliged to observe” as a State Party.11 Some academics and international law 
practitioners, nonetheless concede that while the ICTs have suffered from “teething 
problems”12 and like any justice system is not devoid of shortcomings, many of the 
criticisms directed at them ought to be “ignored or dismissed” because they are based 
“more on supposition than substance” and are framed to “obstruct and undermine the 
judicial process for political ends”.13 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the legality and the legitimacy of the 
International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) of Bangladesh through the prism of the 
principle of complementarity with particular reference to the “principles of due 
                                                
10 Toby M Cadman, ‘Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal: Commentary on the Application of 
International Standards’ (9 Bedford Row International, December 2013) 24-25 
<http://tobycadman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/131121-Bangladesh-Briefing-Document-
December.pdf> accessed 7 August 2017.  
11 ‘International Legal Experts Express Concern Over the Lack of an Appropriate Accountability 
Mechanism in Bangladesh and Calls on the United Nations to Support an Internationally Supervised 
Mechanism’ (Toby Cadman, 31 May 2016) <http://tobycadman.com/international-legal-experts-
express-concern-over-the-lack-of-an-appropriate-accountability-mechanism-in-bangladesh-and-calls-
on-the-united-nations-to-support-an-internationally-supervised-mechanism/> accessed 6 August 2017; 
Desmond de Silva, ‘The Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal Should be Internationalised - for the Sake 
of the Nation’s Future’ (No Peace Without Justice)  <http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Bangladesh-War-
Crimes-Tribunal-should-be-internationalised-sake-nation%E2%80%99s-future.html> accessed 6 
August 2017.   
12 Islam (n 5) 317.  
13 Richard Rogers, ‘International Crimes and the Tribunal in Bangladesh’ (2012) 6(5) Forum 
<http://archive.thedailystar.net/forum/2012/May/international.htm> accessed 21 May 2017.  
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process recognized by international law”.14 For that purpose, the ongoing and 
subsequent Chapters analyse at length the major criticisms of the ICTs that have 
emerged from the international community. These criticisms include, the retroactive 
application of statutory provisions of the ICTA and the amendment enabling the 
Prosecution to appeal against the sentence of life imprisonment given to Abdul Quader 
Molla, the passing of the death penalty by the ICTs and the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh, the application of Articles 47(3) and 47A of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, which provides constitutional protection to the 
ICTA and bars those charged with international crimes from moving the Supreme 
Court to benefit from the remedies guaranteed under Bangladesh’s Constitution, the 
practice of limiting the number of defence witnesses, and finally the holding of trials 
in absentia. These criticisms have been grouped into two broad categories, namely, 
criticisms of statutory provisions of the ICTA which are analysed in the ongoing and 
subsequent Chapter (IV and V) and criticisms of the trial process under the ICTs which 
are analysed in Chapters VI and VII.  
 
In three parts, this Chapter identifies and analyses the major criticisms relating to the 
principle of legality that have been directed towards the ICTA. Part I discusses the 
relationship between the ICTA and the general concept of “international standards” of 
justice. Part II offers a theoretical and historical appreciation of the principle of 
legality, which synonymously is known as the rule against ex post facto or retroactive 
law. Part III critiques three specific provisions of the ICTA that critics allege are 
incompatible with the principle of legality.  
                                                
14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 17(2). 
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1. The relationship between the ICTA and international standards of justice  
 
Critics argue that the overall fairness of the ongoing justice process in Bangladesh 
should be assessed against the “international standards”15 of justice, fairness or due 
process which not only “imposes far greater demands on a process of accountability 
than it did in 1973” but has “redefined” our understanding of international criminal 
law.16 This suggests assessing the major areas of contention surrounding the ICTA 
and the ICTs should start with an examination of the relationship between the ICTA 
and the general concept of “international standards” of justice.  
 
The statutory provisions of the ICTA reflected the standards of justice that existed 
during the early 1970s.17 Just as the German Tribunals formed in 1945 under Control 
Council Law No. 10 in Germany were an improvement on the proceedings of the 
Nuremberg trials, the Israeli Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-
195018 and the Bangladeshi ICTA have been interpreted as “progressive [...] for its 
time”.19 Members of the academic and legal community lauded Bangladesh for 
adopting the ICTA at a time when there was a “void in the world of international 
                                                
15 The phrase “international standards” has been used on countless occasions by critics of the trial 
process ongoing in Bangladesh. Linton (n 7) 191; ‘Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal Should 
Pursue Justice, Not Vengeance’ (International Commission of Jurists, 28 February 2013) 
<https://www.icj.org/bangladesh-international-crimes-tribunal-should-pursue-justice-not-vengeance/> 
accessed 10 August 2017; ‘Bangladesh: War Crimes Verdict Based on Flawed Trial’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 22 March 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/bangladesh-war-crimes-verdict-
based-flawed-trial> accessed 10 August 2017.  
16 Linton (n 7) 209.  
17 Brad Adams, ‘Letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Re: International Crimes (Tribunals) Act’ 
(Human Rights Watch, 8 July 2009) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/08/letter-prime-minister-
sheikh-hasina-re-international-crimes-tribunals-act> accessed 9 August 2017.   
18 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950 <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/aacf823ae32ab469c12575ae0034c1fe/$FILE/Law%20no.%2064.pdf> accessed 9 August 
2017.  
19 Linton (n 7) 208.  
 135 
machinery to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes” and described the effort 
as “remarkable and admirable”.20  
 
For nearly forty years, however, the key statutory provisions of the ICTA remained 
significantly unchanged.21 In 2010, the Bangladesh Government established the first 
ICT to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes through a 
legislation that had never been  applied since its creation. In the meantime, the corpus 
juris of international criminal law had gradually evolved through the trials and 
proceedings of multiple justice initiatives and the human rights movement had gained 
momentum resulting in the development of international human rights law.22 This was 
acknowledged in a letter to the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Law, 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, where Stephen J Rapp the former US Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues commented that it would be problematic to operate “a 
tribunal in 2011 using a law created forty years ago” because international 
humanitarian law had developed more fully since the Nuremberg Code “thanks to the 
Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the 
creation of the International Criminal Court.”23 The first criticism towards the ICTA 
relating to “international standards” was recorded in a report titled “Ignoring 
Executions and Torture - Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces.”24 Published by 
                                                
20 M Amir-Ul Islam, ‘Towards the Prosecution of Core International Crimes Before the International 
Crimes Tribunal’ in Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH Wui Ling (eds), Old Evidence and Core 
International Crimes (TOAEP 2012) 217 <http://www.toaep.org/ps-pdf/16-bergsmo-cheah> accessed 
9 August 2017; Linton (n 7) 208. 
21 After 1973, a few amendments were introduced to the ICTA in 2009, 2012 and 2013. See, (n 3).  
22 Examples of justice initiatives include, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and other trials held in purely domestic 
settings of Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Norway etc.   
23 Letter from Stephen J Rapp to Dr Dipu Moni and Barrister Shafique Ahmed (21 March 2011).  
24 Henrik Alffram, Ignoring Executions and Torture Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces 
(Human Rights Watch 2009) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0509web.pdf> 
accessed 12 August 2017.  
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Human Rights Watch in May 2009, before the ICTs had been established, the report 
observed that the ICTA did not require the application of Bangladeshi laws relating to 
criminal procedure or evidence and expressed concern that the trials held under it 
“may not meet international fair trial standards and [...] be subject to political 
influence.”25 As the ICTs were set up and the trials were underway, the growing list 
of criticisms were all extensions of the initial criticism that “international standards” 
of justice were not being upheld.  
 
Although the phrase “international standards” of justice has been used on many 
occasions to assess the ICTA and the ICTs, as a general concept it is not well-defined 
in international law. In a position paper by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Bangladesh Government, it was argued that although the term “international standard” 
does not “connote any concrete definition as per international law”, the ICTs have 
treated international human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Politics Rights (ICCPR) as the benchmark to assess whether their 
proceedings comply with “so-called ‘international standards’”.26  
 
Amongst critics, there is noticeable disagreement with regards to which set of 
“international standards” ought to be followed. In one of the earliest detailed 
examinations of the ICTA, Suzannah Linton cited “Article 33 new” of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to point out 
that “international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law” were set out 
in Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.27 Some international lawyers including counsel 
                                                
25 ibid 12.  
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n 3) 2.  
27 Linton (n 7) 290.  
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defending the accused have stressed that in addition to the guarantees of the ICCPR, 
the ICTA and the ICTs must employ the “spirit of the Statute of Rome” as a 
requirement under the principle of complementarity.28 Others have called for the 
adoption of the rules and procedures followed by the “Special Court for Sierra Leone 
and similar bodies”.29 According to Geoffrey Robertson QC, the sources of 
“international standards of fairness” include the ICCPR, UN Economic and Social 
Council’s Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death 
penalty 1984 and the General Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee.30  
 
In light of these positions, it is worth taking a brief look at the relationship the legal 
system of Bangladesh shares with international law. The Bangladesh Constitution 
refers to international law on two occasions. Article 25 of the judicially unenforceable 
‘Fundamental Principles of State Policy’31 of the Constitution states: “The State shall 
base its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and 
equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement 
of international disputes, and respect for international law and the principles 
enunciated in the United Nations Charter, […].”32 Article 145A which governs the 
                                                
28 Toby M Cadman and Sarah Bafadhel, ‘Courting Controversy – Representing Accused Before the 
International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh’ (2011) 3 Criminal Bar Quarterly 13; British Barrister 
John Cammegh said: “This is a fanciful notion to suggest that this was a mature Tribunal set up to try 
current modern offences. There was no modernity to it at all. There could have been, had the trial been 
run on consistent lines with the ICC. Now the International Criminal Court has very well laid down 
rules of evidence, definitions of crimes, rules of procedure.” See, Al Jazeera English, ‘Inside Story - 
Bangladesh Executions: Justice or Political Rivalry?’ (22 November 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-O2w18cYgA&t=13s> accessed 10 August 2017; Letter from 
Stephen J Rapp to Dr Dipu Moni and Barrister Shafique Ahmed (n 23); International Crimes Strategy 
Forum, ‘Stephen Rapp: of Misconceptions, Unrealistic Expectations and Double Standards’ (n 5).  
29 Sir Desmond de Silva (n 11).  
30 Geoffrey Robertson, Report on the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (International 
Forum for Democracy and Human Rights 2015) 72-75, 85 & 114.  
31 (n 2) article 8(2) explains that the principles set out in Part II “shall be fundamental to the governance 
of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the State in the making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation 
of the Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the 
State and of its citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable.” 
32 ibid article 25.  
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adoption and codification of international treaties in domestic law and provides that a 
treaty shall be laid down by the President for discussion in the Parliament.33 Both these 
provisions must be interpreted in light of Article 7(2) which sets out that the 
Constitution is the “supreme law of the Republic” and therefore overrides both 
national and international law.34 As time has progressed, case-law has clarified that in 
case of conflict, national law shall prevail.35 International law therefore has limited 
influence on Bangladesh’s legal order.  
 
According to Bianca Karim and Tirza Theunissen, since Bangladesh is a country  with 
a “dualistic common law tradition”, international treaties need to be incorporated into 
domestic legislation before they can become legally enforceable.36 This has been 
acknowledged in multiple judgments including Hussain Muhammad Ershad v 
Bangladesh37 where the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh held: 
“it is [true] that Universal Human Rights norms, whether given in the Universal 
Declaration or in the Covenants, are not directly enforceable in national Courts. But if 
their provisions are incorporated into the domestic law, they are enforceable in 
national Courts.”38 In the absence of any constitutional provision clearly depicting the 
status of ‘customary international law’ in the legal order of Bangladesh, it remains a 
                                                
33 Bianca Karim and Tirza Theunissen, ‘Bangladesh’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and 
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 
2012) 3; ibid article 145A.  
34 (n 2) article 7(2) reads: “This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will of the people, the 
supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”; Bianca Karim and Tirza Theunissen, ‘Bangladesh’ 
in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, 
and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 2012) 10.  
35 Karim and Theunissen (n 33) 10.  
36 ibid 4.  
37 Hussain Muhammad Ershad v Bangladesh & Ors 21 BLD (2001) AD 69. 
38 Karim and Theunissen (n 33) 5; In Bangladesh v Sombon Asavhan 32 DLR (1980) AD 198, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held: “It is well settled that where there is municipal law on 
an international subject the national court's function is to enforce the municipal law within the plain 
meaning of the statute.” 
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generally accepted principle that customary international law is binding as long as it 
does not contradict domestic law.39 Therefore, in situations where courts are left with 
the option of enforcing either a municipal law or the customary international law on a 
given subject, the trend in Bangladesh is to give effect to the municipal law.40  
 
The same principle applies for international covenants and conventions that have been 
ratified but are yet to form a part of the corpus juris of the State via incorporating 
domestic legislation.41 This, however, does not prevent courts from utilizing relevant 
international law as an aid to interpreting provisions of Part III of the Constitution 
which enumerates the judicially enforceable fundamental rights. Justice Bimalendu 
Bikash Roy Choudhury has recognized that national Courts should not straightaway 
ignore international obligations undertaken by Bangladesh and that they “should draw 
upon the principles incorporated in the international instruments” when domestic laws 
are unclear or are silent on the issue at hand and that “beneficial provisions of 
international instruments should be implemented as is the obligation of a signatory 
State.”42 When it comes to interpreting the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of 
the Constitution, Bangladesh Courts have referred to international covenants and 
conventions in the past.43 For instance, in Salma Sobhan v Government of 
Bangladesh44 the High Court Division of the Supreme Court referred to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
                                                
39 Karim and Theunissen (n 33) 8; Karim and Theunissen have argued that Article 25 “has been 
interpreted as containing certain basic principles of customary international law which are considered 
to be jus cogens”; Bangladesh v Unimarine S.A. Panama 29 DLR (1977) 252.  
40 Karim and Theunissen (n 33) 10. 
41 Chaudhury and Kendra v Bangladesh and Ors, Writ petition, No 7977 of 2008, 29 BLD (2009) HCD; 
Bangladesh v Sheikh Hasina 60 DLR (2008) AD 90.  
42 Hussain Muhammad Ershad v Bangladesh & Ors (n 37); State v Md Roushan Mondal Hashem 26 
BLD (2006) HCD 549 (Justice B B Roy Choudhury).  
43 Karim and Theunissen (n 33) 111.  
44 ibid (n 33) 53.  
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Punishment to conclude that the practice of chaining prisoners with bar fetters was a 
“cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and therefore constituted a violation of 
fundamental rights.”45  
 
The Supreme Court has in the past relied upon the ICCPR, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), General 
Comment No. 7 of the Human Rights Committee, a World Health Organization 
resolution and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to interpret and apply 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On appeal in Abdul Quader 
Molla v The Chief Prosecutor46, Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha acknowledged the 
persuasive authority the judgments passed by international tribunals had on the 
proceedings of the ICTs. He explained that although the need to infuse provisions of 
international law did not arise because of the “fulsome, comprehensive and 
unambiguous” provisions of the ICTA, Judges when interpreting and applying the law 
could take the aid of the “ratio or observation[s]” and “decisions” of Nuremberg and 
Tribunals created by the United Nations as persuasive precedents as long as there was 
no conflict between them and the ICTA.47  
 
It is important to note that the above discussion explains the relationship the legal 
system of Bangladesh shares with ‘international law’ and is relevant to this thesis only 
to the extent that it speaks to the legality of the ICTs, not their legitimacy. International 
standards of justice should not be ignored. However, if the requirement for trials taking 
                                                
45 ibid (n 33) 111.  
46 Abdul Quader Molla v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 24 - 25 of 
2013 < http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/601845_CrlA_24_25_2013.pdf > 
accessed 10 August 2017. 
47 ibid 574 – 575.  
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place within a national criminal jurisdiction to be described as ‘independent’ or 
‘impartial’ is to adhere to the highest “international standards” of justice, it is possible 
that such trials will invariably fall short of the benchmark and as a result automatically 
be described as unfair or illegitimate. Chapter III has already demonstrated that the 
‘complementary’ system of justice does not require national criminal jurisdictions to 
adopt the judicial standards of the Rome Statute. Rather, when assessing 
‘independence’ or ‘impartiality’, or in other words the ‘fairness’ of any domestic 
justice mechanism prosecuting international crimes, the ICC is obligated by Article 
17(2) to perform an evaluation using the “principles of due process recognized by 
international law” as the benchmark. While carrying out this assessment, the ICC 
should be receptive towards the “diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures”, 
but also ensure that “violations of the rights” of the accused that are of “egregious” 
nature are not permitted in the name of ‘diversity’.48 Therefore, the persistent and 
sweeping insistence by the representatives of the Bangladesh Government and critics 
that the ICTA and the ICTs either do or do not reflect “international standards” is not 
just an inaccurate position to take but is also the incorrect benchmark to adopt for the 
purposes of assessing the legality and legitimacy of the ICTs.  
 
2. The principle of legality and the ICTA 
                                                
48 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
(International Criminal Court, September 2003) 5 < https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-
de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf > accessed 24 September 2017; 
Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah 
Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi'”) ICC-O1/11-01/11OA6 (24 July 2014) [3] < 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF > accessed 15 March 2016. 
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The principle of legality, also known as the rule against ex post facto or retroactive 
law, remains a recurring point of tension in the global struggle against impunity.49 
This Chapter analyses the major areas of contention surrounding the ICTA relating to 
the principle of legality. To that end, this part offers a theoretical and historical 
appreciation of the principle. It argues that although the amount of importance given 
to the principle of legality has significantly increased over the years, it does not 
prohibit the prosecution of international crimes by way of a retroactively applied law 
as long as the crimes defined in that law were criminalised under international law or 
the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations. The principle 
also doesn’t bar the progressive development of the law, provided that the developed 
law retains the essence of the original crime.  
 
2.1 A theoretical and historical appreciation of the principle of legality  
 
The principle of legality is formulated as nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, a 
phrase coined by German scholar Anselm Feuerbach.50 A fundamental tenet of 
“democratic criminal law”51 that emerged as “a reaction against the system of absolute 
discretion in the sphere of legislation and jurisprudence”,52 it is also often alternatively 
expressed as the ban of analogy, principle of specificity and non-retroactivity.53 The 
                                                
49 Shane Darcy, ‘The Principle of Legality at the Crossroads of Human Rights and International 
Criminal Law’ in Margaret de Guzman and Diane Amann (eds), Arcs of Global Justice; Essays in 
Honor of William A. Schabas (Oxford University Press 2016) 1.  
50 Paul J A Ritter von Feuerbach, ‘The Foundations of Criminal Law and the Nullum Crimen Principle’ 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1005, 1008. 
51 This phrase was coined by Stefan Glaser in his essay, ‘Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ (1942) 24 (I) 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 29.  
52 ibid 30.  
53 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, ‘The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in 
Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 38, 40; 
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principle of legality finds its origins in the doctrine of strict legality54 and hence 
symbolizes the preference of favour rei over favor societatis55 by placing a bar on the 
extension of scope and purport of a criminal rule to a matter that is unregulated by law 
and prohibiting the prosecution of crimes through ex post facto legislation.56 Although 
its genesis remains a matter of limited academic debate, Antonio Cassese has argued 
that strict legality was initially expressed in Article 39 of the Magna Carta libertatum 
of 1205 and found its “philosophical and political underpinnings” in the works of the 
principal thinkers of the Enlightenment.57 Definite traces of strict legality are also 
found within the writings of Montesquieu, Cesar Beccaria and Franz von Liszt and 
also legal instruments such as the American Declaration of Rights and Grievances, 
1774 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789.  
 
Evaluations of the ‘past’ reveal that nullum crimen was not always unanimously 
agreed upon across civil and common law jurisdictions. Over the years multiple 
considerations have gradually strengthened the foundations and cemented the 
universal acceptance of the principle of legality, all of which are founded on the 
notions of ensuring clarity of law coupled with among other things, the fair and 
foreseeable administration of justice.58 One of the guiding principles of nullum crimen 
is that “the idea of guilt demands consciousness of illegality”.59 Therefore, as a 
                                                
54 See generally, Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2013) 22-23; Glaser (n 51) 29-30; Robert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl 
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principle, it bases itself on the idea that persons who reasonably believed their conduct 
was lawful from retroactive criminalization do not deserve to be prosecuted, unlike 
those who were aware that their conduct was of ‘criminal’ nature.60 According to 
Andrew Ashworth, the essence of nullum crimen is that, “a person should never be 
convicted or punished except in accordance with a previously declared offence 
governing the conduct in question.”61 The objective underlying this bar on ex post 
facto prosecution is to safeguard citizens against the arbitrary power of the government 
and also the possibility of excessive judicial discretion.62  
 
Franz von Liszt described nullum crimen as the “magna carta of the delinquent”63 and 
emphasized the importance of this principle in uncompromising terms. Liszt argued 
that the reinforcing of maxims such as nullum crimen sine lege and nullum poena sine 
lege64 in criminal codes protected “the bulwark of the citizen against the State’s 
omnipotence, the individual against the ruthless power of the majority, against the 
Leviathan.”65 Nullum crimen over the years gained support from the Nuremberg 
judgments, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and has transformed from being a 
principle of justice to an internationally recognized human right that forms an integral 
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65 Franz von Liszt, ‘The Rationale for the Nullum Crimen Principle’ (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1009, 1010; Glaser (n 51) 30.  
 145 
part of our conscience of penal justice and must be observed in all circumstances in 
national and international tribunals.66  
 
Early on, international criminal law was driven by the doctrine of substantive justice 
which prompted the legal order to prohibit and punish socially harmful conduct 
irrespective of whether that conduct was legally criminalized at the time it had taken 
place.67 Cassese argues that this was not due to the presence of a totalitarian streak in 
international society but rather because states were not prepared to enter into treaties 
laying down criminal rules and customary international rules covering this area had 
not evolved.68  
 
The preference towards strict legality was, however, manifest during the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 when the first international prosecutions were being conceived.69 
The Commission of Responsibilities pointed out that while the premeditation of a war 
of aggression was something the public conscience would reprove and history would 
condemn, it was not “an act contrary to positive law”.70 When the Commission 
contemplated the possibility of prosecuting individuals for the breach of the “laws and 
principles of humanity”, American negotiators Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott 
objected on the grounds that “an act could not be a crime in the legal sense of the word, 
                                                
66 Kenneth S Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
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 146 
unless it were made by law, and that the commission of an act declared to be a crime 
by law could not be punished unless the law prescribed the penalty to be inflicted.”71 
 
It was only after the Second World War, as the “modern law of human rights”72 began 
to gradually take centre stage, that the doctrine of substantive justice was replaced by 
strict legality – granting nullum crimen a stronger footing in the arena of international 
criminal law not just as a principle of justice but an internationally recognized human 
right.73 In Göring and others the International Military Tribunal (IMT) faced strong 
objections of the German defence counsel on the grounds that it was not allowed to 
apply ex post facto law. Counsel representing the defendants argued in favour of 
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege74 as a “fundamental principle of all law 
- international and domestic” and that:  
 
ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations, 
that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time that 
the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined 
aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission, and no 
court had been created to try and punish offenders.75 
 
Whether the irony of this argument occurred to Hermann Wilhelm Göring and his 
colleagues is unknown. But in 1935 the Nazi regime had abolished the rule against 
                                                
71 Paris Peace Conference, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and 
Dissenting Reports of America and Japanese Members of the Commission on Responsibilities, 
Conference of Paris, 1919 (Clarendon Press 1919); ibid 49.   
72 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 54) 18.  
73 Cassese and Gaeta (n 54) 24-27; Gallant (n 66) 3.  
74 n 50.  
75 ‘Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences October 
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retroactive criminal legislation, which had previously been enshrined in paragraph 2 
of the German Criminal Code of 15 May, 1871 and Article 116 of the Weimar 
Constitution.76 Hans Kelsen notes that this abolition was embraced in Nazi literature 
with high praise. When faced with the death penalty, Göring’s lawyers had insisted 
upon the fundamental nature of the principle of legality – one that could not be 
compromised, yet during the ascension of Nazi Germany, its decrees in the Free City 
of Danzig had allowed courts to punish new crimes where they are “deserving of 
penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of a penal law and sound popular 
feeling”.77 Although these decrees were consistent with European codifications that 
extended legislation by analogy,78 their scope was condemned by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice on the ground that they were irreconcilable with the bar on 
retroactive punishment in the Constitution of the Free City, which was approved and 
guaranteed by the League of Nations.79  
 
Nuremberg did not leave this question unanswered. It was argued that the IMT was 
bound by its Statute, the London Agreement of 8th August 1945, which was “not an 
arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but […] the expression 
of International Law existing at the time of its creation; and […] a contribution to 
International Law.”80 Intriguingly, the Tribunal did not shy away from expressing its 
                                                
76 Paragraph 2 of the German Criminal Code which originally read: “For no act may punishment be 
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reliance on the philosophical underpinnings of substantive justice when it 
acknowledged that there was a retroactive dimension to the prosecution of crimes 
against peace. Its decision to prosecute was justified on the grounds that allowing such 
wrongs to go unpunished would be unjust. Therefore, while one the one hand, 
Nuremberg recognized nullum crimen as general principle of justice,81 it asserted on 
the other hand, that nullum crimen was a relative principle subject to exception in light 
of circumstances.82 The judgment of the IMT delivered on October 1, 1946 read:  
 
[…] the maxim “nullum crimen sine lege” is not a limitation of 
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is 
unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have 
attacked neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue, for in 
such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so 
far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were 
allowed to go unpunished.83 
 
Other examples further disclose that the trial process did not completely disassociate 
itself from the mantra of substantive justice. For instance in United States et al. v Araki 
et al., Dutch jurist and justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal Bernard Victor 
Aloysius Röling in his dissenting opinion described nullum crimen as a rule of policy 
rather than a non-derogable principle of justice.84  
                                                
81 United States v Josef Altstoetter et al. (The Justice Case) 3 Trials of War Criminals Before the 
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In 1947, Kelsen in “Will Nuremberg Constitute a Precedent?” conceded that the 
London Agreement had not respected the rule against retroactive punishment. This 
acknowledgement, however, bore no consequence to Kelsen’s final analysis 
supporting the IMT because to him, the nullum crimen was “not valid at all in 
international law” and “valid within national law only with important exceptions.” 85 
Conscious of the irony within the argument advocated by counsel defending Göring 
and his associates, Kelsen in 1945 posed the question as to how the powers that had 
waged a war to destroy the Nazi regime could use the same detestable principle (i.e. 
the usage of ex post facto laws) that had once seriously discredited the Nazis before 
the civilized world.86 Kelsen argued that making use of such a principle was not 
necessary because there were better arguments substantiating that the rule against ex 
post facto laws did not apply in the prosecution of German war criminals.87  
 
The IMT has been subjected to a fair share of criticisms. In his dissenting opinion to 
the Tokyo judgment, Justice Radhabinod Pal was explicit when it came to expressing 
his reservations about creating crimes that were not in existence when the defendants 
acted.88 Justice Pal disagreed with Lord Wright’s assertion that the crimes enumerated 
in the Nuremberg Charter were already crimes under international law.89 Kenneth 
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Gallant has argued that the Nuremberg judgment presenting nullum crimen as a 
nonbinding principle of justice “has a cynical ring to it” because it “carries with it the 
implication that individual human rights (especially of the evil) fade in the face of the 
collective powers that make up sovereignty.”90 Yet, what is interesting about Justice 
Pal’s views on the principle of legality, which Gallant relied heavily upon, is that even 
he did not claim it to be a rule without exceptions. This was clear in Pal’s writing:  
 
The rule denying retroactivity to a law is not that law cannot be made 
retroactive by its promulgator, but that it should not ordinarily be made so 
and that if such retroactive operation can be avoided courts should always 
do that.91  
 
With the increasing importance of human rights law, the post-Nuremberg era noted 
the replacement of the flexible attitudes to the principle of legality with a more 
restrictive approach.  The prohibition on retroactive prosecution is now “seemingly 
intransigent […] unless it can be shown that the crime existed under international 
law.”92  This is confirmed in the provisions of multiple instruments of international 
law, such as, Article 11(2) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 7 European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 American Convention of Human Rights, 
Article 15 ICCPR, Articles 99 and 67 of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions 
respectively and Article 75(4)(c) First Additional protocol of 1977 – which pay a 
“large degree of deference” to the approach adopted at Nuremberg but at the same 
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time implicitly acknowledge that it did not “faithfully respect the nullum crimen 
principle.”93  
 
Apart from the International Criminal Court which operates prospectively and is 
deprived of jurisdiction over cases arising before its creation,94 most legal texts 
enabling prosecution of core international crimes, either internationally or locally, 
have been applied with retroactive effect.95 Starting from the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, the legal instruments creating the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the internationalized forums in Kosovo and East 
Timor, the Iraq Special Tribunal, the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, to the 
national statutes like the ICTA which have enabled domestic prosecution of 
international crimes, all have served to retroactively deal with crimes committed in 
the past.96 Although the statutes governing judicial forums like the ICTY, ICTR and 
the ECHR profess rigid adherence to the principle of legality, the approach taken in 
practice is relatively relaxed and bears an element of “malleability”,97 resembling the 
kind taken at Nuremberg. This is why their judgments reflect that the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege “does not bar progressive development of the law, provided 
that the developed law retains the essence of the original crime.”98 
 
According to William Schabas, questions relating to retroactivity have “obsessed 
international criminal justice since its earliest days” and has resulted in “unceasing 
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controversy”,99 so much so, that counsels defending accused charged with core 
international crimes have adopted the violation of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla 
poena sine lege100 as a standard defence strategy. Schabas acknowledges, however, 
that defence challenges based on violations of the principle of legality are usually 
unsuccessful.101 The core logic so far adopted by the UN mandated ad hoc tribunals 
has been that prosecutions based on a retroactively applied law does not violate the 
principle of legality because they reflect the rules of customary international law 
which were in existence at the time of the commission of the offence.102 This was the 
case in Celibici where counsel representing Hazim Delic unsuccessfully demanded the 
dismissal of all counts in the indictment based on Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
on the grounds that “the application of the Geneva Conventions to acts which occurred 
before the date of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ‘accession’ would violate the principle 
of legality or nullum crimen sine lege.”103 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
explained that the purpose of the principle of legality was “to prevent the prosecution 
and punishment of an individual for acts which he reasonably believed to be lawful at 
the time of their commission” and that the accused’s claim not to recognize the 
“criminal nature of the acts alleged in the Indictment” lacked credibility and the fact 
that they “could not foresee the creation of an International Tribunal which would be 
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the forum for prosecution” was inconsequential.104 Similar pronouncements have been 
made by the Trials and Appeals Chamber of the ICTR and the SCSL.105  
 
In 1998, ICTY President Theodor Meron offered a glowing tribute to the principle of 
legality claiming that it was “a customary, even peremptory, norm of international law 
that must in all circumstances be observed in all circumstances by national and 
international tribunals.”106 The granting of jus cogens-like status to nullum crimen is 
nevertheless perceived with unease, due to the already prevalent “varying 
interpretations as to the scope of the principle.”107 The belief that a strict application 
of nullum crimen in criminal law is “slightly unrealistic” has endured over the years 
in light of the harsh reality that gross violations of crimes should not go unpunished 
and evil of such proportions, as Gallant notes, “may not be fully predictable in 
advance.”108 This is why even the Meronian form of nullum crimen is not without 
qualifications, one of them being that prosecuting international crimes by way of a law 
adopted after the commission of the crimes does not violate the prohibition against 
retroactive prosecutions, as long as the crimes defined were criminalized under 
international law or according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of the nations.109 Therefore, in order to prosecute international crimes and 
at the same time preserve the principle of nullum crimen, legislators need to first check 
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that the law being ‘used’ does not criminalize conduct that was previously not 
prohibited by a criminal rule and further ensure that the law being created reflects 
customary international law.110  
 
Contemporary scholars like Valentina Spiga and Shane Darcy who have written on 
nullum crimen acknowledge that the principle is prone to speculation and 
interpretation because of the ‘vagueness’ of the content of its exceptions. It has been 
argued that attention should be given to the “degree of accessibility and foreseeability” 
of criminal rules that are allowed to be applied retroactively.111 Although Spiga and 
Darcy are not against the idea of domestic courts resorting to these exceptions in order 
to try an accused without contravening the principle of nullum crimen, the exercise of 
referring to ‘international customary law’ or ‘general principles of law’ may transform 
into a “dangerous Pandora’s box in the hands of a tyrannical judicial power.”112  
 
On the basis of this theoretical and historical appreciation, the following Part analyses 
the major areas of contention surrounding the ICTA which relate to the principle of 
legality.  
 
3. The ICTA and the principle of legality – three strains of incompatibility  
 
According to critics, three statutory provisions of the ICTA are incompatible with the 
principle of legality. Firstly, Section 3(1) ICTA which provides for the trial and 
punishment of persons who committed crimes “before or after the commencement” of 
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the Act violates Article 35(1) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh.113 Secondly, the international crimes defined in Section 3(2) ICTA go 
beyond the state of customary international law that existed in 1971. Thirdly, the 
retroactive application of the amendment ensuring equality of arms in Section 21 
ICTA114 which allowed for the Prosecution to appeal against the life sentence passed 
on Abdul Quader Molla was a violation of the principle of legality. This part analyses 
these criticisms to determine whether these three provisions are compatible with the 
principle of legality or if they are in fact tools used by a tyrannical judicial power that 
opens a dangerous Pandora’s Box.    
 
3.1 Does Section 3(1) ICTA violate Article 35(1) of the Constitution? 
  
Section 3(1) empowers the ICTs to “try and punish any individual or group of 
individuals, [or organisation,] or any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary 
forces, irrespective of his nationality, who commits or has committed, in the territory 
of Bangladesh, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, any of the 
crimes mentioned in sub-section (2).”115 Article 35(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution 
by prohibiting ex post facto laws protects persons from facing retroactive prosecution 
of crimes.116 It states: “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for 
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an 
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than, or different from, that which might 
have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
offence.”  
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Former Attorney General of India, Soli J Sorabjee has described Section 3(1) as the 
“most serious infirmity” of the ICTA because it contravenes Article 35(1) “whose 
thrust is directed against retrospective application of criminal laws.”117 Suzannah 
Linton equates the Constitutional prohibition against retroactive criminal prosecution 
to throwing “a spanner in the works”.118  
 
In order to ascertain the spirit of the Bangladesh Constitution with regard to the 
detention, prosecution or punishment of core international crimes, Articles 35(1), 
47(3) and 47A must be read and interpreted together. Article 47(3) and 47A are 
directly relevant to and assist in the existence and smooth functioning of the ICTA. 
Article 47(3) of the Constitution reads:  
 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any 
provision thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of 
any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces 
[or any individual, group of individuals or organisation] or who is a 
prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and 
other crimes under international law shall be deemed void or unlawful, or 
ever to have become void or unlawful, on the ground that such law or 
provision of any such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any of the 
provisions of this Constitution.119 
 
                                                
117 Sorabjee (n 113) 7.  
118 Linton (n 7) 214.   
119 (n 2) article 47(3). 
 157 
Although this does not specifically mention the ICTA or for that matter any law in 
particular, the fact that the ICTA is the only legislation in Bangladesh with jurisdiction 
to try persons for committing “genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and 
other crimes under international law”, implies that it enjoys enhanced ‘constitutional 
protection’ under Article 47(3).120  
 
Alongside 47(3), Article 47A takes away an accused’s right to challenge the 
provisions of the ICTA on the ground that they violate the right to protection of the 
law (Article 31), protection in respect of trial and punishment (Article 35) and the right 
to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 44).121  It is 
worth recalling at this point that both Articles 47(3) and 47A were inserted into the 
Constitution through Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act in 
1973 (First Amendment). The ‘protection’ ensured through these Articles are 
complemented by Section 26 ICTA which reads: “The provisions of this Act shall 
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other 
law for the time being in force.”122 
 
When a Constitution embodying the principle of legality sets up a condition to its 
application with regard to the prosecuting of core international crimes, the setting up 
of that condition does not automatically run afoul of the principle of legality.123 When 
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it comes to understanding the exceptions to the prohibition of ex post facto criminal 
laws, Jordan Paust acknowledges that the nullum crimen is not violated if “a new 
forum or a new jurisdictional competence for prosecution of what was criminal at the 
time of the alleged offense” is created.124 National and international courts have 
repeatedly affirmed that the general principles of international criminal law and 
criminal justice and principles common to major legal systems may be employed to 
regulate matters that are not covered by specific rules or provisions.125  
 
The experiences of members of the Commonwealth as well as countries that have 
embraced Civil law traditions aid in correctly interpreting the situation in Bangladesh. 
In 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Finta126 found that a forty five year delay 
in initiating prosecution under Canadian war crimes legislation did not amount to an 
“unreasonable delay” under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian 
Charter). Although the challenge to the constitutionality of the Canadian war crimes 
law in R v Finta was based on six distinctive constitutional questions, its core 
challenge revolved around the issue of retroactivity.127 Similar to the argument 
adopted by Linton and Sorabjee, Finta contended albeit unsuccessfully that the 
Canadian war crimes law because of its ‘retroactive’ nature violated Sections 7 and 
11(g) of the Canadian Charter. Although, like the Bangladesh Constitution, the 
Canadian Charter ensures a resolute presumption against ex post facto prosecution, 
Finta’s argument failed because Section 11(g) of the Charter reiterates that any person 
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125 Cassese and Gaeta (n 54) 34.   
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charged with an offense has the right “not to be found guilty on account of any act or 
omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under 
Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of 
law recognized by the community of nations.”128 Thus, to the Supreme Court, it was 
abundantly clear that Section 11(g) was designed to express Parliament’s intention to 
reflect not just Canadian practices and heritage but also the State’s international 
obligations related especially to war criminals.129 The parallel of Section 11(g) of the 
Canadian Charter in the Bangladesh Constitution is Article 25 which reads: “The State 
shall […] respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United 
Nations Charter”130 along with Articles 47(3) and 47A, which confirm that it was and 
remains the Parliament’s intent to detain, prosecute and punishment persons 
responsible for the commission of core international crimes.  
 
The Australian precedent although distinct in nature from R v Finta deserves 
consideration. In Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth, the High Court of Australia 
upheld the validity of the War Crimes Act 1945 despite being retroactive in nature. In 
this case, Ivan Polyukovich who was charged with war crimes allegedly committed 
during the Second World War challenged the constitutional validity of the War Crimes 
Act 1945 on the ground that it operated retroactively. In the judgment, Justice Daryl 
Dawson held:  
 
The ex post facto creation of war crimes may be seen to be justifiable in a 
way that is not possible with other ex post facto criminal laws, particularly 
                                                
128 Constitution Act 1982.  
129 Bello and Cotler (n 127) 462-463. 
130 (n 2) article 25.  
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where the conduct proscribed would have been criminal conduct had it 
occurred within Australia. The wrongful nature of the conduct ought to 
have been apparent to those who engaged in it even if, because of the 
circumstances in which the conduct took place, there was no offence 
against domestic law. And, of course, if the conduct amounted to genocide 
or a crime against humanity, that comment would be the stronger. This 
justification for a different approach with respect to war crimes is reflected 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which 
Australia became a signatory on 18 December 1972. Article 15(1) of that 
Covenant forbids the ex post facto creation of criminal offences, but Art. 
15(2) provides: “Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when 
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations.131 
 
The stare decisis of Finta bears more resemblance to Bangladesh’s attempt at 
prosecuting core international crimes than Polyukovich because unlike the Canadian 
Charter and Bangladesh Constitution, the Australian Constitution does not have an 
express bar against retroactive criminal prosecution. Chronologically speaking, the 
ongoing application of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 in Bangladesh 
is of ex post facto nature. Like the Canadian Charter, the Constitution of Bangladesh 
embodies the principle of legality but an interpretation of relevant provisions show 
clearly that the principle will not disallow laws that prosecute core international crimes 
as long as the conduct in question was “criminal” under international law. Not only 
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does this amount to an unequivocal expression of “constitutionally ensured” intent, 
Bangladesh remains obligated also to uphold Article 15(2) of the ICCPR - ratified in 
2000, along with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 - ratified immediately after 
independence in 1972. It is, therefore, fair to conclude that Section 3(1) ICTA does 
not violate Article 35(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution. What must be ensured that 
the crimes defined in Section 3(2) of the Act reflect the shape and form of crimes of 
the likes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that existed in 1971.  
 
Kelsen observes that an unrestricted prohibition of retroactive legislation leads to 
“unbearable consequences” and that nullum crimen, despite being a basic principle of 
jurisprudence, was never perceived without “the admission of important 
exceptions”.132 Sorabjee and Linton’s position is suspect because it relies on an 
isolated reading of Article 35(1) that fails to accommodate other equally important 
mandates in the form of exceptions enunciated in Bangladesh’s Constitution. 
 
3.2 Does the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the ICTA violate the 
principle of legality?  
 
International crimes enumerated in Section 3(2) ICTA have been under scrutiny for 
the way they have been defined. Critics allege that definitions lack specificity, 
preventing the accused from identifying their ‘ingredients’ and raising a 
comprehensive defence.133 The absence of ‘ingredients’ is the reason some critics have 
concluded that the framers of the ICTA had done no more than pass off ordinary 
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murders as ‘war crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ simply because they were 
committed during wartime.134 This dearth of ‘specificity’ that would have otherwise 
explicitly laid out the elements of crimes, has added fuel to the claim that the ICTA 
definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ does not conform to the body of international 
law as it existed in 1971 or contemporary international law.135  
 
The main thrust behind these criticisms is the demand for a revision of these 
definitions so that they reflect ‘international standards’. A unanimous position is yet 
to be reached with regard to which set of standards should be reflected if the 
definitions were to be ‘revised’. One argument stresses that ICTA crimes should 
mirror the crimes defined in the ICC Statute which reflect current international 
standards. The other argument lends weight to the idea that definitions of crimes in 
the ICTA should reflect crimes as they existed in customary international law when 
they were committed in 1971.  
 
Interestingly some critics have lent support to both positions at different points in time 
which adds further confusion to the matter. Human Rights Watch (HRW), for instance, 
has in the past identified with both camps as is evident in its diverging nature of 
recommendations. On 8 July, 2009, in a letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Brad 
Adams of HRW suggested that “the definition of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, and the definition of liability for crimes, be amended to be the same 
as those under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court so that the court’s 
                                                
134 Toby Cadman, ‘Human Rights in Bangladesh: Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
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 163 
verdicts will be internationally recognized.”136 A departure from this position is noted 
in a subsequent letter to Sheikh Hasina on 18 May, 2011, where HRW urged the 
Bangladesh Government to “articulate the relevant definitions of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide as they existed under domestic or international law at 
the time of the offense.”137  
 
Counsel defending the accused at the ICTs have also supported both positions. Toby 
Cadman has argued that the definitions of ICTA crimes are “outdated and incorrect 
when held against the current definitions employed by the ICC and ad hoc 
International Tribunals” and unless the revised definitions referred to current 
acceptable standards as seen in the ICC Elements of Crimes, Bangladesh would be 
“ignoring the vast progress made in international criminal law.”138 This position was 
echoed by another foreign counsel who argued that the ICT trials could have “been 
run on consistent lines with the ICC” using ICC terms, definitions and rules of 
procedure and evidence.139 Bangladeshi counsel defending the accused have also 
demanded that since the offences in the ICTA are not well defined and “jurisprudence 
on these issues have evolved”, it can take refuge in decisions of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC 
and SCSL to fill in the gaps.140  
 
This position of modelling the ICT along ICC lines can be distinguished from Toby 
Cadman’s subsequent commentary in December 2011. Arguing that the Bangladesh 
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Constitution bars ex post facto laws without exceptions,141 Cadman emphasized that 
Bangladesh as a State Party to the ICCPR was obligated to ensure that the ICTA 
adhered to the principle of nullem crimen sine lege by carefully considering “what the 
definition of a crime against humanity or genocide was at the time of commission of 
the alleged offence”, an exercise that would require “analysis of the elements of the 
offence of crimes against humanity, as an example, during the relevant time period.”142 
 
The former position calling for the adoption of ICC definitions or incorporating 
elements from contemporary definitions of international crimes conflicts with the 
“strictures of nullum crimen sine lege”.143 This ‘conflict’ is generally acknowledged 
by critics. Rapp, for instance urged in 2011 that when determining guilt, ICTs could 
consider taking guidance from courts that defined core international crimes in the 
recent past and also the ICC Elements of Crimes, to an extent that it did not “expand 
criminal responsibility”.144 Linton admits that although a “skilled and serious” attempt 
was made to define core international crimes in the ICTA, in several instances they 
did not “reflect the state of customary international law at the time of the commission 
of the offences.”145 Robertson alleges that ICT judges failed to appreciate that the rule 
against retrospective punishment could be avoided by examining the state of 
international customary law in 1971.146 
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Specifically, critics have objected to the absence of the requirement of a “widespread 
or systematic attack” and the nexus with armed conflict in the ICTA’s definition of 
‘crimes against humanity’ and the addition of “political groups” as one of the protected 
groups in the ICTA’s definition of ‘genocide’ as violations of the principle of legality. 
The following sections evaluate what elements constituted ‘crimes against humanity’ 
and ‘genocide’ under customary international law in 1971 and whether those elements 
were accommodated in the statutory provisions of the ICTA.  
 
3.2.1 Tracing the development of the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ to 1971 
 
Academic texts introducing ‘crimes against humanity’ (CAH) generally tend to refer 
to the joint statement by Britain, France and Russia in 1915 denouncing the massacre 
of Armenians in Turkey as the first instance the wording ‘crimes against […] 
humanity’ was used on an international scale.147 This of course came after Leon 
Trotsky’s usage of ‘crimes against humanity’ in 1911 when he described it as “all the 
indignities to which the human body and spirit are subjected” in his essay ‘Against 
Individual Terrorism’.148 The concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ can be traced back 
to the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, where the Martens Clause referred to the “laws of humanity”.149 All 
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these appearances of the phrase and concept were “abortive”150 in the sense that they 
touched upon existence of ‘crimes against humanity’ but did not lead to the creation 
of a punishable offence under law when the Treaty of Versailles and Treaty of 
Lausanne declined to prosecute.151 This is why although CAH has been dubbed to be 
as old as humanity itself,152 as an “international legal prohibition” it is a relatively new 
concept which blossomed in the latter half of the 20th century after it emerged for the 
first time as a cognizable offence in 1945 – ironically in a law called Nazi 
Verbotsgesetz. i.e. The Nazi Prohibition Law.153 No one was prosecuted under this law 
passed by the provisional government of the Third Reich, and soon after, CAH 
materialized in positive international law under the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal.154 The definition of CAH in Article 6(c) read:  
 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during 
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated.155 
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This definition was framed in response to the classical definition of ‘war crimes’ 
which did not encompass crimes by governments committed against their own 
citizens.156 The inclusion of “crimes committed against a country’s own population”157 
in CAH was one of its three essential features identified by Robert Cryer. The two 
remaining features required CAH to take place in the context of an armed conflict, and 
the reference to ‘population’ meant “to create some requirement of scale”, although 
the Charter and the Nuremberg Judgment did not specify the precise threshold.158 
Whether this definition contravened the principle of nullum crimen has been a matter 
of debate.159 Many of those who felt that a new crime had been created justified this 
‘juridical invention’ on the reasoning that the principle of non-retroactivity had to give 
way to “superior exigencies” such the overriding need for accountability for crimes 
committed by the Nazi regime.160 Kelsen argued that such crimes amounted to “open 
violations of the principles of morality generally recognized by civilized peoples and 
[…] morally not innocent or indifferent when they were committed” and “according 
to the public opinion of the civilized world, it is more important to bring the war 
criminals to justice than to respect, in their trial, the rule against ex post facto law 
[…].”161 The beginning of ‘crimes against humanity’ as a new category of crime 
signaled by offering protection to individuals whose rights had been trampled upon by 
the State “in a manner that [outraged] the conscience of mankind” the international 
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community was expanding the category acts deemed worthy of “meta-national” 
concern162 and also imposing limits on the “omnipotence of the State”.163 
 
In the period immediately following the formulation of the London Agreement, the 
“criminalization” of CAH took place through treaties, customary rules and pieces of 
national legislation.164 CAH was adopted in the Control Council Law No. 10 of 1945 
adding ‘rape’, ‘imprisonment’ and ‘torture’ to the list of inhumane acts and shedding 
the need for the crime to take place in the context of an armed conflict.165 In 1946, 
CAH was adopted in the Tokyo Charter where its provisions were modelled after the 
Nuremberg definition but was subject to the slight modification that it did not include 
persecutions on religious grounds.166 The basis for this exclusion was probably the 
fact that such crimes had not been committed by the Japanese on a large scale.167 
“Crimes against humanity’ was endorsed in the same year by the United Nations when 
it unanimously affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the 
Nuremberg Charter.168 In 1950, the International Law Commission (ILC) was 
entrusted with the responsibility to formulate the “principles of international law 
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recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal.”169 In its report, the ILC dropped the phrase “before or during war” from the 
definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ but at the same time observed that this did not 
mean the crime could be “committed only during war” but also “before a war in 
connection with crimes against peace.”170 Many of the Nuremberg Principles were 
reflected in several international instruments, such as the Peace Treaties with Italy, 
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, all of which improved upon and expanded 
the definition of CAH in the Nuremberg Charter.171 Over the years, a limited number 
of cases dealt with CAH at the national level, which include among others Eichmann, 
Barbie, Touvier, and Finta.172 Since the late 1960s, several treaties and instruments 
such as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 1968, the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973, the UN Declaration on 
Enforced Disappearance 1992 and the Inter-American Convention on Enforced 
Disappearance 1994 cemented the presence of CAH in customary international law.173  
 
The final decade of the 20th century witnessed the reaffirming of the customary 
character of CAH in the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and the International Criminal 
Court and the emergence of the modern definition of ‘crimes against humanity’. 
According to Robert Cryer this modern definition encompasses “the commission of 
certain inhumane acts, such as murder, torture, rape, sexual slavery, persecution and 
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other inhumane acts” in the context of a “widespread and systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population”.174 Definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes are similar to each other.  
 
The ICTY Statute was not an exercise of law ‘creation’ but rather an application of 
“rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
law”.175 CAH in the ICTY tried “to stay close to the IMT’s definition” by retaining 
the requirement for the crimes to be committed in an armed conflict.176 This nexus 
was subsequently severed in the Tadić Decision on the ‘Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction’ which acknowledged that the requirement was 
merely a jurisdictional one and did not form a part of the contemporary definition of 
‘crimes against humanity’. Absent from the definition are the elements of “widespread 
and systematic attack” and discriminatory grounds, although they are seen in the 
parallel definition in the Report of the Secretary-General which accompanies the 
ICTY Statute as an explanatory memorandum.177  
 
When the ICTR Statute was adopted by the UN Security Council, the adoption 
benefitted from the existence of the ICTY Statute and the Secretary-General’s Report. 
Nevertheless, ‘crimes against humanity’ in the ICTR parted ways with the ICTY 
definition in several important aspects. The ICTR definition of CAH dropped the 
nexus to armed conflict but added the nexus to “widespread and systematic attack”. It 
also introduced the element of discriminatory grounds by requiring that “the attack on 
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the civilian population had to be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial, or 
religious grounds.”178  
 
‘Crimes against humanity’ in Article 7 of the ICC Statute is different in ‘character’ 
from previous versions of the crime because of its ‘prospective’ nature. While it 
largely remained an ‘IMT-inspired’ definition, there were some notable differences. 
The nexus to armed conflict embedded in the definitions of CAH in the Statutes of the 
IMT, Tokyo and ICTY and the requirement of discriminatory grounds in the ICTR 
were removed.179 Emphasis was placed more on mens rea elements, i.e. “knowledge 
of the attack”. Enforced disappearance and apartheid were included as new punishable 
acts. The scope of already punishable acts like deportation, imprisonment and rape 
were expanded. A policy requirement with regard to the attack on the civilian 
population was introduced, something which was never a part of past definitions of 
CAH and had in fact been explicitly rejected in ICTY case law.180 The presence of the 
Elements of Crimes combined with the Statute assisted in creating a comprehensive 
definition of ‘crimes against humanity’.181  
 
Taking the above into account, there is no doubt about the status ‘crimes against 
humanity’ enjoys as a core international crime. It is also clear that a unanimous 
definition of the crime is yet to develop and there are differences in all major 
definitions of the crime, so much so that differences exist even when the definitions 
emanated from the same source within a short span of time.182  
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3.2.2 Crimes against humanity in the ICTA and its interpretation by the ICTs 
 
Section 3(2)(a) of the ICTA defines ‘crimes against humanity’ as: 
 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape or other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population or persecutions on 
political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether or not in violation 
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated;183 
  
On 17 July, 1973 Manoranjan Dhar, the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs of the Bangladesh Government stressed in Parliament that the definition of 
‘crimes against humanity’ in the ICTA was identical to the definition employed at 
Nuremberg.184 Dhar’s claim was inaccurate. A close inspection of the definition of 
CAH and its historical background as is evident from the parliamentary debates that 
preceded the enactment of the ICTA reveal that the framers were by and large inspired 
by Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. However, this “adaptation”185 or 
“adoption”186 came with certain caveats. For instance, in addition to ‘murder’, 
‘extermination’, ‘enslavement’, ‘deportation’ and ‘other inhumane acts’, the ICTA 
definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ added the specific acts of ‘imprisonment’, 
‘abduction’, ‘confinement’, ‘torture’ and ‘rape’.187 ‘Ethnicity’ was added to the 
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provision relating to persecution and the link to armed conflict was shed by dropping 
the phrase “before or during the war”.188  
 
‘Crime against humanity’ in the ICTA has been criticized for the manner in which its 
language has been framed. The absence of the requirement of a “widespread or 
systematic attack”, the “hallmark” which distinguishes CAH from other ordinary 
crimes, has been criticized.189 There are disagreements as to whether the element of 
“widespread or systematic attack” constituted a part of the customary international 
law of ‘crimes against humanity’ in 1971. Geoffrey Robertson’s position on this 
matter is clear and unequivocal. He argues that “murder, rape and arson are run-of-
the-mill, common or garden national crimes” and “cannot  be elevated into 
international crimes  unless  the  prosecution  proves  an  additional  element […] that  
these murders and tortures […] are committed  as  part  of  a  widespread  or  systematic  
attack  on  a  civilian  population.”190 Linton, on the other hand, imposes responsibility 
on the ICTs to “establish the state of customary law in 1971” and rule whether ‘crimes 
against humanity’ then “had to be committed as part of a ‘‘widespread or systematic 
attack’’ on the civilian population.”191 She tilts towards accepting Robertson’s 
position by drawing from the United National War Crimes Commission’s 
(LCUNWCC) confirmation of the “prototype” of the ‘widespread or systematic 
attack’ when it observed that “systematic mass action […] was necessary to transform 
a common crime, punishable only under municipal law, into a crime against humanity, 
which thus became also the concern of international law.”192 Linton cites Almonacid-
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Arellano et al v Chile where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights demonstrated 
that ‘crimes against humanity’ were found to have been committed as part of a 
“systematic and general pattern against the civilian population” as early as 1973.193 
Linton also points out that the element of a “widespread or systematic attack against 
the civilian population” was incorporated in the definition of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ in Article 5 of the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chamber in 
the Courts of Cambodia for the purposes of trying crimes committed during the years 
1975-1979.194 
 
There is scope to argue that the element of “widespread or systematic” attack had not 
become a part of customary international law by 1971. In the Fourth Report on the 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind published in 1986, 
Doudou Thiam described in detail the views contrary to the LCUNWCC’s recognition 
of “systematic mass action” as a prerequisite to ‘crimes against humanity’. Thiam 
notes that the exercise of incorporating “systematic mass action” was opposed by the 
‘Congrès international du Mouvement national judiciaire français’ in 1946 in its 
resolution on the punishment of Nazi ‘crimes against humanity’. Opposition was also 
documented in the reports submitted by the delegates of Brazil, Netherlands, Poland, 
Holy See and Switzerland at the eighth International Conference for the Unification 
of Penal Law held in 1947.195 The “mass element” was discussed at length by Henri 
Meyrowitz who put forward that “a plurality of victims or a plurality of acts” was no 
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longer necessary for the elevation of a crime to ‘crimes against humanity’.196 This 
disagreement persisted in judicial practices as well. For instance, the “mass element” 
was not considered essential to the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ by the 
Supreme Court of the British Occupied Zone. In contrast, the military tribunals of the 
United States considered it to form an integral part of CAH.197 Thiam concluded: “The 
distinction resulting from the mass nature of the act is, in any case, not conclusive. 
There are those who still consider that the systematic violation of a single human right 
is a crime against humanity.”198  
 
Therefore, legitimate suspicions may be raised as to whether the element of 
‘widespread or systematic attack’ which found its origins in the LCUNWCC report 
and was developed further in Almonacid-Arellano et al v Chile emerged as an accepted 
rule of customary international law in 1971. According to Robert Cryer, the 
requirement of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ directed against any civilian 
population gained acceptance as the appropriate way of determining the “contextual 
threshold” of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the 1990s.199 
 
That ‘crimes against humanity’ under the ICTA does not need a nexus with armed 
conflict, whether internal or international, has been raised by critics as a weakness.200 
According to Geoffrey Robertson “the judgment of Nuremberg made clear” that 
‘crimes against humanity’ “could only be committed at times of an international armed 
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conflict” and “[i]t was not until the appeal judgment in the Tadic case in 1995 that an 
international court confirmed that crimes against humanity could also be committed 
in an internal conflict such as a civil war.”201 This differs from Linton’s analysis who 
acknowledges that while the nexus to an ‘international’ armed conflict had been 
severed by 1971, there remains a degree of uncertainty as to whether “armed conflict 
per se” had been discarded with altogether by that time.202  
 
It is now well settled that contemporary definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ do 
not require a nexus to armed conflict.203 Originally, however, CAH in the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Charters was connected with ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against peace’ and 
required a nexus with armed conflict. Egon Schwelb and Antonio Cassese perceived 
this close linkage between different crimes as one of the major shortcomings of the 
definition of ‘crimes against humanity’. This meant that the Allies would punish only 
those criminal activities which “directly affected the interests of other States” and the 
infliction of inhuman acts committed within national boundaries was not of interest to 
other states until and unless they had “spill-over effects”.204 Although this may have 
been one of the reasons the nexus with armed conflict was dropped in the Control 
Council Law No. 10, the military tribunals operating under this law were divided as 
to whether or not this nexus was necessary. In United States v. Flick and United States 
v. Ernst von Weizsäcker et al the nexus to armed conflict was retained205 whereas in 
United States v. Ohlendorf and United States v Josef Altstoetter et al the nexus was 
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deemed unnecessary.206 The “indispensable link” between ‘crimes against humanity’ 
and war, which was envisaged in the International Law Commission’s 1951 Draft 
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind was severed in the 
amended definition of CAH in the 1954 Draft Code.207  
 
In that era, a couple of national legislations also shed the nexus to armed conflict. This 
included the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950 which 
expanded the subject matter jurisdiction to crimes committed not just during the period 
of the Second World War but also during the period of the Nazi regime208 and also the 
Penal Code of Ethiopia 1957.209 International conventions such as the Genocide 
Convention 1948, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 1968 and the Apartheid Convention 
1973 also “indicated that a nexus to armed conflict was not required.”210  
 
Cassese marks the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations in 
the late 1960s as the point in time when the “gradual crystallization” of customary 
international law propagating CAH during peace time “was set in motion”.211 
According to the Group of Experts for Cambodia, the bond between CAH and armed 
conflict had severed by 1975.212  It is worth noting that Pakistan voted in favour of the 
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1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations. With respect to 
this, Niall Macdermot had argued that although Pakistan did not ratify the Convention, 
its affirmative vote reflected “acceptance that crimes against humanity” was not 
“restricted to international war situations”.213  
 
Being mindful of the principle of legality requires the ICTs to interpret the definitions 
of crimes in a manner that does not go beyond the standards of customary international 
law that existed in 1971. On 11 December, 2011, Toby Cadman argued that an accused 
“must be entitled to advance the retroactive argument in any given case”.214 While the 
soundness of this argument cannot be challenged, there is sufficient scope to doubt 
Cadman’s subsequent allegation that a blanket ban had been issued to raise this 
argument at the ICTs. 
 
The argument on retroactivity has been raised by defence counsel on multiple 
occasions in multiple cases before the ICTs. The International Crimes Tribunal on 3 
October, 2011, passed Order No. 23 framing charges against accused Delowar 
Hossain Sayeedi.215 In it the ICT chaired at the time by Justice Md Nizamul Huq, 
addressed the retroactivity argument relating to crimes defined in the ICTA and its 
relationship with customary international law216 by reiterating that international 
crimes proscribed in the ICTA “were regarded as crimes under international law long 
before the Act was enacted.”217 In response to the allegation that crimes were 
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inadequately defined and lacked clarifying elements such as the Elements of Crimes 
assisting the ICC Statute, the Tribunal held that the ICTA was drafted in an era “when 
the crimes enumerated therein were fairly known and understood to the world, and 
were very much part of customary international law” and were “quite clear and 
complete without any ambiguity”.218 The Tribunal refused to borrow definitions from 
recent international tribunals not only because it felt it was not obligated to do so, but 
also because it felt the definitions were “adequate in all aspects”.219 The argument that 
Article 15(1) ICCPR issued a blanket prohibition on the retroactive application of law 
was rejected because Article 15(2) had an overriding effect over principle against 
retroactivity “in cases of crimes proscribed by general principle of law recognized by 
the community of nations”. Most importantly, the Tribunal observed that if 
“indispensably required in the interest of fair justice”, it would seek the guidance of 
“jurisprudential” and “normative” developments from other jurisdictions.220  
 
In Part VI of the trial judgment in the case of The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain 
Sayeedi, the ICT dealt with the consistency of ‘crimes against humanity’ defined in 
the ICTA with contemporary definitions of the crime in the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC 
Statutes. Upon perusal these definitions and their development through case-law,221 
the Tribunal assessed that the definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ across the board 
lacked in consistency and differed in “legal technical nitty-gritty” but shared a 
“common spirit”.222 The Tribunal extrapolated the “proper construction” of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ under the ICTA and chalked out the following ‘characteristics’: a) 
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existence of an armed conflict is not mandatory, and that CAH can be committed 
during peace time (the Tribunal added, however, that one could nevertheless not deny 
that an armed conflict had taken place in 1971); b) although the ICTA does not 
explicitly require the attack to be widespread or systematic, the phrase “any civilian 
population” instead of “civilian population” exudes a “collective” quality of the attack 
implying that it excludes “single or isolated acts” and implies that the attack must be 
of widespread or systematic nature. The requirement is “disjunctive” as opposed to 
being “cumulative”. ‘Widespread’ represents the qualitative threshold of the crime, 
i.e. it refers to the large-scale nature of the attack which is reflected in the number of 
victims. On the other hand, ‘systematic’ acts as the qualitative element, indicating the 
organized nature of violence or the “non-accidental repetition of a similar conduct on 
a regular basis” reflected by “some form of a governmental, organizational or group 
policy”; c) the phrase “any civilian population” is to be interpreted broadly and 
includes “population that is predominantly civilian in nature”. The presence of “non-
civilians” such as armed resistance groups or former combatants who have laid down 
their arms, amongst the civilian population would not “alter its civilian nature”; d) 
mens rea is satisfied if the perpetrator possessed knowledge of the context within 
which he took his actions; e) in case of persecution, the attack must be committed on 
discriminatory grounds.223 On the basis of these ‘characteristics’, the ICT concluded 
that the ICTA’s definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ was “fairly consistent” with 
recent definitions of the crime as seen in the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and the SCSL Statutes 
and “broadly and fairly compatible with current international standards.”224  
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In a recent paper titled “The Tribunals in Bangladesh – Falling Short of International 
Standards”, Abdur Razzaq a lead defence counsel claimed that the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (AD) on appeal from judgments passed by the 
ICTs, had “in an Austinian [sic] attack” held that international law could not “qualify 
as law” because it lacked “anything by way of sovereign legislature or of sanctions”, 
nothing beyond the boundaries set by the Bangladesh Constitution could be treated as 
‘law’, and finally, international obligations or responsibilities undertaken by the 
Government did not possess the force of law within the jurisdiction of Bangladesh.225 
According to Razzaq, the AD on the basis of this ‘embargo’ “explicitly rejected” the 
applicability of the “international definition of crimes against humanity” to the Abdul 
Quader Molla case (Molla)226 and barred the application of customary international 
law to “trials conducted under the 1973 Act”.227  
 
It is more than arguable that Razzaq’s position is a misinterpretation of the Appellate 
Division’s views on customary international law. In Molla the AD invited written 
submissions from seven amicus curiae in order to provide an answer as to whether 
customary international law was applicable to ICT cases.228 Upon evaluation, the AD 
reasoned that while the ICTA was “based on the foundation of international legal 
instruments” and “structured in conformity with international standards in 
consultation with international experts”, including ‘international’ crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICTs did not alter its ‘domestic’ identity or create scope for 
customary international law to be its “guiding principles”.229 As a result, the AD would 
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not be bound to follow CIL during trials involving the offences mentioned in Sections 
3(2)(a)-(e), i.e. ‘crimes against humanity’, ‘crimes against peace’, ‘genocide’, ‘war 
crimes’ and ‘violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid 
down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949’. However, an accused charged with 
committing “any other crimes under international law” under Section 3(2)(f) would 
remain entitled to claim the right to have customary international law followed during 
trial.230  
 
The AD adopted several reasons to justify ‘conditional’ reliance on CIL. First of all, 
‘crimes against humanity’ envisaged in Section 3(2)(a) had two categories of crimes. 
The first category includes ‘murder, ‘rape’, ‘abduction’, ‘enslavement’ and 
‘confinement’ and the second category includes ‘extermination’, ‘imprisonment’, 
‘deportation’, ‘torture’ and ‘other inhumane acts’. The AD observed that unlike the 
second category, crimes belonging to the first were well defined by the Penal Code 
1860 which had not been excluded by the ICTA.231 It noted that, in the past, domestic 
legislation tailored to prosecute international crimes had taken the aid of pre-existing 
criminal laws to clarify definitions. This was seen in the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law adopted by the Israeli Knesset in 1950, where “general provisions 
of the Penal Code” applied to offenses under it which included ‘crimes against the 
Jewish people’, ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’.232 Secondly, the 
contemporary prosecutions of international crimes is premised on the principle of 
complementarity which places primary responsibility on national legal systems to 
domestically carry out prosecutions.233 The judicial system of Bangladesh was 
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‘willing’ and ‘able’ to prosecute because its legacy of administration of justice dated 
back for more than four centuries and was largely based on “concepts, principles, rules 
and traditions of English Common Law”. This included the Penal Code passed in 1860 
and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882, the first of its kind that was uniformly 
applied across the Indian subcontinent.234 Furthermore, since the ICTA was devoid of 
any explicit provisions requiring guidance to be taken from the ICC’s Elements of 
Crimes or for that matter any other judicial entity – all of which were different in scope 
and content from the ICTA, the ICTs need not be dependent on them.235  
The Appellate Division also explained the circumstances under which international 
law became locally enforceable within Bangladesh. It clarified that in order for a 
ratified international covenant or convention to be enforceable in local courts, it would 
first have to be incorporated in the municipal laws.236 The AD cited multiple British, 
American and Indian court decisions to substantiate that those jurisdictions also held 
similar views.237 The AD cited from, among others, Halsbury’s Laws of England 
which states: “[…] A state may not rely on an insufficiency in its domestic law as a 
justification for failing to comply with an international obligation. However, 
international law does not, of its own effect, have an impact directly in national law 
so that, for instance, rules of national law which are incompatible with a state’s 
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international obligations will remain valid instruments in national law”.238 Referring 
back to its own decision in Hussain Mohammad Ershad v Bangladesh, the AD 
clarified that national courts should not “straightway ignore international obligations” 
undertaken by a country and that the principles incorporated in international 
instruments could be drawn upon if the domestic laws were ‘unclear’. Where ‘clear’ 
domestic laws appeared inconsistent with the international obligations of the State, the 
national courts “will be obliged to respect the national laws, but shall draw the 
attention of the lawmakers to such inconsistencies”.239  
 
The Appellate Division took refuge in Emmerich De Vattel’s eighteenth century 
treatise The Law of Nations, or, The Principles of Natural Law and the more recent 
contributions of Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati in Withdrawing from International 
Custom to conclude that rules of CIL were binding only on those nations that 
expressed acceptance of those rules as binding obligations through “tacit consent” and 
they remained “binding only those nations that continued to accept them.”240 
Distinguishing between international practices that do not constitute peremptory 
norms, i.e. jus cogens, and rules of customary international law that are accepted and 
recognized as peremptory norms, the AD observed even the breach of the latter did 
not invariably result in the imposition of penal sanctions upon the State that commits 
the violation.241 Similarly, while customary international law significantly contributed 
to the development of international crimes, the scope of penal sanction would be 
significantly reduced unless international crimes were ‘assimilated’ or ‘incorporated’ 
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in domestic laws. This is why when the objective to make crimes established in 
customary international law domestically enforceable, the practice is to legislate.242  
 
In this connection, the AD referred again to Halsbury’s Laws of England which states: 
“Crimes under customary international law of treaties are not crimes in English law 
without implementing legislation to make them so.”243 It also expressed agreement 
with Sir Franklin Berman who argued that “international law could not create a crime 
triable directly, without the intervention of Parliament, in an English court.”244 The 
AD acknowledged, for instance, the persuasive precedent set by the European 
Communities Act 1972 which gave direct effect to provisions of community law but 
did not negate the British Parliament’s need to promulgate the Human Rights Act 
1998.245 Therefore, in case of conflict between international and national law, the AD 
observed that as a ‘dualist’ system, Bangladesh “would apply national law” or at least 
decide which rule would prevail.246 
The Appellate Division also justified its ‘positivist-dualist’ approach by relying on 
provisions of the Bangladesh Constitution entrenching its supremacy over other laws 
within its jurisdiction and the writings of among others, Ian Brownlie and Malcolm N. 
Shaw. Shaw concluded that “any alleged rule of customary law must be proved to be 
a valid rule of international law, and not merely an unsupported proposition”, and even 
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then “a British court would have to heed the terms of an Act of Parliament even if it 
involved the breach of a rule of international law.”247 Writing in reference to Pinochet 
(No. 3)248, Roger O’Keefe, has traced a gradual change to this approach where English 
courts, in light of boundaries set by the constitution have started to permit “customary 
international law a limited direct applicability”.249 The fact that the AD is open to this 
approach is evidenced in its deliberations in Molla where it clarified that despite the 
inapplicability of CIL in interpreting certain aspects of the definition of ‘crimes against 
humanity’, it would not be prevented from relying on the “ratio or observation made 
by tribunals” and “treating them as persuasive […] authorities”250 or using “provisions 
of international law” to assist in the exercise of interpretation251 in the absence of 
domestic authorities.  
 
Based on this reasoning, the Appellate Division rejected the direct applicability of 
customary international law to ICTA trials and elements of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
derived from customary international law – mainly, ‘widespread or systematic attack’ 
in the context of an ‘international armed conflict’ on the grounds that these ‘elements’ 
were not only “misleading” but also “foreign to the [ICTA]”.252 It noted, however, that 
the Prosecution had proved “by adducing reliable evidence beyond a shadow of doubt” 
that the acts of killing and rape committed in 1971 against an “innocent unarmed 
civilian population” were “widespread and systematic”.253  This reflects that the 
Appellate Division in Molla was on occasion in two minds about the role of customary 
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international law in ICT trials. The AD could have shed CAH’s nexus with armed 
conflict solely on the ‘positivist-dualist’ ground that the nexus was clearly not required 
in Section 3(2)(a). Instead of doing that the AD tried to reinforce its position by 
drawing support from ‘foreign’ laws like the Allied Control Council Law, ICC Statute 
and the precedent set by the ICTY in Tadic, which had done the same. If the AD is 
free to exclude ‘armed conflict’ from ‘crimes against humanity’ referring to examples 
beyond its jurisdiction, one may legitimately ask why it did not include ‘widespread 
or systematic attack’ by referring to contemporary similar examples from the past and 
present. After all, both these elements are absent from ICTA’s definition of CAH. This 
is potentially one aspect where the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court erred in interpreting what ‘crimes against humanity’ meant in the ICTA. The 
AD was correct to exclude the two elements but had done so on reasoning that was 
partially flawed. Alongside, the ‘positivist-dualist’ approach, the AD ought to have 
taken the approach of Justice Nizamul Huq in Order No. 23 in 2011. It ought to have 
engaged the principle of nullum crimen to argue that in 1971 the elements in question 
did not form parts of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the customary international law of 
that time and hence was not reflected in the ICTA.  
 
3.3 Does the inclusion of ‘political group’ as a protected group in ‘genocide’ violate 
the principle of legality? 
 
The definition of genocide in the ICTA includes ‘political group’ as one of the 
protected groups. Venturing beyond the four protected groups mentioned in the 
Genocide Convention (namely, national, ethnical, racial and religious) has been 
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interpreted as a violation of the principle of legality.254 Linton has argued that political 
groups were “deliberately excluded from the ambit […] of genocide […] in the 
Genocide Convention” and efforts to reinsert it into ICC definition of ‘genocide’ at 
the Rome Conference was “resoundingly defeated”.255 Out of the twenty-eight cases 
tried to date, nine accused have been found guilty of ‘genocide’.256 All of them have 
been found guilty of destroying in whole or in part Hindus as a ‘religious group’. Since 
no accused has been charged with destroying in whole or in part ‘political groups’, the 
proceeding analysis as to whether the inclusion of ‘political group’ violates the 
principle of legality is a purely ‘theoretical’ exercise. Nonetheless, the importance of 
this exercise cannot be understated given that “Awami League activists and students” 
alongside Hindus were “special targets” of the Pakistan Army in 1971 and on 11 
March 2017 the Bangladesh Parliament passed a resolution granting recognition to 
March 25 as ‘Genocide Day’.257 The targeted killing of members of the Awami League 
featured prominently in the atrocities that occurred. It is likely, therefore, that there 
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will be trials in the future where the accused are charged with genocide committed 
against a political group. At that point the critique may be of particular relevance to 
determining the legitimacy of the ICTs. This section analyses whether the inclusion 
of ‘political group’ in the ICTA’s definition of genocide violates the principle of 
legality. To this end, the following account traces the development of the definition of 
genocide to 1971. It shows that ‘political group’ was always in the minds of those who 
played a role in framing the definition of genocide but was ultimately excluded from 
the Genocide Convention because of political reasons. It argues, why the framers of 
the ICTA may have been justified to include ‘political groups’ in the definition of the 
genocide.  
 
3.3.1 Tracing the development of the definition of ‘genocide’ to 1971  
 
In October 1933, Raphael Lemkin submitted a report to the Fifth International 
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law. The conference was held in Madrid in 
cooperation with the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations. Lemkin formulated 
the creation of two new international crimes, namely, the crime of barbarity and the 
crime of vandalism, which were aimed at the “destruction of and oppression of 
populations”.258 In the end, these proposals which amounted “to the actual concept of 
genocide” were not adopted and hence were not introduced into penal legislation.259 
Eleven years later in 1944, Lemkin as Adviser to the United States War Ministry, 
coined the term ‘genocide’ for the first time in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe 
– Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals of Redress. He proposed 
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that ‘genocide’ had originated from “the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and 
the Latin cide (killing)” and entailed the “destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group”.260 It signified a coordinated plan of multiple actions “aiming at the destruction 
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves.”261 Genocide took place in two phases. The first phase involved 
the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and this was followed 
by the second phase where the oppressor imposed its own national pattern on the 
oppressed.262  
 
Lemkin theorized ‘genocide’ as the “antithesis” of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine 
which held that war was “directed against sovereigns and armies, not […] subjects and 
civilians” and by waging “total war” “not merely against states and their armies, but 
against people” and advocating the predominance of “nation” over “state” in the name 
of National Socialism, Germany had “widely practiced” genocide.263 The need for 
considering ‘genocide’ as a distinct international crime stemmed from the fact that the 
laws of humanity in the Hague Regulations did not fully encompass all forms of 
‘genocide’. These included, for instance among other things, “ingenious measures for 
weakening or destroying political, social, and cultural elements in national groups” 
which were not “expressly prohibited by the Hague Regulations”.264 In his August 
1941 broadcast, Winston Churchill acknowledged the unprecedented nature and scale 
of “Nazi butchery” by stating: “We are in the presence of a crime without a name”.265 
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Lemkin proposed that ‘genocide’ as defined in the amended Hague Regulations would 
comprise of two parts:  
 
in the first should be included every action infringing upon the life, liberty, 
health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and the honor of the 
inhabitants when committed because they belong to a national, religious, 
or racial group; and in the second, every policy aiming at the destruction 
or the aggrandizement of one of such groups to the prejudice or detriment 
of another.266 
 
The Second World War necessitated the need to review international law in light of 
German practices which had “surpassed in their unscrupulous character any 
procedures or methods imagined a few decades ago by the framers of the Hague 
Regulations”.267 Unlike 1933, Raphael Lemkin’s treatise was this time taken very 
seriously. ‘Genocide’ was included in the indictment of major war criminals in the 
Nuremberg trials. It read:  
 
They (the defendants) conducted deliberate and systematic genocide – viz, 
the extermination of racial and national groups – against the civilian 
populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular 
races and classes of people, and national, racial, or religious groups, 
particularly Jews, Poles, Gypsies and others.268  
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This indictment gave recognition to the principle that “every national, racial and 
religious group [had] a right of existence” and attacks upon groups violated this “right 
to exist and to develop within an international community as free members of 
international society.”269  
 
Although there was no dearth of evidence to substantiate the commission of genocide, 
the IMT in a narrow interpretation of its Charter decided that “acts committed before 
the outbreak of the war were not punishable”.270 In light of this, Lemkin proposed that 
an international treaty be formulated at the initiative of the United Nations 
criminalizing ‘genocide’ as an international crime which would provide for its 
“prevention and punishment in the time of peace and war”.271 In 1946 during 
discussions on ‘genocide’ at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UK Attorney 
General Sir Hartley Shawcross conceded that the failure to adopt Raphael Lemkin’s 
proposals in 1933 had “made it impossible to punish some of the serious Nazi 
crimes.”272 A resolution on ‘genocide’ drafted by Lemkin was sponsored by Cuba, 
India and Panama and placed before the UNGA with the strong support of the United 
States.  
 
On 11 December, 1946, the UNGA unanimously adopted Resolution 96(I) affirming 
‘genocide’ as an international crime. In addition to ‘national’, ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ 
groups, i.e. the three protected group identified by Lemkin, the General Assembly 
recognized ‘political’ as the fourth protected group and more importantly observed 
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that genocide could be committed against “other groups” beyond the four explicitly 
recognized ones. Pursuant to this resolution, the UNGA in 1948 approved the 
‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, the first 
human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations.273 In its definition of 
‘genocide’, ‘political’ and ‘other groups’ were dropped from the list of protected 
groups. It is worth noting that preliminary draft Convention prepared by the UN 
Secretariat, the product of deliberations involving the United Nations Division of 
Human Rights, Donnedieu de Vabres, Vespasian Pella, Raphael Lemkin, John 
Humphrey, Emile Giraud and others, retained ‘political’ groups alongside ‘racial’, 
‘national’, ‘linguistic’ and ‘religious’. The objective of this draft was to encompass 
“all the points likely to be adopted, it being left to these organs to eliminate what they 
wished.”274 The first to recommend the exclusion of ‘political groups were the World 
Jewish Congress. The recommendation was made to avert any delay in acceptance of 
the Convention which might have been induced by variances of opinion as to what 
constituted a ‘political group’.275 
 
Experts held diverging opinions with respect to the retention of ‘political’ groups. 
Lemkin felt that political groups were devoid of “permanency” and lacked “specific 
characteristics of the other groups referred to” and that the eventual Convention 
“should not run the risk of failure by introducing ideas on which the world is deeply 
divided.”276 He also added that an appreciation of history would reveal that human 
groups most likely to be a victim of genocide were racial, national and religious 
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groups.277 Vabres opposed this view on the ground that “genocide was an odious 
crime, regardless of the group which fell victim to it, and that the exclusion of political 
groups might be regarded as justifying genocide in the case of such groups.”278 
 
On 7 April, 1948, the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) on Genocide convened at Lake 
Success. The text of the new draft convention, the AHC “unanimously voted to protect 
national, racial and religious groups […] and voted four-to-three to protect political 
groups.”279 By the smallest margin the majority viewed that political groups require 
protection because they were special targets of government repression. The minority 
represented by the Soviet Union, Poland and Venezuela opposed because political 
groups lacked stability, homogeneity and were not properly defined. It was argued that 
such an inclusion was “contrary to the fundamental conception of genocide as 
recognized by science.”280 In the words of the Soviet Union: “crimes committed for 
political motives are crimes of a special kind and have nothing in common with the 
crimes of genocide. The very word ‘genocide’ derived from the word ‘genus’ – race, 
people – shows that it concerns the destruction of nations or races as such, for reasons 
of racial or national persecution and not for the particular political opinions of such 
human groups.”281   One member from the minority expressed that the inclusion of 
political groups would make the Convention “inacceptable to certain governments” 
on the basis of the fear that actions taken against “domestic subversive movements” 
would expose governments taking such actions to “unjustified accusations”.282  
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The draft of the Ad Hoc Committee was transmitted by the Economic and Social 
Council to the UN General Assembly which then referred the Convention to the Sixth 
Committee. In the seventy-fifth meeting of the Sixth Committee, political groups was 
retained in the definition of ‘genocide’ by 29 votes to 13, with 9 abstentions – Pakistan 
being one of the abstaining countries.283 Several reasons warranted this retention. The 
delegate of Netherlands, de Beus recalled that the Nazis had exterminated members of 
opposition political parties in addition to killing national, ethnic, racial and religious 
minorities.284 Ecuador argued that the exclusion of political groups could result in 
governments suppressing dissident groups alleging that they posed as a threat.285 It 
expressed doubt that its inclusion would assist subversive elements to revolt against 
State authorities, because there was a gulf of difference between measures undertaken 
to maintain order and measures employed to perpetrate genocide.286 The United States 
maintained that ‘genocide’ defined in the Convention should take direct inspiration 
from the UNGA Resolution 96(I) which had specifically included the concept of 
‘political group’. Responding to the allegation that political groups were difficult to 
define, the US delegate Mr Gross pointed out that the history of Nazism showed clear 
examples that it was “perfectly possible to identify political groups”.287 This was 
‘possible’ when the German government outlawed the German Social Democratic 
Party and established the Nationalist Socialist Party as the only legal party in Germany 
by decree. Identifying political groups was possible once again when the Allied 
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Control Council following the defeat of Nazism abolished the Nazi Party. This 
argument has the unhappy consequence of possibly marking as ‘genocide’ the 
suppression of the Nazi Party. Nevertheless, it confirms that ‘identifying’ a ‘political 
group’ is not really a problem.  
 
At the 128th meeting of the Sixth Committee, Egypt, Iran and Uruguay for “practical 
reasons” proposed to reconsider excluding ‘political groups’ and the Committee 
decided by 26 votes to 4 with 9 abstentions to reconsider the issue.288 Mr Raafat from 
Egypt explained that in the course of considering other articles of the Convention, the 
necessity was felt to revisit Article II enumerating the definition of ‘genocide’, 
because it had become clear that if political groups were included among protected 
groups it would pose as a serious obstacle to the ratification of the Convention by a 
large number of States.289 Iran expressed support to this argument by pointing to a 
convention on terrorism in 1935 drafted under the auspices of the League of Nations 
which failed to secure more than three ratifications because abstaining States 
perceived that the convention had political implications.290 It was at this meeting the 
United States deviated away from its long-standing position of including political 
groups. The US delegate reiterated that although it still believed in the correctness of 
its point of view, it would support the proposal to delete ‘political group’ out of 
“conciliatory spirit” in order to ensure maximum participation of States in the 
ratification of the Convention.291 It added however, upon ratification of the 
                                                
288 Philippa Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (Oxford University Press 
2013) 36.  
289 United Nations General Assembly, 6th Committee, Official Records - Summary records of Meetings 
(21 September-10 December 1948), 3rd sess, part. 1, 1948 661 < https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c2ef7a/pdf/ > accessed 12 August 2017. 
290 ibid 662.  
291 ibid.  
 197 
Convention by UN Member States, “improvements” to it could be made by including 
‘political groups’.292 As a result, ‘political groups’ was voted out of Article II of the 
Genocide Convention as part of a ‘compromise’ by 22 votes to 6 with 12 abstentions. 
This time, Pakistan did not abstain. Rather, it voted for its exclusion. By 1971, a total 
of 72 States, including Pakistan, ratified the Genocide Convention 1948.  
 
On the face of it, it may appear therefore, that Bangladesh had violated the principle 
of legality by including ‘political groups’ as one of the protected groups in the ICTA 
definition of genocide. There are, however, arguments to suggest that Bangladesh was 
within its right to ‘include’, as opposed to ‘exclude’ ‘political groups’. Excluding 
‘political groups’ from the definition of genocide has been criticized by several 
quarters. M Cherif Bassiouni has described this ‘exclusion’ as one of the “main 
weaknesses” of the Genocide Convention,293 while Beth Vaan Schaack has termed 
this ‘absence’ the Convention’s “blind spot”.294 The debates preceding adoption of the 
Convention to reveal ‘compromises’ which Schaack feels were “born of politics and 
the desire to insulate political leaders from scrutiny and liability” when ‘political 
groups’ was dropped from the definition of ‘genocide’.  
 
It is true that Pakistan voted against the inclusion of ‘political groups’ in the definition 
of ‘genocide’ at the very end of the deliberations surrounding the Genocide 
Convention. However, having actively participated in the drafting of the Convention 
and being fully aware of the circumstances in which ‘political genocide’ was dropped 
from the Convention by departing from the ‘spirit’ of UN General Assembly 
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Resolution 96(I), there is scope to doubt whether Pakistan can claim that it legitimately 
believed that trying to destroy in whole or in part a ‘political group’ was “innocent 
conduct, undeserving of prosecution”.295 Keeping in mind Judge Shahbuddeen’s 
assertion that “the principle of nullum crimen sine lege does not bar progressive 
development of the law, provided that the developed law retains the essence of the 
original crime”296 it may be argued that Bangladesh by granting protection to ‘political 
groups’ within the scope of ‘genocide’ had increased the potential for accountability 
and made an advancement in the struggle against impunity.  
 
3.4 Did the retroactive amendment of Section 21 ICTA allowing the Prosecution to 
appeal against the life sentence passed on Abdul Quader Molla violate the principle 
of nullum crimen?   
 
On 17 February 2013, twelve days after the Shahbag movement had set off, the 
Parliament of Bangladesh passed the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) 
Act, 2013.297 The amendment introduced three important changes relating to the trial 
of organizations,298 the Prosecution’s right to appeal any sentence passed by the ICT299 
and the Supreme Court’s obligation to dispose any appeals from the ICTs within sixty 
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days of its filing.300 These changes were given retrospective effect from 14 July 2009 
bringing the ICT’s judgment and sentence in the case of Chief Prosecutor v Abdul 
Quader Molla within the purview of the amendment.301 Toby Cadman, Mahin Khan 
and others denounced the demands of Shahbag and the changes in the ICTA that it 
compelled the Parliament to introduce as “laws of passion” and the rule of the 
“mob”.302 
 
A prominent area of contention has been the process through which the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court imposed the maximum punishment, i.e. the death 
penalty on the accused in Abdul Quader Molla v The Chief Prosecutor. Passed on 17 
September 2013, the Molla judgment came nearly seven months after ‘Shahbag’, a 
justice movement that gained the support of Bangladeshis within and beyond state 
boundaries but was ‘defined’ by the slogan: ‘fashi, fashi, fashi chai – Razakar er fashi 
chai’ - meaning ‘we want the noose for the Razakars’.303 
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This part evaluates two aspects of the judgment handed down by the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court in the Molla case. Attention is given to the 
maintainability of the appeal filed by the Prosecution on the basis of the retrospective 
application of the amended Section 21(1) ICTA. Furthermore, it also critiques how 
the Supreme Court justified the enhancement of Molla’s punishment on appeal from 
life imprisonment to the death penalty.  
 
It is worth noting that on 5 February 2013 when the ICT handed down its initial 
verdict, Molla’s Chief Defence Counsel Abdur Razzaq confirmed before the press that 
the defence themselves would file an appeal against the judgment before the Supreme 
Court because it was “perverse” and “the charges of crimes against Molla had not been 
established”.304 In short, after the Parliament introduced the amendments to the ICTA 
on 17 February 2013, Abdul Quader Molla and the Chief Prosecutor both filed 
separate appeals against the original sentence passed by the ICT.305 In the course of 
twenty hearings spread over the next eight months, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh 
heard the appeals. On 17 September 2013, Molla’s punishment was enhanced on 
appeal from life imprisonment to the death penalty. The full judgment was published 
on 5 December 2013.306 In response, Molla directed his lawyers to file a petition to 
review the Supreme Court’s judgment under Article 105307 of the Bangladesh 
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Constitution. After two hearings, the Supreme Court dismissed the ‘review’ on 12 
December 2013. Later that night, Abdul Quader Molla was executed by hanging inside 
the Dhaka Central Jail.  
 
Toby Cadman who had been serving as one of Molla’s lawyers since January 2011 
claimed that his client had been “judicially murdered” as a direct consequence of the 
Shahbag movement.308 Critics believe that had it not been the enormity of the mass 
gatherings at Shahbag, the legal provision ensuring the equality of arms allowing the 
Prosecution to appeal would have not found a place in the ICTA. Had the relevant 
statutory provision not been amended, the Prosecution would be unable to appeal 
against the sentence of imprisonment passed on Molla. This is precisely why it has 
been alleged that the hanging of Abdul Quader Molla on 12 December 2013 is an 
example of penal populism and a representation of populist justice.  
 
It has also been argued that when the retroactive changing of laws leads to the altering 
of the final outcome of a case in a manner that is detrimental to the accused - as was 
the case with regard to Abdul Quader Molla, it not only goes against the prohibition 
on retroactivity, but also undermines the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary and raises serious questions about the political motivations behind the trial 
process.309 The words of Brad Adams of Human Rights Watch aptly sum up the 
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critical voices against retroactive application of law in the Molla case: “A government 
supposedly guided by the rule of law cannot simply pass retroactive laws to overrule 
court decisions when it doesn’t like them. The Bangladesh government should pause, 
take a deep breath, and repeal the proposed amendments, which make a mockery of 
the trial process.”310 There is scope to argue that such allegations did not fully 
appreciate the fundamental notions of separation of powers in Bangladesh and the 
Supreme Court’s mandate to ensure ‘complete justice’ under Article 104 of the 
Constitution.  
 
While the Parliament did give retrospective effect to this amendment, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh did not automatically accept that it 
would apply to the Molla case. Seven of the most senior lawyers of Bangladesh were 
invited as Amicus Curiae and asked to make submissions on whether the amendment 
allowing the Prosecution to appeal before the Supreme Court on the basis of a 
retrospectively applied amendment was maintainable and also whether the 
enhancement of punishment was possible on appeal. It was on the basis of the 
submissions made by the Amicus Curiae that the Supreme Court concluded that the 
amendment in question would apply to Molla. Subsequently, when the sentence on 
Molla was enhanced from a sentence of life imprisonment to a death penalty, the SC 
maintained that increasing a sentence on appeal was very much within its powers, and 
that by doing so it was in fact performing “complete justice”.311  
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The moot question is ‘how’ the Supreme Court reached these conclusions. For the 
purposes of determining whether the retroactive application of the amendment 
allowing the Prosecution to appeal had offended the principle of nullum crimen, the 
SC assessed the impugned amendment against the four guidelines issued by the United 
States Supreme Court in Calder v Bull describing the “characteristics of an 
unconstitutional ex-post facto law”: 1) “Every law that makes an action done before 
the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes an 
action.”; 2) “Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed.”; 3) “Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law, annexed to the crime, when committed.”; and 4) “Every law 
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the 
offender.”312  
 
The Supreme Court relied on the persuasive precedents of multiple foreign cases. It 
agreed with Jagannadhadas J in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v The State of Vindhya 
Pradesh who observed that a trial conducted under a procedure different from what 
was in place at the time of the commission of the offence was not ‘ipso facto’ 
unconstitutional.313 In Dobbert v Florida the death penalty was invalidated as a form 
of punishment soon after Ernest Dobbert murdered his two children. However, five 
months later when the Florida legislature enacted a revised statute allowing for the 
death penalty for murder in the first degree, Dobbert was convicted and sentenced to 
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death. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held:  
 
The changes in the death penalty statute between the time of the murder 
and the time of the trial are procedural, and, on the whole, ameliorative, 
and hence there is no ex post facto violation. […] The existence of the 
earlier statute at the time of the murder served as an ‘operative fact’ to 
warn petitioner of the penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him 
if he were convicted of first-degree murder.314 
 
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh held that the appeal filed at the instance of the 
Prosecution was “maintainable” because the amendment to Section 21(1) ICTA had 
merely enlarged the class of persons competent to appeal against sentences passed by 
the ICTs.315 The retroactive application of this ‘enlargement’ of class of persons did 
not violate the principle of nullum crimen because it did not in any way attach 
criminality to any act previously done which happened to be innocent when it had 
been done. The amendment also did not provide a greater punishment than was 
prescribed at the time of its commission or for that matter alter the degree or lessen 
the amount of measure of proof which was necessary to convict when the crime was 
committed.316  The statutory provisions of the ICTA stating the crimes with which 
Molla was charged, the punishment prescribed for those crimes and finally the degree 
of proof necessary to establish his guilt remained unaffected despite the retroactive 
application of the procedural amendment brought to Section 21(1).317 The Supreme 
Court also took refuge in the ratio decidendi of Tarique Rahman v Government of 
                                                
314 Dobbert v Florida (1977) 432 US 282 cited in (n 46) [165] – [166].  
315 (n 46).  
316 Carmell v Texas (98-7540) 529 US 513 (2000).  
317 Thompson v State of Missouri (1898) 171 US 380.  
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Bangladesh and Government of Bangladesh v Sheikh Hasina.318  
 
Both cases were heard by the Supreme Court in the past and had dealt with the issue 
of retroactive application of law. In Rahman the SC held that Article 35(1) of the 
Constitution “envisages the prohibition on conviction or sentence under ex-post facto 
law, not trial of the offence alleged to have been committed or the procedure to be 
followed in the investigation, inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been 
committed.”319 In Hasina, the Supreme Court held that procedural laws would not 
contravene the ban on ex-post facto law merely because retroactive effect had been 
given to it. The Parliament, therefore, was empowered to give retroactive effect to 
procedural laws but not to laws which retroactively created offences and or increased 
punishment. In the Molla case, the amendment to Section 21(1) ICTA had not created 
any new offences or new forms of punishment. The death penalty was always open 
for the ICTs to apply to any of the accused if found guilty. The amendment was of a 
‘procedural’ nature the application of which allowed the Appellate Division to 
analogously dispose of two appeals – one that had been initiated at the instance of the 
Government and the other at the instance of the convicted accused.  
 
Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha who wrote the leading judgment in Molla observed that 
the dispute over the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Prosecution was 
“academic” in nature.320 This was because even if the Prosecution’s appeal filed on 
the basis of a retrospective law was held to be ‘unmaintainable’ on the grounds that it 
violated the principle of nullum crimen, the Supreme Court would still have to hear 
                                                
318 Tarique Rahman v Government of Bangladesh 63 DLR (AD) 18; Government of Bangladesh v 
Sheikh Hasina 60 DLR (AD) 90.  
319 (n 46).  
320 ibid [173].  
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the appeal filed by the Defence during which it would evaluate if the ICT had 
“awarded a proper sentence to the accused” on the basis of powers conferred by 
Section 21 ICTA and Article 104 of the Constitution.321 In effect, the amendment to 
Section 21(1) allowing the Prosecution to appeal was wholly unnecessary. In the end, 
the Supreme Court heard both appeals on their merits and applied its inherent power 
to determine whether if the ICT had “awarded a proper sentence to the accused”.322 
With respect to Charge No. 6, the SC found that the ICT had erred in law by sentencing 
Molla to life imprisonment. Noting that Molla did not at any point show any sort of 
“repentance” for his “acts and deeds”, the Supreme Court held that it “completely 
offset” Molla’s young age at the time of the offence, which was identified by the court 
as the only mitigating factor.323 As a result, the Supreme Court exercised its power 
conferred by Section 21 of the ICTA along with its powers under Article 104 of the 
Constitution to pass an order as was necessary for “the ends of justice” and enhanced 
the sentence from life imprisonment to death on the count of killing of Hazrat Ali, his 
wife Amena, his two minor daughters Khatija and Tahmina and two year old son on 
26 March, 1971.324 The Supreme Court drew support from Bachan Singh v State of 
Punjab and Machhi Singh v State of Punjab where the constitutional validity of the 
death penalty in India was tested and it was observed that the death penalty could be 
invoked only in the rarest of cases.325 In Molla the Supreme Court held: 
 
We noticed the atmosphere that was prevalent during the recording of the 
evidence of P.W.3 from the note sheet of the tribunal. She was narrating 
                                                
321 ibid [173] – [174].  
322 ibid [173].  
323 ibid [786].  
324 ibid [183].  
325 Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 
470 cited in (n 46) [784].  
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the events of brutal killing of her mother and siblings; two of them were 
so much ravished that they fell into the jaws of death and the other - a child 
of two years was dashed to death. She was lamenting at the time of 
deposing as evident from the remarks noted by the tribunal like a baby, 
and then lost her sense. A pathetic heart breaking atmosphere seized the 
proceedings of the tribunal. If one reads her testimony it will be difficult 
to control emotion. The murders were extremely brutal, cold blooded, 
diabolical, revolting so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the 
community. It was perpetrated with motive. On a close reading of the 
evidence of P.W.3 one can instantaneously arrive at a conclusion that there 
is something uncommon about the incidents of murder which render 
sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and deserve for a death 
sentence. […] If the gravity of the offence is taken as the basis for 
awarding sentence to the appellant, it is one of the fittest case to award the 
appellant the highest sentence in respect of the charge no.6 in which the 
killing and rape were brutal, cold blooded, diabolical and barbarous. If the 
tribunal does not award the maximum sentence considering the gravity of 
the charge, it will be difficult to find any other fit case to award such 
sentence.326 
 
Of course, enhancement of a sentence is a recognized capability for appeal courts in 
other jurisdictions and in international criminal law.327 A close parallel to the Molla 
                                                
326 (n 46) [248] - [249] & [252].  
327 ‘Tadic Sentence increased to 25 Years Imprisonment’ (The Hague, 11 November 1999) 
<http://www.icty.org/en/press/tadic-sentence-increased-25-years-imprisonment> accessed 22 May 
2017; ‘War Criminal Loses Appeal’ BBC News (24 March 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/689147.stm> accessed 22 May 2017; Marija Ristic, ‘Serbia 
Gives Ex-Fighter Maximum War Crimes Sentence' (Balkan Transitional Justice, 12 March 2013) 
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appeal is Case 001 heard by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
where Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch’s sentence was increased from thirty five years to 
life imprisonment on appeal.328 The reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court 
Chamber was that the Trial Chamber had “attached undue weight to mitigating 
circumstances and insufficient weight to gravity of crimes and aggravating 
circumstances” resulting in an “error on a question of law” and the imposing of a 
“manifestly inadequate sentence.”329 It is also worth noting that after Molla, the ICTs 
and the Supreme Court passed sentences of life imprisonment on Ghulam Azam, 
Abdul Alim and Delwar Hossain Sayeedi. In Sayeedi, the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court on appeal from the ICT reduced the accused’s punishment from the 
death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment and the Prosecution’s review 
application to enhance the punishment was also dismissed. 
 
On the basis of abovementioned analysis, there is scope to conclude that the decision 
of the Appellate Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court in Molla has some validity. 
Nonetheless, the enhancement of Molla’s sentence after the Shahbag movement 
reveals two important points of tension in the principle of complementarity. Firstly, 
while the complementary system created by the Rome Statute identifies national 
courts as having priority in addressing the culture of impunity, the national context 
prevailing at the time of judgment may prompt these courts to succumb or be perceived 
to succumb to populist demands for justice. Secondly, while the principle of 
                                                
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/belgrade-increase-sentence-for-war-crimes-in-bosnia> 
accessed 22 May 2017; Sven Milekic, ‘Croatian Police Official’s War Crimes Sentence Increased’ 
(Balkan Transitional Justice, 13 February 2017) <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatian-
police-official-war-crimes-sentence-pro-longed-02-13-2017> accessed 22 May 2017.  
328 ‘Shock for Khmer Rouge Leader Duch as his Sentence is Increased to Life’ The Telegraph (03 
February 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/cambodia/9058823/Shock-for-
Khmer-Rouge-leader-Duch-as-his-sentence-is-increased-to-life.html> accessed 22 May 2017.  
329 Summary of Appeal Judgment (Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch) Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC, 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 3 February 2012 [35], [44].  
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complementarity requires the ICC to be receptive to the diverse standards of justice of 
national criminal jurisdictions, to what extent does it accommodate national courts 
that have embraced the challenge to fight impunity but apply the death penalty while 
doing so? 
 
Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has analysed three criticisms directed at various statutory provisions of 
the ICTA, all of which are related to the principle of legality. This has been conducted 
in light of Bangladesh’s national and international obligations which includes the fair 
trial guarantees enshrined in Bangladesh’s Constitution, the ICTA and its Rules of 
Procedure and the “principles of due process recognized by international law”. Using 
the above standards as the benchmark to assess the veracity of the three significant 
criticisms relating to the principle of legality, this Chapter concludes that all criticisms 
are by no means incontrovertible.  Section 3(1) ICTA empowering the ICTs to 
prosecute “any individual or group of individuals, […] whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act” does not violate Article 35(1) of the Bangladesh 
Constitution. By and large, the definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘genocide’ 
in the ICTA reflect the customary international law surrounding those definitions in 
1971. Any variation falls within the boundaries of reasonable discretion exercised by 
a national legal system. Finally, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court relied on established 
judicial principles and precedents to justify the enhancement of Molla’s punishment 
on appeal from life imprisonment to the death penalty. 
 
Valentina Spiga and Shane Darcy warned that the non-observance or the misuse of the 
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principle of legality may result in the opening of a “dangerous Pandora’s box in the 
hands of a tyrannical judicial power.”330 While the ‘process’ through which Molla’s 
punishment was enhanced revealed two important points of tension in the principle of 
complementarity, it is doubtful the ICTs or the Supreme Court of Bangladesh qualify 
as ‘tyrannical judicial powers’. Since 2010, the justice system established in 
Bangladesh to try and punish the perpetrators of international crimes has come a long 
way. This is indicated in the Supreme Court’s reduction of Sayeedi’s punishment on 
appeal from the death penalty to life imprisonment and also the fact that the ICTs have 
not always handed down the death penalty to the accused but have imposed varying 
sentences of imprisonment as well.  
 
The following Chapter analyses the last major criticism that has been directed towards 
the ICTA. It evaluates the critical views regarding Section 20(2) ICTA which 
empowers the ICTs to “award sentence of death” if they feel that such punishment is 
“proportionate to the gravity of the crime”.331 It answers whether if the principle of 
complementarity can accommodate national courts handing down the death penalty as 
they fight impunity.
                                                
330 Spiga (n 101) 12. 
331 (n 1) s 20(2). 
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Chapter V 
Analysing the major criticisms of the ICTA (II) 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the more important challenges to the legitimacy or legality of the ICTs has 
been its adoption of the death penalty as a possible punishment for those convicted of 
international crimes. Section 20(2) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 
(ICTA) empowers the sentencing of “death or such other punishment proportionate to 
the gravity of the crime” which appears “just and proper” to the Tribunal.1 As of 2017, 
a total of 242 charges have been brought against 55 accused under Section 3(2) of the 
ICTA. The accused have been acquitted in 73 of these charges. Death penalties were 
passed in 67 charges against 31 of the accused. In the remaining charges, a wide range 
of punishments starting from imprisonment of five years to life imprisonment were 
passed. Following appeals filed by 7 of the accused, the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh (SC)2 has passed the sentence of death against 6 of them 
resulting in the executions of, namely, Abdul Quader Molla (Molla), Muhammad 
Kamaruzzaman (Kamaruzzaman), Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (Mujahid), 
Salauddin Qader Chowdhury (Chowdhury), Motiur Rahman Nizami (Nizami) and Mir 
Quasem Ali (Ali).3 On appeal, the SC commuted Delwar Hossain Sayeedi’s 
punishment from the death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment.4 
                                                
1 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 [ACT NO. XIX OF 1973] s 20(2) < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=435 > accessed 6 May 2014.  
2 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh is the country’s apex court.  
3 ‘Bangladesh Hangs Islamist Mir Quasem Ali for 1971 War Crimes’ BBC News (4 September 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37268320> accessed 7 January 2017.   
4 ‘Bangladesh Islamist Delwar Sayeedi death Sentence Commuted’ BBC News (17 September 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29233639> accessed 7 January 2017.  
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There are deep divisions amongst stakeholders over the presence and application of 
the statutory provision allowing the death penalty in the ICTA. The Bangladesh 
Government maintains that the death penalty has been retained in the ICTA in light of 
the country’s “socio-political realities and legal system” and that it is handed down 
only where the accused are convicted of the “most heinous crimes” and after all 
“relevant legal safeguards” available to an accused have been exhausted.5 On the other 
hand, the retaining and imposing of the death penalty has been criticized from several 
perspectives by lawyers representing the defendants, a few practitioners of 
international law, human rights and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International (Amnesty), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) as well as major bodies of the United Nations including 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
These criticisms can be divided into two broad categories, which are, the principled 
opposition to the death penalty as an inhumane and degrading form of punishment and 
the alleged failure of the ICTs to ensure fair trial safeguards enshrined in Article 14 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).6 
                                                
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘A Position Paper on ICT-BD Trials and Execution of Verdict against 
Mr. Abdul Quader Molla on 12 December 2013’ (The Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, 2013) 6 <http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/position-paper-ict-bd-trials-and-execution-
verdict-against-mr-abdul-quader-molla> accessed 8 August 2017 
6 ‘Press Briefing Notes on Nepal and Bangladesh’ (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 
November 2015) <https://perma.cc/GJS9-XRE8> accessed 25 April 2016; ‘Press Briefing Notes on 
Bangladesh’ (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 April 2016) <https://perma.cc/PU69-
HRHA> accessed 19 April 2016; ‘Bangladesh: Suspend Death Penalty for War Crimes Convict’ 
Human Rights Watch (New York, 9 May 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/09/bangladesh-
suspend-death-penalty-war-crimes-convict> accessed 19 April 2016; Toby M Cadman, ‘Barrister Toby 
Cadman after the Execution of Abdul Quader Mollah - Washington, DC, December 12, 2013’ (12 
December 2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-OAEt-bYZA> accessed 19 April 2016; 
‘Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal: Commentary on the Application of International 
Standards’ (9 Bedford Row International, December 2013) 15 & 21 <http://tobycadman.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/131121-Bangladesh-Briefing-Document-December.pdf> accessed 19 April 
2016; ‘Co-Chairs Urge Stay of Execution in Bangladesh Case for Lack of Due Process’ (Tom Lantons 
Human Rights Commission United States Congress, 6 May 2016) 
<https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/news/press-releases/co-chairs-urge-stay-execution-
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In two parts, this Chapter analyses whether the passing of the death penalty by the 
ICTs and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh violates the principle of complementarity. 
To this end, Part I briefly traces the global movement for abolition of the death penalty 
and identifies the categories of crimes against which the passing of the death penalty 
is still permissible under contemporary standards of international law. Part II asks if 
the ‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute) permits domestic courts of State Parties to apply the 
death penalty as punishment for international crimes.  
 
1. The death penalty’s ‘place’ in international law and the ‘complementary’ 
system of justice  
 
This part briefly traces the strides that have been made towards the ‘abolition’ of the 
death penalty. It argues that while there is a strong global movement against capital 
punishment, consensus on ‘abolition’ does not yet command universal support. The 
absence of this ‘consensus’ is reflected not only in the ‘views’ expressed by countries 
that retain the death penalty but is also acknowledged in multiple instruments of 
international law which allow the imposing of capital punishment for the ‘most serious 
crimes’. 
 
1.1 Cesare Beccaria and the campaign for abolition of the death penalty  
 
                                                
bangladesh-case-failing-due-process-standards> accessed 19 April 2016; ‘Bangladesh: Halt Imminent 
Execution of Motiur Rahman Nizami’ (ICJ News, 9 May 2016) < https://www.icj.org/bangladesh-halt-
imminent-execution-of-motiur-rahman-nizami/> accessed 19 April 2016.  
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Cesare Beccaria at the age of twenty-five published a treatise titled Dei delitti e delle 
penne (Essay on Crimes and Punishments) and in doing so cemented his place in 
history as one of the pioneers who advocated for the abolition of the death penalty in 
a “concerted fashion”.7 This ‘contribution’ came at a time when the ‘abolition of man’ 
was “virtually unchallenged” and was  handed down for offences as ‘petty’ as stealing 
turnips or cutting down trees.8 In the chapter discussing the ‘punishment of death’, 
Beccaria boldly posed a fundamental question: “What right, I ask, have men to cut the 
throats of their fellow creatures?”9 Answering that this was not “authorised by any 
right”, he claimed that the death penalty was no more than “a war of a whole nation 
against a citizen” whose destruction was perceived as “necessary or useful to the 
general good”.10 Beccaria argued that if he could demonstrate that the death penalty 
was “neither necessary nor useful”, he would win the “cause of humanity”.11 
 
Emphasizing the need for the “efficiency of punishment”,12 Beccaria advocated the 
proportionate determination of punishment which would refrain from inflicting 
extreme pain and needless cruelty on criminals. He explained that inflicting excessive 
pain was “counter-productive”13 because awareness that excessively severe 
punishments would be applied incited men to perpetrate “other crimes, to avoid the 
punishment due to the first.”14 Referring back to the “experience of all ages”, Beccaria 
                                                
7 Berand van Niekerk, ‘Hanged by the Neck Until you are Dead: Some Thoughts on the Application of 
the Death Penalty in South Africa’ (1969) 86 South African Law Journal 457, 461; Paul Friedland, 
Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment (Oxford University Press 2012) 205, 
207.  
8 James B Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Politics: The British Movement to Abolish the 
Death Penalty 1945-57 (George Allen & Unwil Ltd 1962) 13-14.  
9 Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (New edn, W C Little & Co 1872) 97.  
10 ibid 98.  
11 ibid. 
12 Paul Friedland, Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 205.  
13 ibid 206.  
14 Beccaria (n 9) 94. 
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took note of the simple reality that capital punishment had “never prevented men from 
injuring society” and hence was incapable of having a deterrent effect on crime.15 He 
proposed, that the “traditional spectacle” of the death penalty be replaced by 
“perpetual slavery”, an alternate penal spectacle that would effectively deter “the most 
hardened and determined” criminals and simultaneously be of productive use to the 
society at large.16 This ‘alternative’, however, failed to gain acceptance, despite 
support from thinkers of the likes of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Jacques Pierre 
Brissot.17 
 
Interestingly, Cesare Beccaria was not an ‘abolitionist’ to the extent he was 
“fashioned” to be.18 Despite being convinced of its ineffectiveness, Beccaria conceded 
that the death penalty could be applied in certain circumstances, maintaining a 
‘conditional’ stance on abolition which was in effect very similar to the views of 
Montesquieu or Jean-Jacques Rousseau who believed in the sovereign’s right to take 
the life of a criminal “when it was a matter of collective self-defence”19:   
 
The death of a citizen cannot be necessary but in one case. When, though 
deprived of his liberty, he has such power and connections as may 
endanger the security of the nation; when his existence may produce a 
dangerous revolution in the established form of government. But even in 
this case, it can only be necessary when a nation is on the verge of 
                                                
15 ibid 99.  
16 ibid 101; Friedland (n 12) 206.  
17 Beccaria (n 9) 193-195; Friedland (n 12) 211-212.  
18 Friedland (n 12) 207.   
19 ibid 208.  
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recovering or losing its liberty; or in times of absolute anarchy, when the 
disorders themselves hold the place of laws.20 
 
Beccaria’s treatise inspired significant changes in the penal landscape. In the following 
years and decades, penal reform embraced a combination of ‘humanitarianism’ and 
‘utilitarianism’.21 This process enhanced the “positive value” of the individual, 
including those who had committed crimes.22 Capital punishment underwent a process 
of ‘delocalization’ whereby it transformed from being a ‘spectacular’ community 
ritual to a “discreet, hidden, almost abashed”23 event controlled by state authorities.24 
These ‘changes’ did not come about easily and without resistance. Beccaria’s treatise 
was staunchly rebutted at the time by Pierre-Francois Muyart de Vouglans. In defence 
of capital punishment, Muyart argued that it would be a “sovereign injustice not to 
make murderers suffer the same penalty that they inflict on others” and by “taking it 
upon himself to sketch the Laws of all nations from the depths of his office”, Beccaria 
had undermined “natural law and the law of nations” based on centuries of experience, 
which established the death penalty’s position as a legitimate form of punishment.25  
 
Nonetheless, as of 2017, 141 countries are abolitionist either in law or in practice 
representing more than two-thirds of all States.26 This does not mean application of 
                                                
20 Beccaria (n 9) 98.  
21 Friedland (n 12) 210.  
22 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (W W Norton 2007) 76, 82, 112; Kenneth Younger, 
‘The historical perspective’ in Louis Blom-Cooper (ed), The Hanging Question: Essays on the death 
penalty (Gerald Duckworth & Co 1969) 7.   
23 Friedland (n 12) 217. 
24 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition (Oxford 
University Press 2010).  
25 Muyart de Vouglans, Réfutation des principes hasardés dans le Traité des délits et peines (Lausanne 
1767) 18, 22, 86-7 cited in Friedland (n 12) 214.  
26 ‘The Death Penalty in 2016: Facts and Figures’ (Amnesty International, 11 April 2017) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/death-penalty-2016-facts-and-figures/> accessed 
25 May 2017.   
 217 
the death penalty has universal support. In 2015, responding to General Assembly 
resolution 69/186 entitled “Moratorium on the use of the death penalty”, Bangladesh 
and 26 other countries urged the United Nations to view the death penalty from a 
“broader perspective” that took into account the “rights of victims” and the “right of 
the community to live in peace and security”.27 According to these countries, the 
retention of the death penalty formed a part of their inalienable right to choose their 
“political, economic, social, cultural, legal and criminal justice systems” without 
external interference.28 Pointing out that no Member State of the UN had the right to 
impose its point of views on others, it was argued that countries that still applied the 
death penalty had the right to determine the path that corresponded with their “own 
social, cultural and legal needs”.29 While there is a growing consensus that the death 
penalty is lacking in ‘deterrent value’30, resistance to this claim has not completely 
waned.31 According to Paul Friedland, in the eighteenth century there was a general 
agreement amongst ‘protagonists’ of abolition and ‘supporters’ of the death penalty 
that if it ought to be applied at all, it be applied ‘sparingly’ and only to dangerous 
                                                
27 UNGA, ‘Note verbale dated 28 July 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General’ (29 July 2015) UN Doc A/69/993, 3-5; Rayhan Rashid, ‘ICT and 
the ‘death penalty’ debate’ (ICSF Forum, 18 March 2013) <http://icsforum.org/articles-en/892> 
accessed 15 May 2017.   
28 UNGA (n 27).   
29 ibid 3-5.   
30 See generally, Carolyn Hoyle and Roger Hood, ‘Deterrence and Public Opinion’ in Ivan Simonovic 
(ed), Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and Perspectives (United Nations 2014) 
70-74; John Lamperti, ‘Does Capital Punishment Deter Murder? A Brief Look at the Evidence’ (2010) 
Dartmouth College Research Paper, 6 
<https://www.dartmouth.edu/~chance/teaching_aids/books_articles/JLpaper.pdf> accessed 28 April 
2016; John Donohue and Justin J Wolfers, ‘The Death Penalty: No Evidence for Deterrence’ (2006) 3 
(5) The Economists’ Voice <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DonohueDeter.pdf> accessed 28 April 
2016; John Donohue and Justin J Wolfers, ‘Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death 
Penalty Debate’ (2006) NBER Working Paper No 11982 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11982.pdf> 
accessed 28 April 2016; ‘The Death Penalty and Deterrence’ (Amnesty International, 2016) 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/the-death-penalty-
and-deterrence> accessed 28 April 2016.  
31 Cass R Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? - Acts, Omissions, 
and Life-Life Tradeoffs Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment’ (2006) 58 Stanford Law Review 
703, 706.  
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criminals.32 The intriguing aspect of this ‘agreement’ is that it embodied what would 
dominate the contemporary standard of handing down the death penalty under 
international law, i.e. international law’s permissiveness of the death penalty as 
punishment for the ‘most serious crimes’.  
 
1.2 The death penalty for the ‘most serious crimes’  
 
Despite support for ‘abolition’ during the debates of the Third Committee, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognized the “right to life” and the 
right not to be subjected to “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”, but did not explicitly prohibit the death penalty.33 This changed in the 
1950s and the 1960s when international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR, 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) prohibited the death penalty for crimes that were not 
“sufficiently serious” but allowed it “under carefully defined circumstances”.34 For 
instance, Article 6(2) ICCPR restricts countries that have not abolished capital 
punishment to apply it only with respect to the ‘most serious crimes’. Similar 
provisions are seen in Article 4(2) ACHR.35 The protocols to these treaties, namely, 
Protocols 6 and 13 to the ECHR, the additional protocols to the ICCPR and the ACHR 
proceeded in advancing the cause for abolition and presently count nearly one hundred 
                                                
32 Friedland (n 12) 215.  
33 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
art 3 and 5 <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> accessed 1 May 2015; 
William A Schabas, ‘International Law and the Death Penalty’ in Peter Hodgkinson and William A 
Schabas (eds), Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition (Cambridge University Press 2004) 36-37, 
40.  
34 Schabas (n 33) 41.  
35 Schabas (n 33) 46.  
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states that have signed or ratified them.36 While the protocols to the ICCPR and the 
ACHR permit the application of the death penalty during war time, Protocol 13 of the 
ECHR extended upon its predecessor and abolished the death penalty not just during 
peace time but also during times of war.37 These numbers point towards the definitive 
presence of an abolitionist norm in Europe and Latin America.38 In 2004, when a total 
of sixty states had signed the protocols in question, William Schabas argued that the 
search for a ‘global’ customary norm prohibiting capital punishment for all crimes was 
“premature”, but in the same breath predicted the crystallization of such a norm in the 
next few decades.39 Taking into consideration that a further 37 countries have signed 
the protocols since 2004, there is little scope to doubt the realistic chances of Schabas’s 
estimate.  
Experts on the death penalty like Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have called for the 
“dynamic interpretation” of the concept ‘most serious crimes’.40 Inferring from the 
phrase “in countries that have not abolished the death penalty” in Article 6(2) and the 
contents of Article 6(6) which does not “delay or prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by an State Party to the Covenant”, it has been argued that the term ‘most 
serious crimes’ in the ICCPR was a “marker” that signified “the policy of moving 
towards abolition through restriction”.41 As a result, the list of ‘most serious crimes’ 
                                                
36 Schabas (n 33) 42; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, UNTS vol  1642, 414; Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “Protocol 
of San Salvador”, Signatories and Ratifications <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html> 
accessed 15 May 2017; Protocol No 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, ETS No 
187 <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/187/signatures?p_auth=p9GUofJE> accessed 1 May 2016.  
37 Schabas (n 33) 43.  
38 ibid 44.  
39 ibid 41.  
40 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 151.  
41 ibid 25-26, 151.  
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has undergone a process of “evaluation and re-evaluation” and has gradually narrowed 
down with the passage of time.42 Hood and Hoyle’s assertion complements the opinion 
of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) which has called for “restrictive” 
interpretation of Article 6(2) implying that the application of the death penalty is an 
“exceptional measure”.43  
 
Although the reference to ‘most serious crimes’ has been criticized on the grounds of 
being too permissive towards wide-ranging state practices and for failing to curb the 
tendency of pro-death countries to execute persons convicted of a crime,44 rights based 
bodies have, over the years, clarified to a significant extent what crimes do not qualify 
for the ‘most serious’ threshold.45 Article 4(4) ACHR stipulates that capital 
punishment cannot be inflicted for “political offences or related common crimes”.46 
The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) has imposed additional restrictions 
on sentencing to death persons guilty of ‘non-violent financial crimes’ or ‘non-violent 
religious practices or expressions of conscience’.47 Crimes related to ‘opposition to 
order’ and ‘national security violations’ as well as ‘threats against national security’, 
and ‘broadly written definitions of terrorism’ have also been found to be “excessively 
vague” and “inconsistent” with the ethos of Article 6(2) ICCPR.48 Philip Alston’s 
compilation of crimes determined by the Commission on Human Rights and the 
                                                
42 ibid 26.  
43 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6 (Sixteenth Session 1982), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 6 (1994) <https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom6.htm> accessed 1 
May 2016.  
44 Schabas (n 33) 46.  
45 Hood and Hoyle (n 40) 152.  
46 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32) 
<https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm> accessed 1 
May 2016.   
47 UNCHR, ‘Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2004/67: Question of the Death Penalty’ (21 
April 2004) E/CN.4/RES/2004/67. 
48 Decisions on Procedures of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc A/54/40, para 128.  
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Human Rights Committee to have fallen beyond the scope of ‘most serious crimes’ 
include: ‘abduction not resulting in death’, ‘abetting suicide’, ‘adultery’, ‘apostasy’, 
‘corruption’, ‘drug-related offences’, ‘economic crimes’, ‘the expression of 
conscience’, ‘financial crimes’, ‘embezzlement by officials’, ‘evasion of military 
service’, ‘homosexual acts’, ‘illicit sex’, ‘sexual relations between consenting adults’, 
‘theft or robbery by force’, ‘religious practice’ and ‘political offences’.49 
 
A significant attempt to provide a clear understanding of the concept of ‘most serious 
crimes’ was made by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the early 
1980s. In the ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the 
Death Penalty’ which was adopted without opposition in 1984, the ECOSOC and the 
UN General Assembly stipulated that ‘most serious crimes’ “should not go beyond 
intentional crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences”.50 Thirty years later 
in 2014, the UN Secretary-General in the Report titled “Question on the Death 
Penalty” explained that ‘most serious crimes’ in international human rights 
jurisprudence has been interpreted to allow “the death penalty to be applied only to 
the crime of murder or intentional killing.”51 Hood and Hoyle acknowledge that the 
developments so far with respect to the narrowing down of what is understood as ‘most 
serious crimes’ under international law are moving “undoubtedly […] in the right 
direction”.52 
 
                                                
49 Philip Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions’ 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/20, para 51.  
50 Alston (n 49) paras 49 and 51. 
51 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Question of the death penalty’ (30 June 2014) A/HRC/27/23.  
52 Hood and Hoyle (n 40) 154.  
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2. Death penalty for ‘international crimes’ and the ‘complementary’ system of 
justice  
 
This part briefly examines the practice of applying the death penalty for international 
crimes. It questions whether the ‘complementary’ system of justice created by the 
Rome Statute permits domestic courts of State Parties to apply the death penalty as 
punishment for international crimes even though modern ‘international’ tribunals no 
longer employ the death penalty as a form of punishment.  
 
Since international law is permissive towards the infliction of capital punishment on 
the ‘most serious crimes’ (as discussed in the previous section), customary 
international law as a natural consequence cannot be said to explicitly prohibit the 
passing of the death penalty as a punishment for international crimes.53 When 
determining the punishment for persons guilty of international crimes, courts enjoy 
more “judicial discretion”.54 A general consensus about a “tariff” of sentences for 
international crimes is yet to be achieved because of the divergent views States hold 
about the gravity of crimes, the attachment of guilt for each offence, and the degree of 
severity of punishment.55 Consequently, although the ICC, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), the internationalized panels in Kosovo, the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes  of East Timor (SPSC), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have set the cap of 
                                                
53 Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 20.   
54 Antonio Cassese and Paola Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 36; Margaret M deGuzman, ‘Harsh Justice for International Crimes’ (2014) 39 Yale Journal 
of International Law 1, 7.  
55 Cassese and Gaeta (n 54) 36.   
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maximum punishment at life imprisonment, capital punishment for international 
crimes has been applied in the distant and recent past.56 
 
After World War II, capital punishment was handed down by the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) and International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
for war crimes and for crimes that did not involve killings such as torture and rape. 
Twelve of the accused in the ‘Trial of Major War Criminals’ before the IMT were 
hanged.57 Seven defendants before the IMTFE faced the same fate.58 A general 
agreement persists that the Nuremberg principles were not reflections of victors’ 
justice but “constituted a development vital for the survival of mankind and the 
stability of the world order.”59 Therefore, the death penalty was perceived to have 
applied been at that time not out of vengeance but because the practice formed a part 
of the laws and customs of war.60  
 
                                                
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 77; Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, article 24(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, article 23; 
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of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, article 3 new; Steven Freeland, 
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15 (2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 1, 3.  
57 William A Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2000) 463.  
58 Freeland (n 56) 3.   
59 Gideon Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem (Schocken Book 1968) 441.  
60 ‘Annex II – United States Law and Practice Concerning Trials of War Criminals by Military 
Commissions and Military Government Courts’ in United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed), Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals: Volume I (English edn, His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1948) 120; 
‘Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita’ in United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed), Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals: Volume IV (His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1948) 95; ‘Trial of 
Hauptsturmfurer Oscar Hans’ in United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed), Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals: Volume V (His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1948) 86; ‘Punishment of Criminals’  in 
United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed), Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals: Volume XV 
Digest of Laws and Cases (English edn, His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1948) 200-202; ‘Trial of 
Kriminalassistent Kal-Hans Hermann Klinge’ in United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed), Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals: Volume III (8th edn, His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1948) 3.  
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The national courts of Allied States also applied the death penalty. For instance, even 
though there were no provisions under the national law to pass death sentences on 
quislings, Norwegian judges enforced them nonetheless stating that the death penalty 
for war crimes was permissible under customary international law.61 Similarly, the 
UK and US prosecutions of ‘minor’ war criminals across Germany and other parts of 
Europe from 1945-1948 resulted in numerous death penalties being handed down. 
Although prosecutions led by the USSR did not result in the passing of the death 
penalty, the punishment of transportation for hard labour in Siberia amounted to the 
same thing. However, the application of the death penalty in national prosecutions 
during the post-Nuremberg era have been “historically rare”62 with only a few 
noteworthy cases (including the executions of Adolf Eichmann by Israel in 1962 and 
the twenty-two Rwandan ‘genocidaires’ in 1998 and the unenforced death sentences 
passed against Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot and his Deputy Prime Minister in 1979).63 
According to unofficial estimates, death sentences were also passed in 40% of the 
sentences passed by the Rwandan domestic courts in the first 150 trials.64 In recent 
times, domestic courts in Bangladesh, Iraq and Libya have passed the death sentence 
against persons found guilty of international crimes. These include sentences passed 
against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2006 and Libya’s Abdullah al-Senussi in 2015.65 
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But in general the application of the death penalty for international crimes has been 
the exception since the late 1940s.  
 
According to Steven Freeland, the dramatic reduction in the frequency and practice of 
handing down the death penalty over the past half-century is a consequence of ‘micro’ 
and ‘macro’ reasons.66 He suggests that the ‘micro’ reasons are founded on practical 
considerations. International tribunals require financial support and they have been 
unlikely to receive that if adopting punishment which contravenes the principles of 
major contributing states or organisations.67 More convincingly, the ‘macro’ reasons 
relate primarily to the evolution and influence of international human rights over the 
past six decades and the progress nation-states have made in the campaign for 
abolition.68  
 
Despite this marked shift, the ‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome 
Statute does not prohibit domestic courts of State Parties from punishing the 
perpetrators of international crimes by applying the death penalty. In the third Chapter 
of this thesis, it was demonstrated that the ICC is receptive towards the ‘diverse’ 
standards of justice in national criminal jurisdictions when assessing the 
‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘manner’ of those jurisdictions. These ‘diverse’ 
standards include the application of punishments like the death penalty. Although 
proposals calling for the Rome Statute to incorporate the death penalty were ultimately 
unsuccessful, the President of the Rome Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court reiterated that there was “no 
                                                
66 Freeland (n 56) 26-27.  
67 ibid 21.  
68 ibid 27.  
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international consensus on the inclusion or non-inclusion of the death penalty”.69 It 
was clarified that the ICC would not “affect national policies” relating to punishment 
and its non-inclusion of the death penalty would not “have a legal bearing on national 
legislations and practices with regard to the death penalty” or influence “development 
of customary international law” or the “legality of penalties imposed by national 
systems for serious crimes”.70 This position is clearly expressed in Article 80 of the 
Rome Statute which explicitly provides that none of its provisions affect “the 
application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law”.71  
 
Countries that still apply the death penalty for international crimes include Belarus, 
States belonging to the Caribbean Commonwealth, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Singapore, Sudan, USA and Zimbabwe.72 From the courts of these States alongside 
the Bangladeshi ICTs, the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) has passed a range of sentences 
some of which had led to the executions of at least five of the accused.73 Courts in 
Libya have also passed the death penalty on perpetrators of international crimes. When 
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asked whether if it would have been better to try Saddam Hussein before the ICC, 
Stephen J Rapp the US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues explained that 
the cases before the IHT were beyond the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. He added 
further:  
 
We have to remember that this is a national system. It is theirs. It is their 
national norms. It may not be to everybody’s liking, but that is the world 
we live in. We try to work at the national level first and foremost, and we 
cannot always expect it to be perfect. We want to have something that as 
good as we can.74 
 
The most recent development in this area has been Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council’s 
decision to open a “special judicial body to investigate the terrorist crimes committed 
against Yezidis” by alleged members of ISIS.75 
 
However, critical of the level of fairness ensured during the domestic trials of Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi in Libya, Jennifer Trahan has described the 
ICC’s “role in allowing domestic executions” as “troubling” and has called upon State 
Parties to “request the Court to adopt a policy of requesting diplomatic assurances of 
non-use of the death penalty in any ICC cases ruled inadmissible.”76 According to 
Geoffrey Robertson, the cases of Gaddafi and al-Senussi reveal a “design fault in the 
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ICC”.77 Despite these critical views, the statutory provisions of Article 80 remain 
unchanged and it cannot plausibly be said that the ‘complementary’ system of justice 
created by the Rome Statute does not preclude States or future international tribunals 
from applying the death penalty as punishment for international crimes.78  
 
Conclusion 
 
As of 2017, a total of 141 States are abolitionist in law or practice, revealing a clear 
trend that the global community is moving away from the practice of applying the 
death penalty and has made important strides towards reaching a consensus that the 
death penalty violates the prohibition on “torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment”.79 Nevertheless, the complete prohibition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances has not assumed the status of a “customary norm” and is therefore 
still absent in international law.80 Contemporary standards of international law, 
therefore, are still permissive of the passing of the death penalty for the ‘most serious 
crimes’ which are limited to murder or intentional killing. Although international 
justice systems such as the ICTY, ICTY, SPSC, SCSL, ECCC and the ICC are 
statutorily barred from applying the death penalty, the ‘complementary’ system of 
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justice created by the Rome Statute does not preclude the domestic courts of State 
Parties from applying the death penalty as punishment for international crimes. This 
position is explicit in Article 80 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, although the trend 
towards the global abolition of the death penalty is undeniable, the divergence in the 
approach between international and domestic courts when it comes to sentencing 
persons for international crimes is apparent.81  
 
Critics of the ICTA and the ICTs have questioned the legitimacy of the ICTs of 
Bangladesh because they apply the death penalty. Their main objection originates 
from a principled opposition to the death penalty as form of punishment. In a press 
release issued following the executions of Chowdhury and Mujahid, the OHCHR 
claimed that the UN opposed the death penalty “in all circumstances” and “even for 
the most serious international crimes”.82 In light of this and other similar criticisms, 
this Chapter began by asking whether the passing of the death penalty by the ICTs and 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh violates the principle of complementarity. The 
question is complex, but the answer is simple. They do not, as international criminal 
law currently stands. The application of the death penalty has not been a fundamental 
benchmark of the principle of complementarity as a starting principle.  
 
However, critics have also expressed reservations towards the death penalties by the 
ICTs and the Supreme Court because of their alleged failure to uphold the fair trial 
safeguards ensured in Article 14 ICCPR. In May 2016 after the Supreme Court 
dismissed Matiur Rahman Nizami’s petition to review its previous decision upholding 
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his death sentence, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) issued a call to the 
President of Bangladesh to halt Nizami’s execution. The ICJ argued that an execution 
carried out “on the basis of a flawed trial” would be “inconsistent with international 
human rights standards”.83 An identical call came from HRW and other human rights 
organizations. Brad Adams, the Asia Director of HRW pointed out that the death 
sentence was “problematic” because there were questions whether “fair trial 
standards” were ensured during Nizami’s trial.84  
 
These criticisms set the stage for the next chapter of this thesis which shifts focus away 
from the most contentious objections of law to the most contentious objections relating 
to the trial procedures at the ICTs. It analyses three important fair trial concerns that 
revolve around Bangladesh’s struggle against impunity. These include an assessment 
of Article 47A(1) of the Bangladesh Constitution which critics believe have deprived 
those accused of international crimes “of their fundamental rights”85, the practice of 
limiting the number of defence witnesses and finally holding trials in the absence of 
the accused.
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Chapter VI 
Analysing the major criticisms of the trial process (I) 
 
Introduction 
 
Alongside some of the most contentious objections of law surrounding the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (ICTA), the legality and legitimacy of the 
International Crimes Tribunals of Bangladesh (ICTs) have also been challenged on 
the grounds that they failed to uphold fair trial safeguards ensured in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While the Bangladesh Government 
maintains that the ICTA and its Rules of Procedure (RoP) adhere “to most of the rights 
of the accused enshrined under Article 14 of the ICCPR”, critics state that the trials 
have been unfair because of some “significant omissions of accepted international 
standards”.1  
 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to determine the legality and legitimacy of 
the ICTs through the prism of the principle of complementarity in the context of 
national criminal jurisdictions prosecuting international crimes. This Chapter and the 
one immediately following explore the extent to which due process concerns have 
violated the principle of complementarity and compromised the legitimacy of the 
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ICTs. To that end, they take a deeper look at three of the most contentious objections 
relating to the trial process of the ICT’s, namely, the application of Articles 47(3) and 
47A of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, which provides 
constitutional protection to the ICTA and bars those charged with international crimes 
from moving the Supreme Court to benefit from the remedies guaranteed under 
Bangladesh’s Constitution, the practice of limiting the number of defence witnesses, 
and finally the holding of trials in absentia. In three parts, this Chapter specifically 
analyses the first two areas of contention. Part I identifies the fair trial safeguards that 
are guaranteed to those who are charged with international crimes in Bangladesh under 
the ICTA. Part II asks whether Articles 47(3) and 47A deprive those charged with 
international crimes of their fair trial rights and alter the ‘basic structure’2 of 
Bangladesh’s Constitution. Part III examines the ICTs practice of limiting the number 
of defence witnesses and assesses the extent to which this practice has affected the 
rights of the accused. Throughout, the recurring question remains to what extent any 
variation in application of fair trial standards (or breach thereof) renders a national 
process invalid from the perspective of the principle of complementarity.  
 
1. Fair trial safeguards guaranteed in the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 
1973 and its Rules of Procedure 
 
Mirroring Articles 14(1) and (2) ICCPR, the ICTA and its RoP place a positive 
obligation on the ICTs to exercise their judicial functions independently and ensure 
                                                
2 The doctrine of basic structure is a principle that certain basic features of the Constitution cannot be 
altered or destroyed through amendments initiated by the Parliament.   
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that their hearings are “fair” and “public”.3 This is achieved through a range of 
safeguards that uphold the rights of the accused during the various stages of a case 
relating to arrest, investigation, detention, trial and punishment.  
 
The ICTA ensures certain safeguards when it comes to the recording of statements or 
confessions by accused persons which may be made to him during the course of the 
investigation or at any time prior to the commencement of the trial.4 It stipulates that 
a First Class Magistrate before recording any statement or confession is legally obliged 
to explain to the accused that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does 
opt to make such a confession, it may be used against him as evidence.5 In addition to 
this, the Magistrate is also barred from recording any confessions unless he has reason 
to believe that the person making it is doing so voluntarily.6  
 
Although the ICTA empowers the Investigation Officer (IO) to secure through the 
Prosecution an arrest warrant from the Tribunal at any stage of the investigation, he 
must do so by satisfying the Tribunal that “such arrest is necessary for effective and 
proper investigation.”7 This reduces the possibility of carrying out arbitrary arrests. In 
adherence to Articles 9(2) and 14(3)(a) ICCPR which requires an arrestee to be 
informed of the reasons for his arrest at the time of his arrest and to be promptly 
informed of the charges against him, the ICTA and the RoP ensure that the accused is 
aware of the crimes he is charged with by serving of a copy of the allegations upon 
                                                
3 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 [ACT NO. XIX OF 1973] s 6(2A) and 10(4) < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=435 > accessed 6 May 2014; International 
Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 Bangladesh Gazette 15 July 2010, rule 43(4).  
4 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 14(1).  
5 ibid s 14(2). 
6 ibid s 14(2).  
7 International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rule 9(1). 
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him when a warrant of arrest is being executed.8 Furthermore, the Chief Prosecutor is 
obliged to provide copies of the Formal Charge, a list of witnesses along with the 
recorded statements of such witnesses and other documents he intends to rely on in 
support of the charges at least three weeks before the commencement of the trial for 
the purposes of allowing the accused to prepare his defence.9 These provisions are 
similar to the Nuremberg and IMTFE Charters as well as the Statutes governing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which provided the accused with 
“reasonable” or an “adequate” amount of time to prepare.10  
 
Critics argue that the statutory provision giving a minimum preparation period of three 
weeks to the accused does not comply with Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR which stipulates 
that the accused must be given “adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence”. According to Geoffrey Robertson, a minimum period of three months 
should be given to the accused to prepare his defence and that the existing three week 
period is “hopelessly inadequate” given the lengthy nature of the trials involving 
dozens of charges.11 However, a cursory glance over the timelines of some of the trials 
                                                
8 ibid rule 9(3).  
9 (n 3) s 9(3) and 16(2); International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rule 18(4).  
10 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), article 16(a); International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE Charter), article IV(a); Statute of the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR Statute), article 20(4)(b); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute), article 21(4)(b). 
11 Anbarasan Ethirajan, ‘Bangladesh Finally Confronts War Crimes 40 Years on’ BBC News (20 
November 2011) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15794246 > 9 July 2016; David Bergman, 
‘Defence Walkout: Wise Heads Must Prevail’ (Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal Blog, 19 November 
2011) < http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/defence-walkout-wise-heads-must-
prevail.html > 9 July 2016; Geoffrey Robertson, Report on the International Crimes Tribunal of 
Bangladesh (International Forum for Democracy and Human Rights, 2015) 114; Surabhi Chopra, ‘The 
International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh: Silencing Fair Comment’ (2015) 17 Journal of Genocide 
Research 211, 213; Toby M Cadman, ‘Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal: Commentary on the 
Application of International Standards’ (9 Bedford Row International, December 2013) 13, 22, 37 < 
http://tobycadman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/131121-Bangladesh-Briefing-Document-
December.pdf > accessed 7 August 2017. 
 235 
that have been completed show that the amount of time given in practice to the accused 
to prepare was considerably longer than the minimum three week period.12 In Chief 
Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the counsel representing the accused were 
given roughly three months to prepare.13 After the judgment by the ICT-1 was handed 
down on 28 February 2013, the hearings before the Supreme Court began on 24 
September 2013, giving the accused nearly seven months to prepare for the appeal.14 
In Chief Prosecutor v Md Kamaruzzaman, the counsel representing accused were 
given five months to prepare.15 After the judgment by the ICT-2 was handed down on 
9 May 2013, the hearings before the Supreme Court began on 5 July, 2014 giving the 
counsel of the accused around fourteen months to prepare for the appeal.16 In Chief 
Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali, the counsel representing the accused were given just 
over three months to prepare.17 After the judgment by the ICT-2 was handed down on 
2 November 2014, the hearings before the Supreme Court began on 09 February, 2016 
giving the counsel of the accused around fifteen months to prepare for the appeal.18 
                                                
12 Mary Kozlovski, ‘Bangladesh’s way: Dhaka’s Controversial International Crimes Tribunal’ 
(International Bar Association, 4 July 2013) < 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=AA9E9993-62BA-4E44-A177-
DF51CA884C19 > accessed 7 August 2017.  
13 The Chief Prosecutor v Delwar Hossain Sayeedi (Order No 10) ICT-1 (18 August 2011) ICT-BD 
Case No 01 of 2011, 5; The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (Order No 23) ICT-1 (3 
October 2011) ICT-BD Case No 01 of 2011, 18.  
14 The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (Judgment) ICT-1 (28 February 2013) ICT-BD 
Case No 01 of 2011, 1 < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/sayeedi_full_verdict.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; Delwar Hossain Sayeedi v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) 
Criminal Appeal No 39-40 of 2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/617564_CRIMINAL_APPEAL_NO.39-
40_OF_2013_2.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017. 
15 The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (Order No 8) ICT-2 (9 May 2013) ICT-BD Case 
No 03 of 2012, 4 & 17.  
16 The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (Judgment) ICT-2 (9 May 2013) ICT-BD Case 
No 3 of 2012, 1 < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/MKZ.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; 
Muhammad Kamaruzzaman v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 62 of 
2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/650628_CRIMINALAP62_of_2013.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017. 
17 The Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali (Order No 12) ICT-2 (5 September 2013) ICT-BD Case No 
03 of 2013, 4 & 18.  
18 The Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali (Judgment) ICT-2 (2 November 2014) ICT-BD Case No 3 
of 2013, 1 < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/Mir%20Quasem-judge-02.pdf > accessed 
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While the Tribunals formed after the Second World War did not give the accused more 
than a few weeks to prepare his/her defence, the UN sponsored Tribunals of the 
modern era have given more time.19 According to Robert Cryer, modern day 
international investigations and prosecutions are more time-consuming than domestic 
ones because the latter are “very complex, factually, legally and politically”.20 Several 
judgments of the ICTR and ICTY clarify the theoretical underpinnings of the right to 
adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR 
in Kayishema and Ruzindana and the ICTY in Kordić and Cerkez explained that the 
accused’s right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence does 
necessitate a “parity of resources between the parties, such as the material equality of 
financial or personal resources.”21 In the Appeal Judgment of Nahimana et al. it was 
held that when considering the accused’s right to have adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of the defence, the Appeals Chamber must assess whether the Defence 
as a whole was deprived of adequate time and facilities, not any individual counsel.22 
In agreement with the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Appeals Chamber in 
Krajišnik held that “adequate time” for the preparation of the defence depended on the 
circumstances of the case and could not be “assessed in the abstract”.23 In Tadić, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that respecting the right to adequate time and 
                                                
12 August 2017; Mir Quasem Ali v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 
144 of 2014, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/824674_Crl_A_No_144_2014_final.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017. 
19 Richard May and Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Transnational Publishers 2002) 
272. 
20 Robert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press 2010) 436.  
21 ibid 435.  
22 Nahimana et al. v The Prosecutor (Media case) (Appeals Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 
2007) [220].  
23 The Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajišnik (Appeals Judgment) ICTY-00-39-A (17 March 2009) [80].   
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facilities meant that the conditions of the trial did not place the accused “at a 
substantial disadvantage as regards his or her opponent”.24  
 
Additional assessments of the HRC provide a clearer sense of when violations of 
Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR take place. In Rayos v The Philippines, the accused had been 
sentenced to death for rape and murder. The HRC found that the accused’s right to 
adequate time and facilities had been violated because he had initially been forced to 
sign an extra-judicial confession prior to which he did not have a lawyer. Furthermore, 
he was only allowed to communicate with his lawyer for a few minutes every day 
during the trial itself.25 In Ndong Bee and MicAbogo v. Equatorial Guinea, the 
notification of charges two days prior to the reading out of the indictment was ruled 
by the HRC to have deprived the accused of sufficient time to prepare their defence.26 
In Hill and Hill v. Spain, the HRC found that the complainants right to adequate time 
and faculties to prepare had not been violated despite having only one 20-minute 
consultation with their legal aid lawyer, because the hearing was subsequently 
adjourned to allow the lawyer to prepare the defence.27 In light of the abovementioned 
guidelines, there is scope to doubt the claim that the accused before the Bangladeshi 
ICTs were deprived of their right to adequate time and facilities to prepare their 
defence to such an extent that they were substantially disadvantaged when compared 
to the Prosecution. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the statutory provision 
stipulating a minimum period of three weeks in the ICTA and its RoP may not be 
                                                
24 William A Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press 2006) 514.  
25 Rayos v Philippines (27 July 2004) UNHRC 1167/2003 cited in ‘Case Digests: International 
Standards on Criminal Defence Rights: UN Human Rights Committee Decisions’ (Open Society Justice 
Initiative, April 2013) 22 < https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/digests-
arrest%20rights-human-rights-committee-20130419.pdf > accessed 7 August 2017.  
26 Ndong Bee and MicAbogo v Equatorial Guinea (31 October 2005) UNHRC 1152/2003 and 
1190/2003 cited in (n 25) 22.  
27 Hill and Hill v Spain (2 April 1997) UNHRC 526/1993 cited in (n 25) 22.  
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perceived as an adequate amount of time and ought to be increased by an amendment 
so that the revised time period reflects the length of time the ICTs have provided to 
the accused in practice.  
 
Multiple provisions of the ICTA and RoP protect the accused’s right to be tried 
without undue delay, a right enshrined in Article 14(3)(c) ICCPR. Following an 
accused’s arrest, the Police are obliged to produce him before the Tribunal within 
twenty-four hours.28 When an investigation is being carried out against an accused 
who is detained, that investigation must be concluded within a period of one year.29 
Only under exceptional circumstances can the Tribunal extend the period of 
investigation by six months after showing reasons recorded in writing.30 The IO 
through the Prosecutor is required to submit progress reports of the investigation every 
three months before the Tribunal so that it may review its order of detention issued 
against the accused.31 If the investigation process extends beyond the one year limit, 
the Tribunal may grant the accused bail subject to the fulfilment of certain 
conditions.32 Furthermore, Sections 11(3)(a)-(b) along with Rules 43(5) and 53(iii) 
oblige the ICTs to “confine the trial to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by 
the charges” and prevent actions “which may cause unreasonable delay” to the trial 
proceedings.  
 
Once arrested and detained, an accused cannot be subjected to any form of coercion, 
duress or threats of any kind while he is questioned or his case is investigated by the 
                                                
28 International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rule 34(1).   
29 ibid rule 9(5). 
30 ibid.  
31 ibid rule 9(6).  
32 ibid rule 9(5).  
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IO.33 When an IO searches and seizes any documents or things under a seizure list, he 
is required to carry out such activities in the presence of two witnesses.34 This 
provision serves to ensure that the IO does not abuse his power when a search or seize 
is being carried out. 
 
In consonance with Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR which provides an accused with the right 
of representation, the ICTA and its RoP uphold the accused’s right to be represented 
by counsel of his choosing.35 This includes the right to be defended not just by 
Bangladeshi lawyers but also by foreign counsel who may appear before the ICTs in 
person subject to permission granted by the Bangladesh Bar Council.36 Although 
multiple foreign counsel have been formally appointed to represent many of the 
accused facing trial before the ICTs, their involvement has remained restricted to 
activities formulating defence strategies, drafting legal briefs and lobbying on behalf 
of the accused. This is because the Bangladesh Bar Council has not yet granted any 
foreign counsel the permission to physically present their arguments before the ICTs.37 
While this embargo has affected the accused’s right of representation to an extent, it 
would be an overstatement to claim that the embargo delegitimizes the justice process 
in Bangladesh, keeping in mind that foreign counsel have participated in all aspects of 
preparing the defence of the accused save for physically presenting arguments before 
the ICTs.  
 
                                                
33 ibid rule 16(2).   
34 ibid rule 10.  
35 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 10 A(2), 12 and 17(2); International Crimes 
Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rules 42 and 43. 
36 (n 3) rule 42.  
37 David Bergman, ‘Bar Council Not to Allow Foreign Counsel in War Crimes Tribunal’ New Age 
(Dhaka, 2 November 2010) < 
http://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/87/records/25/Bar%20Council%20not%20to%20allow%20foreign%2
0counsel%20in%20War%20Crimes%20Tribunal.pdf > 7 August 2017.  
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The ICTA and its RoP ensure further protections to the accused. The ICTs are obliged 
to presume the innocence of an accused until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt 
by the Prosecution.38 Reflecting Article 14(3)(e) ICCPR, the ICTA empowers an 
accused “to present evidence at the trial in support of his defence, and to cross-
examine any witness called by the prosecution”.39 The right of appeal enshrined in 
Article 14(5) ICCPR is guaranteed in Section 21(1) of the ICTA which grants a person 
convicted and sentenced by the ICTs to appeal against such conviction and sentence 
before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The right to have 
“the free assistance of an interpreter” enshrined in Article 14(3)(f) ICCPR is 
guaranteed through Sections 10(2) and 10(3) ICTA. Finally, the right not to be 
compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt enshrined in Article 14(3)(g) 
ICCPR is protected in Sections 8(5) and 18 ICTA. The right to receive compensation 
for unnecessary punishment suffered as a consequence of a miscarriage of justice 
guaranteed in the Articles 9(5) and 14(6) ICCPR remains unaccommodated in the 
ICTA.40 The legal system of Bangladesh as a whole does not provide for compensation 
to victims of miscarriage of justice.41 In 2010, Tureen Afroz argued against 
incorporating this right into the statutory provisions of the ICTA because doing so 
                                                
38 International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rules 43(2), 50 and 51.  
39 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 10(1)(e) and 17(3); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, article 14(3)(e) reads: “To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him”. 
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 39) article 9(5) reads: “Anyone who has been 
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation”; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 39) article 14(6) reads: “When a person has by 
a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been 
reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively 
that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such 
conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the 
unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him”.  
41 Mohammad Shahabuddin, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Study on 
Bangladesh Compliance (National Human Rights Commission 2013) 53 < 
http://nhrc.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/nhrc.portal.gov.bd/page/348ec5eb_22f8_4754_bb62_
6a0d15ba1513/Study%20Report%20ICCPR.pdf > accessed 7 September 2016.  
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would “distort the national criminal jurisprudence” of Bangladesh.42 The Government 
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not oppose “the principle of 
compensation for miscarriage of justice”, but maintains that it “is not in a position to 
guarantee a comprehensive implementation of this provision for the time being.”43 
Since 2010, Bangladesh has made important strides in the effort to compensate people 
who were victims of miscarriages of justice. The most prominent example was the 
compensation some of the victims received after the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in 
2011 declared that the trial and execution of Lt Colonel M A Taher Bir Uttam’s by a 
Special Martial Law Tribunal in 1976 was illegal and unconstitutional.44 Moreover, 
The Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, 2013 obliges a person convicted 
of torture to pay an amount of compensation to the victim which cannot be less than 
Taka 25,000/-.45 As a State that has ratified the ICCPR and has expressed its 
commitment to “ensure full implementation” of the right to be compensated for 
unnecessary punishment suffered following a miscarriage of justice “in the near 
future”, the absence of this right in the ICTA and its RoP is a shortcoming that needs 
to be addressed.46 
 
From the preceding discussion, there is scope to conclude that despite a few omissions 
                                                
42 Tureen Afroz, ‘Let There be Light: Commentary on IBA Fatwas’ in Tureen Afroz (ed), Genocide, 
War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity in Bangladesh: Trial under International Crimes (Tribunals) 
Act, 1973 (Forum for Secular Bangladesh and Trial of War Criminals of 1971 2010) 194.  
43 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
40 of the Covenant Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 2001 (Bangladesh)’ (3 September 2015) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/BGD/1, para 7 < https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/198/21/PDF/G1519821.pdf?OpenElement > accessed 15 August 
2016.   
44 Julfikar Ali Manik, ‘5th Amendment Verdict Paves Way for Justice’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 25 
August 2010) < http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-152188 > accessed 15 September 2016; 
Ashutosh Sarkar, ‘Taher Trial Illegal’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 23 March 2011) < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-178777 > accessed 15 September 2016.   
45 Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013, s 15.  
46 UN Human Rights Committee (n 43) para 7.  
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concerning the statutory provision allowing an accused a minimum period of three 
weeks to prepare his defence, the inability of foreign counsel to physically place their 
arguments before the ICTs and the absence of the right of compensation to victims of 
miscarriage of justice, an accused charged with international crimes under the ICTA 
enjoys a range of fair trial safeguards which mirror most of the rights enshrined in 
ICCPR.  
 
2. Does the ‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) and 47A deprive those charged 
with international crimes of their fair trial rights and alter the ‘basic structure’ 
of the Bangladesh Constitution?   
 
Article 47(3) of the Bangladesh Constitution extends “special treatment” to the ICTA 
by giving “constitutional protection” to any law or provision that functions to detain, 
prosecute or punishment any person “for genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes and other crimes under international law.”47 This is followed by Article 47A 
which takes away an accused’s right to challenge the provisions of the ICTA on the 
ground that they violate the right to protection of the law, protection in respect of trial 
and punishment and the right to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.48 Both these articles were inserted into the Constitution through the First 
                                                
47 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, article 47(3) reads: “Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Constitution, no law nor any provision thereof providing for detention, 
prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces 
[or any individual, group of individuals or organisation] or who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law shall be deemed void 
or unlawful, or ever to have become void or unlawful, on the ground that such law or provision of any 
such law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any of the provisions of this Constitution” < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=367 > accessed 12 August 2017; Mizanur 
Rahman and S M Masum Billah, ‘Prosecuting ‘War Crimes’ in Domestic Level: The Case of 
Bangladesh’ (2010) I The Northern University Journal of Law 14, 18.  
48 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 47) article 47A reads: “(1) The rights 
guaranteed under article 31, clauses (1) and (3) of article 35 and article 44 shall not apply to any person 
to whom a law specified in clause (3) of article 47 applies. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in 
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Amendment in 1973. The protection ensured through these Articles are complemented 
by Section 26 ICTA which provides that the statutory provisions of the ICTA “shall 
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other 
law for the time being in force.”49 
 
Critics of the ICTA maintain that reading Articles 47(3) and 47A together creates a 
‘scheme’ that represents one side of the 1971 conflict, a side which is biased towards 
the Bangladesh Government and causes detriment to those facing trial. Questions have 
been raised about the extent to which the principles of fairness, equality and the 
responsible use of power are applicable to the accused because this ‘scheme’ blocks 
their ability to rely on the Bangladesh Constitution to protect their fundamental 
rights.50 Referring to the precedent set by Nazi Germany, Suzannah Linton has warned 
how unchecked Parliamentary supremacy – the signs of which she sees in Bangladesh, 
can lead to the ruin of a nation.51 Linton points out that a state of emergency did not 
exist when the ICTA came into existence in 1973 just as it does not exist today, leaving 
no justifiable reason for denying an accused being tried before the ICTs the right to 
seek remedies available under the Constitution.52 Linton relies on the writings of 
Gustav Radbruch and H.L.A Hart to explain what she perceives is a ‘constitutional 
predicament’. Radbruch belonged to a school of thought that rejected the positivist 
argument permitting legislation of any kind, even legislation that is manifestly 
                                                
this Constitution, no person to whom a law specified in clause (3) of article 47 applies shall have the 
right to move the Supreme Court for any of the remedies under this Constitution.” 
49 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 26. 
50 Suzannah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War 
of Liberation’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 191, 217.   
51 ibid 216.  
52 ibid 218-219; Steven Kay QC, ‘Bangladesh its Constitution & the International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act 2009’ (Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar Association Human Rights Conference, 
Dhaka, 13 October 2010). 
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immoral.53 He argued that “[w]here there is not even an attempt at justice, where 
equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, 
then the statute is not merely ‘flawed law’, it lacks completely the very nature of 
law.”54 In 2010, when Linton penned a detailed evaluation of the prospect of trials 
under this problematic ‘scheme’ created by the First Amendment, she stopped short 
of classifying it as manifestly immoral, but did comment that it was, as a whole, 
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.55 Linton predicted that if trials were to 
proceed under this ‘scheme’, they would likely be a matter of concern for the UN 
Human Rights Committee in light of Bangladesh’s compliance with the ICCPR and 
also the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.56 Linton concludes 
that the resulting ‘scheme’ is unnecessary and disproportionate.57 
 
Steven Kay QC, a lawyer specializing in international law who has represented several 
members of the Jamaat-e-Islami who have been tried by the ICTs, has described this 
‘scheme’ as one that introduced “inequality” into the Bangladesh justice system by a 
“Constitution that claimed to promote equality”.58 Ambassador Stephen Rapp and 
Nicholas Koumjian have lent support to the position taken by Linton and Kay. Both 
have argued that Article 47A is inconsistent with Bangladesh’s obligations under the 
ICCPR which requires all persons the same set of privileges during trial. In the absence 
of any compelling reasons justifying its presence in the Constitution, Rapp and 
Koumjian believe that Article 47A “severely damages the perception of the ICT(s)” 
and benefits the critics of Bangladesh’s struggle against impunity giving them 
                                                
53 Linton (n 50) 216-217.  
54 ibid 217.    
55 ibid 219.  
56 ibid 220.  
57 ibid 219.  
58 Kay (n 52). 
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leverage to make the claim that the concerned trial proceedings are not intended to be 
held in a manner that is fair.59 Human Rights Watch has adopted a similar position and 
petitioned for the repeal of Article 47A because it bears the potential to “form the basis 
for complaints that fair trial standards are not met under the ICT Act.”60  
 
There is truth in Rapp and Koumjian’s assertion that the ‘scheme’ resulting from 
Articles 47(3) and 47A has had an adverse effect on the way the ICTs have been 
perceived by critics. The problem, nonetheless, rests in the fact that this ‘perception’ 
is constructed on an inadequate appreciation of why the First Amendment was 
introduced into the Constitution. When passing ‘judgment’ on this ‘scheme’, critics 
may have forgotten to take into consideration the purpose it serves, i.e. ensuring an 
unencumbered judicial process for the detention, prosecution and punishment of 
persons committing core international crimes. It was on the foundation of this 
‘purpose’ that the First Amendment was introduced and the ICTA was enacted in 
1973. There would have been grounds to object to such a ‘judicial process’ resulting 
from such a ‘scheme’ if it truly deprived an accused of fundamental fair trial rights 
otherwise ensured by the Bangladesh Constitution. The ICTA’s compliance with the 
rights of an accused enshrined in the ICCPR has been discussed in the first part of this 
Chapter. Therefore, there is legitimate scope to question the allegation that the 
‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) and 47A is biased towards the Government and 
impairs the capacity of the ICTs to fairly conduct judicial proceedings.  
 
                                                
59 ‘International War Crimes Tribunal, Notes from Stephen Rapp and Nick Koumjian to the Office of 
the Chief Prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunals’ 1-2.  
60 Brad Adams, ‘Letter to the Bangladesh Prime Minister Regarding the International Crimes 
(Tribunals) Act’ (Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2011) < https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/18/letter-
bangladesh-prime-minister-regarding-international-crimes-tribunals-act > accessed 17 September 
2016.  
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A parallel line of reasoning critiques the ‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) and 47A 
on the grounds that it may potentially alter the ‘basic structure’ of Bangladesh’s 
Constitution, the kind of alteration which has been deemed illegal by the Appellate 
Division (AD) of the Supreme Court in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, 
also known as the 8th Amendment Case. In 1988, the Constitution (Eighth 
Amendment) Act was passed amending Article 10061 of the Constitution resulting in 
“fragmentation” of the High Court by the setting up of permanent regional Benches 
outside Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh.62 The judgment of the 8th Amendment case 
is ‘celebrated’ in the legal history of Bangladesh because it was the first of its kind 
where the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Constitution made by the 
Parliament. The central argument made by a 3-1 majority of the Appellate Division 
was that the provisions of Article 763 ensuring the basic and unalterable supremacy of 
the Constitution places an implied limitation on the Parliament’s power to amend the 
Constitution under Article 142.64 Since the Supreme Court (comprising of the High 
Court Division and Appellate Division) vested with judicial power over the Republic 
is a basic structure of the constitution, it cannot be altered through an amendment made 
by the Parliament.65 Therefore, the 8th amendment by compromising the “oneness” of 
the High Court Division had altered the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution and left 
an irreconcilable conflict with other Constitutional provisions.66  
                                                
61 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 47) article 100 reads: “The permanent 
seat of the Supreme Court shall be in the capital, but sessions of the High Court Division may be held 
at such other place or places as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the President, from time to 
time appoint”.   
62 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh (Eighth Amendment Case) 41 DLR (AD) 165; Opinion of 
Michael J Beloff QC on War Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh, 24 para 6.7.  
63 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 47) article 7. 
64 ibid article 142; Opinion of Michael J Beloff QC on War Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh (n 62) 24 
para 6.7.  
65 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh (Eighth Amendment Case) (n 62); Soli J Sorabjee, 
‘Opinion’ (19 May 2010) 8.  
66 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh (Eighth Amendment Case) (n 62).  
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Statutory provisions of the ICTA are not subject to constitutional challenges because 
they are protected by Articles 47(3) and 47A. The nature of this protection is slightly 
different from the kind of protection accorded to multiple pieces of legislation under 
the First Schedule of the Bangladesh Constitution. The First Schedule contains at least 
twenty-eight laws which are beyond the scope of judicial review.67 The protection 
accorded to the ICTA is different because the ICTA is not one of the laws listed under 
the First Schedule. The ICTA enjoys ‘protected status’ because it happens to be the 
only law in Bangladesh providing for the “detention, prosecution or punishment of 
any person […] for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes 
under international law” and such laws shall not “be deemed void or unlawful, or ever 
to have become void or unlawful, on the ground that such law […] is inconsistent with, 
or repugnant to, any of the provisions of this Constitution.”68 
 
Providing constitutional protection to laws is not uncommon in the legal parlance in 
South Asia. For example, the 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India reveals a total 
of two hundred and eighty-four pieces of legislation which have been accorded 
‘constitutional protection’ under Article 31B. Until 2007 the understanding with 
regard to laws included in the 9th Schedule was that their provisions could not be 
declared void on the ground that they are inconsistent with any of the fundamental 
rights enshrined in Part III of the Indian Constitution. This changed following a 
landmark judgment in 2007 where a nine-member Bench of the Indian Supreme Court 
took refuge in the doctrine of basic structure and held that “there could not be any 
                                                
67 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 47) First Schedule.  
68 ibid.  
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blanket immunity from judicial review of laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule of the 
Constitution.”69 The judgment read:  
 
The power to grant absolute immunity at will is not compatible with the 
basic structure doctrine and, therefore, after April 24, 1973 the laws 
included in the Ninth Schedule would not have absolute immunity. The 
validity of such laws can be challenged on the touchstone of basic structure 
[…].70 
 
Taking into account the extent of rights extended to an accused under the ICTA and 
its RoP, it is unlikely that provisions of the ICTA will be successfully challenged on 
the grounds that they contravene fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
However, due to the precedent left by the 8th Amendment Case and the persuasive 
authority of the Indian case discussed above, one cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that the First Amendment may be subjected to judicial review to ascertain 
if it has altered the ‘basic structure’ of the Bangladesh Constitution. This will be set in 
motion if and when “a provision of the Constitution or a law is violated” and the Court 
having exercised “great restraint” and weighed “all the consequences that may follow 
from its order” exercise its power of review “not suo muto, but at the instance of an 
aggrieved person”.71 Whether such a ‘review’ will succeed is a different question 
altogether and matter of speculation.  
 
                                                
69 J Venkatesan, ‘IX Schedule Laws Open to Review’ The Hindu (12 January 2007) < 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/IX-Schedule-laws-open-to-review/article14705323.ece > 
accessed 17 September 2016. 
70 ibid.  
71 Mahmudul Islam (ed), Constitution 8th Amendment Case Judgment – with Summary of Submissions 
(Special Issue, Bangladesh Legal Decisions 1989) 180.  
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According to Suzannah Linton, the basic structure and features of the Bangladesh 
Constitution that cannot be altered include “independence of the judiciary and 
fundamental rights” and the “rule of law”.72 Although the 8th Amendment Case bases 
its reasoning on the doctrine of basic structure, what actually constitutes the ‘basic 
structure’ of the Bangladesh Constitution is scattered across multiple paragraphs of 
the judgment. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury listed 21 “unique features” of the 
Constitution, some of which are “basic features of the Constitution” not “amendable 
by the amending power of the Parliament.”73 He goes on to write: “In the scheme of 
Article 7 and therefore of the Constitution the structural pillars of Parliament and 
Judiciary are basic and fundamental.”74 In subsequent parts of the judgment Justices 
Shahabuddin Ahmed and M. H. Rahman identify the basic structures of the 
Constitution which include: supremacy of the Constitution as the solemn will of the 
people, democracy, Republican government, Unitary State, separation of powers, 
independence of the judiciary, fundamental rights and the rule of law.75 The judgment 
of the 8th Amendment Case went to great lengths to identify what constitutes ‘basic 
structure’ and concluded that many of them are enunciated in the Preamble of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh which is “something different from that of an ordinary 
statute” and “is not merely the outline of the governmental structure” but also “the 
embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of the people” which “includes the nation’s 
high and lofty principles and people’s life philosophy.”76  The first two sentences of 
the Preamble reads:  
 
                                                
72 Linton (n 50) 218. 
73 Islam (ed) (n 71) 109, 111.  
74 ibid 111. 
75 ibid 156, 171. 
76 ibid 147. 
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We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our independence on 
the 26th day of March, 1971 and through [a historic struggle for national 
liberation], established the independent, sovereign People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh; [Pledging that the high ideals of nationalism, socialism, 
democracy and secularism, which inspired our heroic people to dedicate 
themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in, the national 
liberation struggle, shall be the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution;]77 
 
It is evident from the quoted lines that unblemished importance has been placed on 
the Proclamation of Independence and the sacrifices of the martyrs of the Liberation 
War of Bangladesh in 1971 in the Preamble of the Bangladesh Constitution. This is 
the same Proclamation that unambiguously mentioned the “ruthless and savage war” 
and the “numerous acts of genocide and unprecedented tortures, amongst others on 
the civilian and unarmed people of Bangladesh” committed by the Pakistani 
authorities.78 Although the judgment of the 8th Amendment Case did not attempt to 
provide a comprehensive list of past amendments that had destroyed the basic structure 
of the Constitution, it did acknowledge that mishaps of such nature had taken place in 
the past. This included the Fourth Amendment Act dated 25 January 1975 which had 
“changed the Constitution beyond recognition in many respects” and had brought 
about overnight “a Presidential form of Government authoritarian in character on the 
basis of a single party” replacing “a democratic Parliamentary form of Government 
on the basis of multiparty system”.79 Also included were the Martial Law 
                                                
77 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (n 47) Preamble. 
78 Sajahan Miah, ‘Proclamation of Independence’ (Banglapedia) < 
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Proclamation_of_Independence > accessed 22 January 2016. 
79 Islam (ed) (n 71) 139. 
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Proclamation Orders which had “badly mauled” the Constitution on ten occasions, all 
of which were incorporated in and ratified by the Constitution Fifth Amendment Act 
in 1979.80 These included, the replacement of secularism as one of the Fundamental 
State Principles with “Bismillah-er-Rahman-Ar-Rahim” and the giving of a different 
meaning to socialism.81  
 
This does not automatically negate the possibility that the First Amendment Act, 1973, 
i.e. the ‘scheme’ created by the First Amendment may be added to the list of 
amendments that had fundamentally altered the ‘basic structure’ of the Bangladesh 
Constitution. However, keeping in mind that the fair trial guarantees enshrined in the 
ICTA and its RoP, the absence of any provisions in the ICTA which gives undue 
preference towards the Government and against the accused, the text of the Preamble 
of the Constitution placing a great deal of weight on international crimes committed 
against the Bengali populace and finally the absence of the First Amendment in the 
initial list of ‘unconstitutional’ amendments compiled in the course of the 8th 
Amendment Case, it is possible to argue that the ‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) 
and 47A does not create a ‘scheme’ that alters the ‘basic structure’ of Bangladesh’s 
Constitution.  
 
The ‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) and 47A does not deprive those charged with 
international crimes of their fair trial rights guaranteed in the ICTA. However, it has 
had an adverse effect on the way the ICTs have been perceived by critics. On balance 
                                                
80 ibid 140.  
81 ibid 140. 
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this criticism may have some weight but it is insufficient to cause concern under the 
principle of complementarity.  
 
3. Does the practice of limiting the number of defence witnesses delegitimise the 
justice process of the ICTs? 
 
The ICTs have in about forty percent of its cases restricted the number of defence 
witnesses permitted to give evidence during trial. Various quarters, including counsels 
defending the accused and international human rights organizations along with 
international lawyers and journalists observing the trials, have been critical of this 
practice. The premise underlying this stance is that limiting the number of defence 
witnesses adversely impacts the equality of arms at the expense of the accused. The 
restrictions imposed by the ICTs have been described as “systematic”82, “arbitrary”83, 
made “without justification”84 and “perhaps the most significant set of decisions […] 
impacting upon the question of the fairness of the trials”.85 
 
The following account is an assessment of the ICTs practice of limiting defence 
witnesses. This analysis is divided into two sub-sections. The first section briefly 
                                                
82 David Bergman, ‘Has Bangladesh Finally Buried the Ghosts of 1971 War Crimes Along with Motiur 
Rahman Nizami?’ Scroll.in (13 May 2016) < http://scroll.in/article/808023/has-bangladesh-finally-
buried-the-ghosts-of-1971-war-crimes-along-with-motiur-rahman-nizami > accessed 21 June 2016.  
83 ‘Bangladesh: War Crimes Verdict Based on Flawed Trial’ (Human Rights Watch, 22 March 2016) < 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/bangladesh-war-crimes-verdict-based-flawed-trial > accessed 
21 June 2016. 
84 Ilia Maria Siatitsa, ‘National Trials of International Crimes in 2013: Procedural and Fair Trial 
Guarantees’ in Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013 (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 481.   
85 David Bergman, ‘Are the Tribunals Justified in Restricting Defence Witness Numbers?’ (Bangladesh 
War Crimes Tribunal Blog, 25 November 2013) < 
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/are-tribunals-justified-in-restricting.html > 
accessed 21 June 2016.  
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sketches an overview of how and the extent to which ICTs limited the number of 
witnesses listed by the defence. The second section offers an assessment of the ICTs. 
 
3.1 Limiting of the number of defence witnesses by the ICTs – a brief overview  
 
The right of an accused to present evidence in his defence – a right safeguarded in the 
ICTA, is a guarantee that assists in ensuring the ‘equality of arms’ and in turn 
preserving the overall ‘fairness’ of an adversarial trial.86 This includes, the right to 
adduce and examine witnesses and documents which the accused intends to rely upon, 
and which he or she must submit to the Tribunal and the Prosecution when the trial 
commences.87 An important qualification to this ‘guarantee’ is that, it is not an 
‘unfettered’ one. In fact, the ICTs are empowered to limit the number of witnesses 
where it appears that they have been listed by the defence with a purpose abusing and 
causing unreasonable delay to the judicial process.88 
 
Counsel representing the accused are correct to argue that the ICTA and its RoP do 
not ‘explicitly’ provide for the right of Tribunals to place a ‘cap’ on the number of 
defence witnesses.89 The ICTs have, however, relied on several provisions in 
justification of their ‘limiting’ Orders. One such provision is Section 9(5) ICTA, which 
reads: “A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the documents or copies 
thereof, which the defence intends to rely upon, shall be furnished to the Tribunal and 
                                                
86 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 17(3) reads: “An accused person shall have the 
right to present evidence at the trial in support of his defence, and to cross-examine any witness called 
by the prosecution”. 
87 ibid s 9(5) reads: “A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the documents or copies 
thereof, which the defence intends to rely upon, shall be furnished to the Tribunal and the prosecution 
at the time of the commencement of the trial”.  
88 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 11(3)(b).   
89 The Chief Prosecutor v Mohammad Kamaruzzaman (Order No 114) ICT-2 (20 February 2014) ICT-
BD Case No 03 of 2012, [3].  
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the prosecution at the time of the commencement of the trial.” In Kamaruzzaman, the 
Tribunal reasoned that the words “if any” in this Section meant that the right of the 
defence to furnish witnesses is not obligatory or mandatory.90 This is coupled with 
Section 11(3) ICTA and Rules 43(5), 46A and 53(iii) of the RoP which oblige the 
Tribunals to arrange for “effective and expeditious” trials by  preventing actions 
“which may cause unreasonable delay” and simultaneously rule out “irrelevant issues 
and statements” by exercising their inherent power to issue orders “necessary to meet 
the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process.”91 Finally, these provisions are 
supplemented by Rule 51A(2) which requires the Tribunal to issue orders compelling 
the attendance of witnesses listed by the accused but also grants the power to refuse 
to do so if it appears that the application was made with a “purpose of vexation or 
delay or for defecting the ends of justice”.92  
 
These provisions have formed the bedrock of the ICTs orders limiting the number of 
defence witnesses in eleven of the twenty-seven cases that have been completed. In 
the cases of Molla, Sayeedi, Kamaruzzaman, Azam, Mujahid, Chowdhury, Alim, 
Nizami, Ali, Forkan and Razzak et al, the ‘limiting’ orders passed by the Tribunals 
                                                
90 The Chief Prosecutor v Mohammad Kamaruzzaman (Order No 114) ICT-2 (20 February 2014) ICT-
BD Case No 03 of 2012, [7].  
91 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 11(3) reads: “A Tribunal shall – (a) confine the 
trial to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges; (b) take measures to prevent any 
action which may cause unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements”; International 
Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010, rule 43(5) reads: “The accused shall be tried without undue 
delay” while rule 46A reads: “Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the 
inherent power of the Tribunal to make such order(s) as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice 
or to prevent abuse of the process”.  
92 International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2010 (n 3) rule 51A(2) reads: “If the accused 
applies for the issuance of process for compelling the attendance of any witnesses proposed by him, the 
Tribunal shall issue such process unless it considered that such application should be refused on the 
ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defecting the ends of justice.” The 
Chief Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam (Order No 72A) ICT-1 (9 October 2012) ICT-BD Case No 
6 of 2011, 2.  
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allowed the Defence to call a maximum of 6, 20, 5, 12, 3, 5, 3, 4, 3, 4 and 7 witnesses 
respectively.93 
 
3.2 Assessing the practice of limiting of the number of defence witnesses by the ICTs  
 
Does the practice of limiting the number of witnesses the defence is permitted to call 
“inevitably preclude” the accused’s ability to present his or her case and compromise 
the principle of ‘equality of arms’?94 Was the number of defence witnesses 
‘systematically’, ‘arbitrarily’ and ‘unreasonably’ limited by the ICTs? Did the 
‘limiting’ practice impede the accused from determining the nature of evidence that 
would be presented through witnesses of his or her own choosing?95 This section starts 
                                                
93 The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla (Judgment) ICT-2 (5 February 2013) ICT-BD Case No 
2 of 2012, [25], [27] and [29] < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/quader_full_verdict.pdf 
> accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (Judgment) ICT-1 (28 
February 2013) ICT-BD Case No 01 of 2011, [36] < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/sayeedi_full_verdict.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief 
Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (n 16) [28], [35]-[38] & [151]; The Chief Prosecutor v 
Professor Ghulam Azam (Judgment) ICT-1 (15 July 2013) ICT-BD Case No. 6 of 2011, [35] - [36] < 
http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT%20BD%20Case%20NO.%2006%20of%202011%20_Delivery%
20of%20Judgment__final_.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan 
Muhammad Mujahid (Judgment) ICT-2 (17 July 2013) ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2012, [29]-[30] < 
http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/AAMMujahid.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The 
Chief Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury (Judgment) ICT-2 (01 October 2013) ICT-BD Case 
No 2 of 2011, [41]-[42] < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT-
BD%20Case%20No.%2002%20of%202011%20Delivery%20of%20judgment%20final.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim @ M A Alim (Judgment) ICT-2 (9 
October 2013) ICT-BD Case No 1 of 2012, [25]-[29] < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/ALIM-FINAL.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v 
Motiur Rahman Nizami (Judgment) ICT-1 (29 October 2014) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2011, [50]-[51] < 
http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT-
BD%20Case%20No.%2003%20of%202011%20dated.....%20.12.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The 
Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali (Judgment) ICT-2 (2 November 2014) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2013, 
[32]-[34] and [50] < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/Mir%20Quasem-judge-02.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Md Forkan Mallik @ Forkan (Judgment) ICT-2 (16 
July 2015) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2014, [13] < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/Judgment%20ICT%202%20part%202/Forkan-Judgment.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; 
The Chief Prosecutor v Mohibur Rahman alias Boro Mia, Mujibur Rahman alias Angur Mia and Md. 
Abdur Razzak (Judgment) ICT-1 (1 June 2016) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2015, [38] < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict1/Judgment%20part%202/3%20of%202015.pdf > accessed 12 August 2012.   
94 David Bergman (n 85).  
95 David Bergman, ‘5 Nov 2012: Tribunal Order Reduces Molla Witnesses’ (Bangladesh War Crimes 
Tribunal Blog, 17 February 2013) < http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/5-nov-2012-
tribunal-order-reduces-molla_17.html > accessed 17 July 2016. 
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by addressing the first ‘general’ question and then moves on to the subsequent 
‘specific’ questions.  
 
3.2.1 Setting an upper limit on the number of defence witnesses and the ‘equality of 
arms’  
 
While the opportunity to comprehensively present one’s case is an essential fair trial 
attribute, a trial that succumbs to unnecessary delay undermines another basic right of 
the accused – the right to a speedy trial. ‘Expedited’ trial proceedings were a point of 
interest during the ‘historic’ trials of Nuremberg.96 In the past, the European 
Commission of Human Rights has curbed defence evidence for the sake of preserving 
procedural efficiency and economy.97 In these cases, it was held that the principle of 
equality of arms did not give an accused an “unlimited right to obtain the attendance 
of witnesses” and courts were entitled not to summon witnesses whose statements do 
not bear any relevance to the case or were unlikely to assist in the ascertainment of the 
truth.98 In that vein, the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers of the ad hoc tribunals and the 
ICC have over the years developed a ‘culture’ where the Prosecution and the Accused 
are required to submit the minimum amount of evidence necessary to sufficiently 
prove their case.99 This is done so that a balance is maintained between protecting the 
accused’s right to effectively present his case and ensuring the overall 
                                                
96 Mark Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Trials – Confronting Legal Gaps and the 
Reconstruction of Disputed Events (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 458.  
97 Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press 2001) 
288; Klamberg (n 96) 458.   
98 Austria v Italy App no 788/60 (Commission Decision, 11 January 1961) and Hopfinger v Austria 
App no 524/59 (Commission Decision, 19 December 1960) 390-392; quoted in Klamberg (n 96).  
99 Josée D’Aoust, ‘The Conduct of Trials’ in José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser and M Cherif Bassiouni 
(eds), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor 
Blishchenko (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 875; Gideon Boas, James L Bischoff, Natalie L Reid and B Don 
Taylor III, International Criminal Procedure Volume 3 (Cambridge University Press 2011) 264. 
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‘expeditiousness’ of a trial. This was reiterated by the Pre-Trial of the ICC in 
Mathaura et al where it was “convincingly emphasised” that the “expeditiousness” of 
a trial was not incompatible with the rights of the accused.100 Originally rooted in civil 
law traditions, the practice of limiting defence witness numbers has now become a 
standard “procedural tool” of case management.101  
 
The culture of ‘limiting’ witnesses, however, is not beyond reproach. In fact, disputes 
regarding the number of defence witnesses permitted during trial are common in the 
annals of international criminal law. Critics believe that the practice of ‘limiting’ is 
“problematic” because it creates a tension between the “principle of equality of arms 
and […] judicial economy”102 and leaves the defence at a “significant disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the prosecution”.103 Bennett L. Gershman maintains that the ‘limiting’ 
practice is one of the ways judges impede the defence counsel’s ability to “effectively 
challenge the prosecution’s case” and “make independent decisions about how to 
present the defence.”104  
 
Criticisms of such nature have been acknowledged and addressed in multiple decisions 
of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICTs, where it has been held that the practice of 
imposing ‘caps’ on the number of defence witnesses does not “inevitably preclude” 
the accused’s ability to present his or her case, nor does it automatically compromise 
                                                
100 Klamberg (n 96) 460.  
101 Richard May and Marieke Wierda (n 19) 279-280; Cryer, Friman, Robinson, and Wilmshurst (n 20) 
462.  
102 Geert Jan Alexander Knoops, ‘The Dichotomy between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms 
within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defence Perspective’ (2006) 2 (4) 
International Studies Journal 1, 2.   
103 Boas, Bischoff, Reid and Taylor III (n 99) 242-243 & 248; Charles Chernor Jalloh and Amy DiBella, 
‘Equality of Arms in International Criminal Law: Continuing Challenges’ in William A Schabas, 
Yvonne Mcdermott and Niamh Hayes (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International 
Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate 2013) 268.  
104 Bennett L Gershman, Trial Error and Misconduct (LexisNexis 2007) 1-4(d)(1).  
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the principle of equality of arms. In Orić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stressed 
that the rights of parties to a fair trial should not be encroached by the need for judicial 
economy, but at the same time clarified that setting a limit on the number of defence 
witnesses did not by default violate the rights of the accused. The rationale justifying 
this view was neatly summed up by the Appeals Chamber in the following manner:  
 
At a minimum, “equality of arms obliges a judicial body to ensure that 
neither party is put at a disadvantage when presenting its case,” certainly 
in terms of procedural equity. This is not to say, however, that an accused 
is necessarily entitled to precisely the same amount of time or the same 
number of witnesses as the Prosecution. The Prosecution has the burden 
of telling an entire story, of putting together a coherent narrative and 
proving every necessary element of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Defence strategy, by contrast, often focuses on poking 
specifically targeted holes in the Prosecution’s case, an endeavour which 
may require less time and fewer witnesses. This is sufficient reason to 
explain why a principle of basic proportionality, rather than a strict 
principle of mathematical equality, generally governs the relationship 
between the time and witnesses allocated to the two sides.105 
 
Since the Prosecution is burdened with telling the “entire story”, it is generally the 
case that the number of witnesses it relies on during trial exceed the number of 
witnesses listed by the defence. As a result, in Kanyabashi, despite the fact that the 
                                                
105 Prosecutor v. Naser Orić (Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defence Case) (Appeals Chamber) 
IT-03-68-AR73.2 (20 July 2005) [7] – [8].  
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number of Prosecution witnesses had not been reduced, the accused’s persistent 
demands to establish the equality of arms which he perceived as “the ability to 
summon more witnesses” were rejected by the ICTR.106  
 
3.2.2 Limiting defence witness numbers at the ICTs – systematic, arbitrary and 
unreasonable? 
 
Were the ICTs ‘arbitrary’ or ‘systematic’ in curtailing the number of witnesses listed 
by the Defence? A reason ‘common’ to all ‘limiting’ orders issued by the ICTs was 
that the number of witnesses listed by the defence was viewed by the Tribunals as 
“excessive” and furnished with the “intention to delay the trial”.107 If one appreciates 
the number of witnesses initially listed by the defence in light of the number of charges 
brought against the accused and the number of witnesses the Prosecution listed to 
substantiate them, there is scope to find merit in the claim that witnesses were listed 
with a purpose of delaying the trial process. As has been stated earlier, the number of 
defence witnesses have been limited in 11 of the cases tried so far by the ICTs. In the 
cases of Molla, Sayeedi, Kamaruzzaman, Azam, Mujahid, Chowdhury, Alim and 
Nizami, the ICTs framed 6, 20, 7, 5, 7, 23, 17, and 16 charges respectively against the 
accused. In addition to documentary evidence, the Prosecution listed 12, 20, 7, 5, 7, 
23, 17 and 16 witnesses respectively to substantiate those charges. In these cases, the 
number of witnesses originally listed by the defence were 965, 48, 1354, 2939, 1315, 
                                                
106 Prosecutor v Ndayambaje et al. (Decision on Joseph Kanyabashi’s Appeal against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 21 March 2007 concerning the Dismissal of Motions to Vary his Witness List) 
(Appeals Chamber) ICTR-98-42-AR73 (21 August 2007) [27] – [28] cited in Jalloh and DiBella (n 
103) 268.  
107 David Bergman, ‘14 Aug 2012: Sayedee 20 Defence Witness Order’ (Bangladesh War Crimes 
Tribunal Blog, 20 November 2012) < http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/14-aug-
2012-sayedee-20-defence-witness.html > accessed 27 June 2016.   
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1153, 3328 and 10,111 respectively.108 As a consequence of the ‘limiting’ Orders 
issued by the Tribunals, the Defence was allowed to list a maximum of 6, 20, 5, 5, 12, 
3, 5, 3 and 4 witnesses in these cases. Out of the 11 cases where ‘caps’ were imposed, 
the Defence were unable to bring the maximum number of witnesses permitted in the 
‘limiting’ Orders in Molla, Sayeedi, Azam, Mujahid, and Chowdhury.109 Although 
Geoffrey Robertson has been critical of the ‘extent’ of reduction by the ICTs, he has 
acknowledged that the act of listing over a thousand witnesses was a “vexatious […] 
delaying tactic”.110  
 
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY has applied an “objective standard or test” when 
evaluating the “reasonableness” of the ‘limit’ imposed.111 This test requires the 
Tribunal to consider whether the number of witnesses allowed was “objectively 
adequate” in light of the “complexity” of the subject matter of the case.112 For instance 
in Orić, a case where it was necessary to resolve complex issues such as “military 
necessity”, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that the Trial Chamber’s allotment 
of 30 witnesses and 27 days of testimony to the Defence in comparison with the 
allotment of 50 witnesses over 100 days of testimony to the Prosecution, was 
unjustifiably disproportionate.113 It is possible to gain a perspective on the degree of 
                                                
108 The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla (n 93) [29]; The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain 
Sayeedi (n 93) [36]; The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (n 16) [38] & [151]; The Chief 
Prosecutor v Professor Ghulam Azam (n 93) [35]; The Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad 
Mujahid (n 93) [29], [41]; The Chief Prosecutor v Md Abdul Alim @ M A Alim (n 93) [25]; The Chief 
Prosecutor v Motiur Rahman Nizami (n 93) [51]; The Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali (n 93) [50]; 
The Chief Prosecutor v Md Forkan Mallik @ Forkan (n 93) [13]; The Chief Prosecutor v Mohibur 
Rahman alias Boro Mia et al. (n 93) [180].   
109 In Molla, Sayeedi, Azam, Mujahid and Chowdhury, a total of 5, 17, 1, 1 and 4 witnesses testified for 
the Defence, when in fact, the ICTs had allowed the Defence to bring in 6, 20, 12, 3 and 5 witnesses in 
those cases. 
110 Robertson (n 11) 118.   
111 Knoops (n 102) 12.  
112 ibid 12-13.  
113 ibid 12-13.  
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‘proportionality’ and ‘reasonableness’ of the allocation of witnesses and time from the 
transcripts of Kamaruzzaman. In this case, the 18 Prosecution witnesses were given 
20 days to testify, while the cross-examinations of those witnesses by the Defence 
spanned 39 days.114 For example, the examination-in-chief of the Investigation Officer 
in Kamaruzaman was completed in three hours. The defence cross-examined him over 
a period of four days over nearly ten hours.115 The 5 witnesses who testified for the 
defence did so over a period of 5 days.116 In Kamaruzzaman, the Tribunal felt that it 
was unnecessary to substantiate the defence’s plea of alibi with a many witnesses 
because the “adjudication of facts in issue does not depend upon the success or failure 
in proving defence”.117 The Tribunal explained the burden of proof with respect to the 
Prosecution and the Defence in a criminal trial: 
 
[…] it is settled jurisprudence that in a criminal trial the burden or 
obligation of proof of the guilt of the accused is place squarely on the 
prosecution. The burden rests upon the prosecution in respect of every 
element or essential facts that makes up the offence with which the 
accused has been charged. That burden never shifts to the accused. It is of 
course not for the accused to prove his/her innocence. […] It is quite 
misconceived that the defence is burdened to ‘disprove’ the prosecution 
case. An alibi, in contrast to a defence, is intended to raise reasonable 
doubt about the presence of the accused at the crime site, this being an 
                                                
114 Orders No. 22-132 (22 July 2012 – 18 March 2013) The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad 
Kamaruzzaman (Orders) ICT-2 ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2012.  
115 The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (n 16) [34]. 
116 ibid [29], [34]-[38]. 
117 The Chief Prosecutor v Mohammad Kamaruzzaman (Order No 114) ICT-2 (20 February 2014) ICT-
BD Case No 03 of 2012, [9]. 
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element of the prosecution’s case, thus the burden of proof is on the 
prosecution.118  
 
This brings us to the final point of contention of whether the ICTs Orders limiting 
witnesses had engaged in “judicial meddling” and determined the “nature of the 
defence’s legal strategy”.119 In the ICTY and the ICTR, the Trial Chamber sets an 
upper limit on the number of defence witnesses prior to the commencement of the trial 
during the pre-defence conference. During this ‘stage’, the Chamber decides whether 
to limit witnesses by taking into account the ‘will-say’ statements of the witnesses 
listed by the defence.120 It has been alleged that the Tribunals had reduced the number 
of defence witnesses without possessing any knowledge on the “relevance of the 
witnesses on substantive issues”.121 The ICTA and its RoP do not provide for any 
mechanism that is similar to a ‘pre-defence conference’. Section 9(3) ICTA requires 
the Chief Prosecutor to furnish to the Tribunal a list of witnesses intended to be 
produced during the trial along with recorded statements of such witnesses.122 The Act 
                                                
118 The Chief Prosecutor v Mohammad Kamaruzzaman (Order No 114) ICT-2 (20 February 2014) ICT-
BD Case No 03 of 2012, [4] & [10].  
119 Boas, Bischoff, Reid and Taylor III (n 99) 249; Bergman (n 85).  
120 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
rule 73 ter (c); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
rule 73 ter (d); Nancy Amoury Combs, ‘Legitimizing International Criminal Justice: The Importance 
of Process Control’ (2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 321, 330; Daryl A Mundis, 
‘Improving the Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2000) 94 The 
American Journal of International Law 759, 765; Knoops (n 102) 5; Håkan Friman, Fabricio Guariglia, 
Claus Kress, John Rason Spencer and Vladimir Tochilovsky, ‘Measures Available to the International 
Criminal Court to Reduce the Length of Proceedings’ (ICC, 2003) 4, 9 < https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-
907F631453ED/281982/length_of_proceedings.pdf > accessed 30 June 2016; Sometimes, the 
Tribunals limit the number of defence witnesses indirectly. For instance, at the pre-defence conference 
in Milosevic, the ICTY refrained from limiting the number of witnesses the accused could call, but 
insisted that the case in question be limited to 150 working days. As a result, Slobodan Milosevic was 
compelled to be judicious while selecting who to call from his list of 1631 witnesses to testify in his 
case. See, ‘Unlimited Number of Witnesses, but in Limited Time’ Sense Tribunal (The Hague, 17 June 
2004) < http://www.sense-agency.com/icty.29.html?news_id=8642 > accessed 30 June 2016.  
121 Bergman (n 85).  
122 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 3) s 9(3) reads: “The Chief Prosecutor shall, at least 
three weeks before the commencement of the trial, furnish to the Tribunal a list of witnesses intended 
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does not, however, impose a similar responsibility on the defence, which under 
Section 9(5) is obligated only to provide the Tribunal and the Prosecution with a list 
of witnesses it intends to reply upon.123 Nevertheless, previous orders and judgments 
of the ICTs have clarified that the Tribunals limited the number of defence witnesses 
on the basis of the “defence-case” that could be “extracted” from the trend of cross-
examinations of Prosecution witnesses carried out by the counsels representing the 
accused.124 Therefore, while the allegation that the ICTs enforced an upper limit on 
the number of defence witnesses without ‘knowing’ what they would say is 
‘technically’ true, their decisions were based on the line of questioning adopted by the 
accused’s counsel during the cross-examinations of Prosecution witnesses.  
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that there is a definite scope to improve this 
‘exercise’. This will be achieved if a mechanism similar to that of the ‘pre-defence 
conference’ is introduced into the ICTA during which the Tribunal will have the 
opportunity to evaluate the ‘will-say’ statements of each witness. Alternatively, if 
legislators perceive that incorporating a ‘pre-defence conference’ will amount to too 
significant a change in the system of the ICTs, a simple amendment to Section 9(5) 
may be introduced requiring the Defence to submit not just a list of witnesses, but also 
“a summary of the facts on which each witness will testify” as is the case with respect 
to the ICTY and the ICTR.125  
 
                                                
to be produced along with the recorded statement of such witnesses or copies thereof and copies of 
documents which the prosecution intends to rely upon in support of such charges”.  
123 ibid s 9(5) reads: “A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the documents or copies 
thereof, which the defence intends to rely upon, shall be furnished to the Tribunal and the prosecution 
at the time of the commencement of the trial”.  
124 The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla (n 93) [29] & [404]; The Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan 
Muhammad Mujahid (n 93) [43].  
125 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, rule 73 ter 
(b)(iii)(b).  
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To sum up, the practice of limiting the number of defence witnesses creates an 
inevitable tension between the need to ensure the equality of arms and judicial 
economy. Nevertheless, the practice of curbing of the amount of evidence provided 
by the defence which includes the number of defence witnesses is not uncommon in 
international criminal law. This is why UN sponsored Tribunals have held that that 
the practice of imposing ‘caps’ on the number of defence witnesses does not inevitably 
preclude the accused’s ability to present his or her case or automatically compromise 
the principle of equality of arms. With regards to the 11 cases before the Bangladeshi 
ICTs where a cap was imposed on the number of defence witnesses, the Tribunals 
performed this task on the basis of case presented by the defence and from the trends 
of cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses carried out by the defence counsel. This 
system is not perfect.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter found that other than a few omissions concerning the statutory provision 
allowing an accused a minimum period of three weeks to prepare his defence, the 
inability of foreign counsel to physically place their arguments before the ICTs and 
the absence of the right of compensation to victims of miscarriage of justice, an 
accused facing trial before the ICTs enjoys a range of fair trial safeguards which mirror 
most of the rights enshrined in ICCPR. There have been other criticisms of trial 
procedures adopted by the ICTs. Due to constraints of space, this Chapter analysed 
two of the most contentious objections, namely the application of Articles 47(3) and 
47A of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the ICTs practice 
of limiting the number of defence witnesses. The ‘scheme’ created by Articles 47(3) 
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and 47A of the Bangladesh Constitution does not deprive those charged with 
international crimes of their fair trial rights under the ICTA, nor does it alter the ‘basic 
structure’ of the Constitution. While the criticisms of this ‘scheme’ may have some 
weight because they create an ‘image’ crisis of the ICTs, they remain insufficient to 
cause concern under the principle of complementarity. This Chapter also examined 
the ICTs practice of imposing caps on the number of defence witnesses on the basis 
of the case presented by the defence and from the trends of cross-examination of 
Prosecution witnesses carried out by the defence counsel. Although the practice of 
limiting the number of defence witnesses is not uncommon in international criminal 
justice and other local jurisdictions, the process through which this is done at the ICTs 
is not perfect and needs to be improved. Furthermore, the ICTs can allow the defence 
to introduce more witnesses if they are convinced that more defence witnesses are not 
being prayed for as a delaying tactic. However, the claim that this practice is 
systematic, arbitrary and unreasonable appears to be an exaggeration. 
 
Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR upholds the accused’s right “to be tried in his presence”. In 
nearly half of the cases heard by the ICTs, the accused were absconding. The following 
Chapter analyses the last contentious objection relating to the trial process of the ICTs, 
i.e. the legality and legitimacy of the ICTs practice of trying an accused in his absence.
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Chapter VII 
Analysing the major criticisms of the trial process (II) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The trial of the Muslim cleric named Abul Kalam Azad, did not just result in the first 
ever judgment of the International Crimes Tribunals of Bangladesh (ICTs) in January 
2013, but was also the first of a series of trials that were conducted in the physical 
absence of the accused. Till date, twenty-eight persons accounting for nearly half of 
all the accused who have been tried and sentenced or are currently on trial before the 
ICTs were physically absent during the proceedings, resulting in those trials to be 
conducted in absentia.1 One cannot count out the possibility that there will be more 
trials in absentia (TIA) in the future. Since 2016, 62% of all accused who have been 
tried and sentenced and are currently facing trial before the ICT have been physically 
absent from the proceedings, noting a clear rise in the usage of TIA.2 The demands to 
hold to account the 195 Pakistani military personnel identified in the early 1970s as 
the principal perpetrators of the 1971 war remains unfulfilled.3 The formation of a 
                                                
1 International Crimes Tribunal-1, Bangladesh < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/judgments.php > accessed 
7 July 2016; International Crimes Tribunal-2, Bangladesh < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/judgments.php 
> accessed 7 July 2016; ‘War Crimes Tribunal Concludes Trial of Jamaat Leader Aziz’ Bdnews24 
(Dhaka, 9 May 2017) < http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/05/09/war-crimes-tribunal-concludes-
trial-of-jamaat-leader-aziz > accessed 25 August 2017.  
2 Since 2016, judgments have been handed in 7 trials against 31 accused amongst whom 18 were 
physically absent. Of the trials that are ongoing where charges have been framed against 29 accused, 
19 amongst them are physically absent. This amounts to a total of accused 37 (out of 60) who have 
been tried or are currently being tried by the ICT in their absence. See, International Crimes Tribunal-
1 and International Crimes Tribunal-2 (n 1).  
3 Zulfiqer Russell, ‘Tribunal to Investigate 195 Pakistani Soldiers’ Dhaka Tribune (Dhaka, 28 
December 2013) < http://www.dhakatribune.com/law-amp-rights/2013/dec/28/tribunal-investigate-
195-pakistani-soldiers > accessed 7 July 2016; ‘Bangladesh Committee to Conduct ‘Symbolic Trials’ 
of 195 Pakistan Army Men’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 18 December 2015) < 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/12/18/bangladesh-committee-to-conduct-symbolic-trials-of-
195-pakistan-army-men > accessed 7 July 2016.  
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five-member committee by the ICT in 2016 to collate information about the crimes 
committed by Pakistani soldiers and Bangladesh’s intention conveyed in 2017 to seek 
the extradition of 195 former POWs from Pakistan to face “trial on charges of 
genocide” show that the prospect of trying Pakistani military personnel is being treated 
with seriousness.4 In the likely event that Pakistan will refuse to extradite, the 
mechanism of in absentia trials will be employed again by the ICTs.5  
 
Critics have identified the ICTs practice of conducting TIA as “possibly the most 
evident and palpable proof that, […] justice has ended at the gallows in Bangladesh”.6 
This conclusion is foregrounded on the claims that the accused were not given 
effective notice of impending proceedings, were deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel, and were denied the right to re-trial during the trials conducted in absentia 
which led to death sentences passed against thirteen of the accused.7 The possibility 
that an absconding accused will be hanged to death if apprehended has been described 
as “extreme and undoubtedly unfair”.8 These criticisms remain unaddressed by the 
Bangladesh Government.  
                                                
4 Haroon Habib, ‘Probe on 195 Pakistani ‘War Criminals’ Begins’ The Hindu (21 January 2016) < 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Probe-on-195-Pakistani-%E2%80%98war-
criminals%E2%80%99-begins/article14010444.ece > accessed 15 July 2017; ‘Bangladesh to Demand 
Handover of 195 Pakistani POWs’ Newage Bangladesh (Dhaka, 30 March 2017) < 
http://www.newagebd.net/article/12331/bangladesh-to-demand-handover-of-195-pakistani-pows > 
accessed 15 July 2017.  
5 ‘Can They be Tried!’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 26 January 2014) < 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/01/26/can-they-be-tried > accessed 15 July 2017.  
6 ‘Justice at the Gallows: The Regulation of Trials in Absentia in the International Crimes Tribunal of 
Bangladesh’ (Toby Cadman, 9 July 2016) < http://tobycadman.com/justice-at-the-gallows-the-
regulation-of-trials-in-absentia-in-the-international-crimes-tribunal-of-bangladesh/ > accessed 15 July 
2017.  
7 ‘Report on the ‘Experts’ Rountable on Trials in Absentia in International Criminal Justice’ 
(International Bar Association, September 2016) 10.   
8 Surabhi Chopra, ‘The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh: Silencing Fair Comment’ (2015) 
17 Journal of Genocide Research 211, 213-14; Geoffrey Robertson, Report on the International Crimes 
Tribunal of Bangladesh (International Forum for Democracy and Human Rights, 2015) 56-57; 
Elizabeth Herath, ‘Trials in Absentia: Jurisprudence and Commentary on the Judgment in Chief 
Prosecutor v. Abul Kalam Azad in the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal’ (2014) 55 Harvard 
International Law Journal 1.  
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The scope and purpose of this chapter is to analyze these criticisms against Article 
14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which 
asserts the right of an accused to be tried ‘in his presence’ and the principle of 
complementarity which dictates that the International Criminal Court (ICC) should be 
receptive towards the ‘diverse’ standards of justice in national criminal jurisdictions 
when assessing the ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘manner’ of those jurisdictions. 
To this end, this Chapter is divided into two parts. Part I asks if the ‘complementary’ 
system of justice created by the Rome Statute of the ICC permits domestic courts of 
State Parties to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of international crimes through trials 
in absentia. Part II analyses the specific criticisms directed towards the trials in 
absentia held before the ICTs for the purposes of determining whether they have 
rendered illegitimate the justice process in Bangladesh created by the ICTA.  
 
1. Balancing the accused’s right to be present against trials in absentia  
 
The right to be tried in one’s own presence, expressed in the Latin phrase audi alteram 
partem (let the other side be heard as well) is acknowledgment of one of the innate 
notions of fairness and is asserted in Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR, other major instruments 
of international law such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
is explicitly recognized as a fundamental right in many national constitutions.9 
                                                
9 European Convention on Human Rights, article 6; ‘Customary IHL, Practice Relating to Rule 100. 
Fair Trial Guarantees, Section I. Presence of the Accused at the Trial’ < 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter32_rule100_sectioni > accessed 27 
February 2017; Thilo Marauhn, ‘The Right of the Accused to be Tried in his or her Presence’ in D 
Weissbrodt and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), The Right to a Fair Trial (Springer 1997) < 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/fairtrial/wrft-tm.htm > accessed 12 August 2017; Council of Europe, 
Judgments in Absentia, European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) Committee of Experts on the 
Operation of European Conventios in the Penal Field (PC-OC), Secretariat Memorandum prepared by 
the Directorate of Legal Affairs, 3 March 1998m (Doc PC-OC(98)7) 4 < 
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Nevertheless, trials in absentia persist in limited circumstances. In fact, trials in the 
absence of the accused have been carried out for centuries and their “actual roots” go 
back as long as the French Criminal Ordinance of 1670.10  This part explains the 
importance of ensuring the presence of an accused during his or her trial. It then 
identifies the circumstances in which trials in absentia are permitted. This will then 
help determine whether trials in absentia to prosecute alleged perpetrators of 
international crimes are permitted within the ‘complementary’ system of justice 
created by the Rome Statute. 
 
1.1 Why is the right to be ‘present’ important? 
 
There are many reasons why an accused’s ‘presence’ during trial is desirable. Most 
are based on the apparent disadvantages of trying a person in his or her absence. The 
absence of an accused has been described as “inherently unfair” because it precludes 
his “effective participation” during trial and prevents him from being adequately 
defended.11 It has been said that determining the culpability of an accused in his 
absence is tantamount to “hearing half the story” and prevent courts from objectively 
determining the guilt or innocence of an individual.12 When an accused is ‘present’, it 
                                                
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-
oc/Standards_extradition_en_files/07E.98%20trial%20absentia.pdf > accessed 27 February 2017.  
10 Ralph Riachy, ‘Trials in Absentia in the Lebanese Judicial System and at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1295, 1296; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human 
Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and 
Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 235, 279-80. 
11 M Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2nd revised edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
2013) 818; ‘Letter to Secretariat of the Rules and Procedure Committee Extraordinary Chambers of the 
Courts of Cambodia’ (Human Rights Watch, 17 November 2006) 1-2 < 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Letter%20Cambodia-HRW-
ECCC%20Rules%2011.17.06_0.pdf > accessed 17 February 2017.  
12 Mark Kersten, ‘Defendants on the Run — What’s a Court to do?’ (Justice in Conflict, 16 April 2012) 
< http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/16/defendants-on-the-run-whats-a-court-to-do/ > accessed 17 
February 2017; David Krieger, ‘A Permanent International Criminal Court and the United Nations 
System’ in Najeeb Al-Nauimi and Richard Meese (eds), International Legal Issues Arising under the 
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serves a dual purpose. First of all, the “public” interest in the accurate adjudication of 
a case is satisfied.13 Secondly, it serves the “individual” interest of influencing the 
outcome of the case by allowing an accused to appreciate the evidence stacked against 
him, advise his counsel and also confront witnesses.14  
 
When an accused is not present, the State appointed counsel is deprived of the 
opportunity to know the wishes of his client, or discuss with him the strategy of 
defence.15 Since an accused who is absent during trial in unable to benefit from a “full 
defence”, the reliability of the judgment is ‘questioned’ and justice may not be “seen” 
to be done.16 According to Christoph Safferling, an accused’s absence frustrates the 
“modern understandings of criminal prosecution” because it treats him as a passive 
“object” as opposed to an active “subject” of judicial proceedings.17 Concerns have 
also been raised about the practicability of enforcing judgments passed in absentia. It 
has been argued that imposing judgments that have little or no chance of being 
enforced will present courts as forums that sponsor “show trials”.18 This brings 
“disrepute” to the court and results in the “progressive loss” of the court’s “authority 
                                                
United National Decade of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 788; ‘The International Criminal 
Court: Making the Right Choices – Part II: Organizing the Court and Ensuring a Fair Trial’ (Amnesty 
International, 30 June 1997) 117 < https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR40/011/1997/en/ > 
accessed 17 February 2017.  
13 Marauhn (n 9).  
14 Lucas Tassara, ‘Trial in Absentia: Rescuing the “Public Necessity” Requirement to Proceed with a 
Trial in the Defendant’s Absence’ (2009) 12 Barry Law Review 153, 169-170.   
15 ‘STL Defence in Absentia Will Mean Uncharted Waters’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 29 May 2011) < 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/news-and-press/selected-interviews/head-of-the-defence-office/717-29-05-
2011-stl-defence-in-absentia-will-mean-uncharted-waters-daily-star > accessed 17 February 2017. 
16 ‘The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices – Part II: Organizing the Court and 
Ensuring a Fair Trial’ (Amnesty International, 30 June 1997) 118 < 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR40/011/1997/en/ > accessed 17 February 2017. 
17 Christoph Safferling, ‘Trial in Absentia’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2009) 543.  
18 ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1994 Volume II Part Two (UN Publication 1996) 53 < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1994_v2_p2.pdf > accessed 17 February 
2017.  
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and effectiveness” before the general people.19 Lucas Tassara adds to this argument 
by pointing out the possibility that confidence in the justice system will erode if trials 
in absentia are arbitrarily applied.20  
 
1.2 An exception to the right to be present – trials in absentia  
 
In a global order where States are often reluctant to transfer accused and in the absence 
of an effective global policing system, proponents argue that trials in absentia 
“dictated by realism” are effective means of preventing the “undue” and “indefinite” 
delay of justice.21 Supporters contend that a State that counts out the option of holding 
an in absentia trial if an accused can avoid being apprehended, indirectly encourages 
the accused to “become a fugitive” and “play” the system by intentionally avoiding a 
trial.22 In the context of Christoph Safferling’s rather alarming claim that “it is the 
plain right of the accused to try to avoid prosecution by absconding”, the justice 
system’s right to be open to trials in absentia, seems all the more necessary.23 As a 
matter of policy, an accused should not be allowed to “make a mockery of […] justice” 
by deliberately absenting himself from trial and essentially “vetoing” a legitimate 
court’s jurisdiction.24  
                                                
19 Marauhn (n 9); ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (n 18) 53. 
20 Tassara (n 14) 171.  
21 UNSC, ‘Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United 
Nations Addressed to The Secretary-General’ (10 February 1993) UN Doc S/25266; Mark Kersten, 
‘Defendants on the Run — What’s a Court to do?’ (Justice in Conflict, 16 April 2012) < 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/16/defendants-on-the-run-whats-a-court-to-do/ > accessed 17 
February 2017.  
22 Safferling (n 17) 743; Sarah C Sykes, ‘“Defence Counsel, Please Rise”: A Comparative Analysis of 
Trial In Absentia’ (2013) 216 Military Law Review 170, 208.  
23 Safferling (n 17).   
24 Martin Wahlisch, ‘Introductory Note to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber: 
Decisions on the Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Trials in Absentia’ (2013) 52 
International Legal Material 163, 165; James G Starkey, ‘Trial in Absentia’ (1979) 53 St. John's Law 
Review 721, 743; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 2016, rule 43; ‘Report of the Working Group 
on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’ in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1993 Volume II Part Two (UN Publication 1995) 120 < 
 272 
 
The approach of not pursuing a trial until and unless an accused is physically present 
before the court has disadvantages. The “prolonged delay” caused by the absconding 
of the accused may result in the loss of evidence by “accident or carelessness”, 
diminishing memories and the unavailability of witnesses.25 In 1993, Doudou Thiam 
cautioned that a complete prohibition on trials in absentia in the proposed ICC Statute 
could “paralyse the work of the court”.26 Thiam’s view has been prophetic in light of 
the reality that a good number of accused indicted by the ICC have avoided trial by 
evading the custody of the court.27 When detractors claim that pursuing trial in an 
accused’s absence gives off the essence of a “show trial”, it has been countered that 
the ICC does not gain ‘credibility’ by indicting an accused but not having a trial at 
all.28 Herman Schwartz and Lloyd Cutler argue that untried indictments are nothing 
more than unproven charges, which is why verdicts rendered through trials in absentia 
are necessary “formal condemnations”, especially where the probative value of 
evidence is determined after careful consideration.29 Such judgments act as “moral 
sanctions” and influence the “isolation and ultimate capture” of the accused.30 Gary 
                                                
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1993_v2_p2.pdf > accessed 15 February 
2017.  
25 Starkey (n 24) 743; ‘Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court’ (n 24) 120.  
26 Doudou Thiam, ‘Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ in Document A/CN.4/449 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1993 Volume II 
Part One (UN Publication 2000) 121 < 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1993_v2_p1.pdf > accessed 15 february 
2017.   
27 Gary J Shaw, ‘Convicting Inhumanity In Absentia: Holding Trials In Absentia at the International 
Criminal Court’ (2012) 44 The George Washington International Law Review 107, 130.  
28 ibid 138. 
29 Herman Schwartz and Lloyd N Cutler, ‘Try them In Absentia’ The Washington Post (27 August 
1996) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1996/08/27/try-them-in-
absentia/c6b0e05b-ae16-4026-86b9-92243ff3820f/ > accessed 25 February 2017.  
30 ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 3 May - 23 July 
1993, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10’ UN Doc 
A/48/10 in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1993 Vol II Part Two (UN Publication 1995) 
1.  
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Shaw posits that while verdicts rendered through TIA will not lead to instant 
punishment, they do pave way for a “sense of vindication for victims and their 
families”.31 These considerations have prompted the idea that an accused who 
consciously declines to participate in a trial he has been informed about has “little 
standing to complain” as to why in absentia proceedings were conducted.32 Restricting 
TIA would create an imbalance between the interests of victims and the rights of the 
accused and the pursuit of ‘justice’ would be compromised by catering to the interests 
of an accused who has purposefully evaded trial.33  
 
This is why, despite the undoubted preference for the accused to be present during 
trial, trials in absentia are permitted under exceptional circumstances. There are a 
number of situations where an accused may not participate in a trial ‘in person’. These 
include, when he has for instance, conducted himself in a manner that disrupted the 
trial; appeared initially during the pre-trial stage but absconded afterwards; explicitly 
waived his right to appear; or deliberately declined to participate.34 Other reasons 
include when the accused is in hiding from the very beginning, where the court is 
unable to ensure the accused’s presence because of the non-cooperation of the State 
where he is located, and also when the court decides that the accused’s absence serves 
the interests of justice.35 The collective attitudes of critics, those who appreciate the 
usefulness of trials in absentia and decade’s worth of judicial precedence have shaped 
the way TIA have been interpreted by major international treaties such as the ICCPR 
                                                
31 Shaw (n 27) 138. 
32 Starkey (n 24) 742.  
33 Göran Sluiter and William Schabas,  ‘Fourth Report of the Hague Conference 2010’ (International 
Law Association, 2010) 7-8 < http:/bit.ly/22ucW3T > accessed 25 February 2017.  
34 Emily Given, ‘Dissolving the Arrest Problem: Trials in Absentia at the International Criminal Court’ 
(ICC Forum, 24 March 2014) < http://iccforum.com/forum/permalink/93/4090 > accessed 25 February 
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35 ibid.  
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and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and bodies such as the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
which are entrusted to interpret and enforce such treaties. Through multiple guidelines 
and pronouncements, procedures relating to trials in absentia have evolved over time 
and have been found to be compatible with human rights treaties when certain 
safeguards are respected in three particular aspects of the trial: procedure notifying an 
accused of impending proceedings; the accused’s right to be defended in his absence; 
and the scope of appeal/review/retrial once an accused surrenders or is apprehended. 
 
1.3 Tracing the application of trials in absentia in the aftermath of mass crimes 
 
Justice initiatives at the end of both World Wars involved trials in absentia to a limited 
degree. At the end of the Great War the French President Alexander Millerand’s 
proposal to try the Kaiser par contumace (in absentia) in 1920 failed to gain 
international support.36 Although in absentia trials were permitted in French domestic 
law, British law at the time “had no equivalent procedure” leaving France unable to 
pursue the trial on its own.37 No trials were held and Kaiser Wilhelm II lived a long 
life, eventually passing away of old age in Holland.38 Despite this initial failure to 
prosecute, several trials in absentia did take place after the Great War. In 1919, French 
courts at Amiens sentenced Hermann Rochling to ten years imprisonment in absentia 
for causing destruction to French factories.39 The trial of Bulgarian Prime Minister 
                                                
36 Gary J Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengence: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University 
Press 2000) 87.   
37 ibid. 
38 ibid.  
39 Captain Jody M Prescott, ‘In Absentia War Crimes Trials: A Just Means to Enforce International 
Human Rights?’ (The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army 1994) 102 < 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456639.pdf > accessed 2 February 2017; Ruth Hanna Sachs, 
White Rose History, Volume I [Academic Version]: Coming Together (January 31, 1933 - April 30, 
1942) (Exclamation Publishers 2003) ch 4, p 5.  
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Radoslavov Vasil held in the years 1921-23, where he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, was also held in his absence.40 Held ‘locally’ in Turkey at the direction 
of Allied Powers,41 thirty-four leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 
responsible for orchestrating the Armenian massacre were tried by the Special Court 
Martial between 1919 and 1920.42 Eleven of them were tried in absentia, seven of 
whom were found guilty of “first degree mass murder” and sentenced to death.43  
 
Trials in absentia were applied for the first time in international criminal law under 
Article 12 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT).44 At the time, 
absentia provisions were “grudgingly accepted” by common law powers US and the 
UK.45 However, once its place was cemented within the Charter, American Chief 
Prosecutor Robert Jackson conceded that although absentia trials did not “comply 
with the constitutional standard for citizens” in US proceedings, he would not object 
to pursuing such trials at Nuremberg in the interests of justice.46 Sir Hartley Shawcross 
also argued in favor of taking “advantage” of TIA, although they were impermissible 
under British domestic laws.47 Fabián Raimondo argues that the provisions of Article 
                                                
40 Patrycja Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression (Routledge 2010) 133-34; 
Yannis Sygkelos, Nationalism from the Left The Bulgarian Communist Party during the Second World 
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(Cambridge University Press 2011) 93.  
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2013) 359.  
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47 ibid 339.  
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12 reflected the adopting of ‘inquisitorial’ attitudes by the IMT Charter, permitting 
trials in absentia under certain circumstances, as opposed to the adversarial 
proceedings which are based on the “effective presence of both parties”.48 The only 
person tried in absentia by the IMT was Martin Bormann whom the Allies failed to 
capture.49 In the end, Bormann who was likely to have not been alive at the time, was 
found guilty for war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to death. 
 
Provisions for trials in absentia were also kept in the decree of 22 January, 1946, 
which established the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland. There is at least one 
recorded instance of a trial in absentia involving war crimes in post WWII Yugoslavia. 
Convened in 1946 by the Military Council of the Yugoslavian Supreme Court, twenty-
four defendants were tried, ten of whom were not present during the trial.50 A 
significant number of accused were tried in absentia by the Permanent Military 
Tribunal created by France. In February 1947, twenty-one of the twenty-four accused 
in the case of France v Major Franz Holstein and others were tried in absentia at 
Dijon.51 Later that year in July, the Permanent Military Tribunal at Lyon tried 
seventeen of the twenty accused in absentia in France v. Gustav Becker, Wilhelm 
Weber, Karl Schultz and others.52 In 1953, the Bordeaux trial prosecuting the massacre 
of villagers from Oradour-sur-Glane, forty-four of the defendants were tried in 
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Tribunals (Brill 2008) 76.  
49 Grzebyk (n 40) 135.   
50 Prescott (n 39) 55-57.  
51 ‘Case No. 46: Trial of Franz Holstein and Twenty-Three Others’ in The UN War Crimes 
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absentia.53 An estimated 956 individuals were tried in absentia by French military 
tribunals based in France and Algeria.54 In the Soviet Union, the first in absentia trials 
for World War II war criminals took place in 1962. An Estonian court sentenced three 
defendants to death for crimes committed at the Tartu concentration camp.55 Among 
them, Karl Linnas and Erwins Viks were tried in absentia as they had escaped to the 
US and Australia respectively.56  
 
Although trials in absentia continued to be held throughout local jurisdictions, they 
went through a long hiatus in the post-Nuremberg era until the establishment of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in 2009. One example that stood out at the 
national level was the in absentia trial of Khmer Rouge Leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary 
in 1979 at the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of Cambodia (PRTC). Prior to the 
establishment of the STL, TIA were permitted only on a very limited scale. In 1993, 
the Report of the UN Secretary General relating to the establishment of an 
international tribunal for the “prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991”57 read:  
 
A trial should not commence until the accused is physically present before 
the International Tribunal. There is a widespread perception that trials in 
absentia should not be provided for in the statute as this would be 
                                                
53 Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Bordeaux Trial: Prosecuting the Oradour-sur-Glane Massacre’ in Kevin Jon 
Heller and Gerry Simpson (eds), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (Oxford University Press 
2013) 142-143.  
54 Prescott (n 39) 49.  
55 Jerome S Legge Jr, ‘The Karl Linnas Deportation Case, the Office of Special Investigations, and 
American Ethnic Politics’ (2010) 24 Holocaust and Genocide Studies 26.  
56 Prescott (n 39) 55. 
57 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993)’ (1993) UN Doc S/25704, para 1. 
 278 
inconsistent with article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which provides that the accused shall be entitled to be tried 
in his presence.58 
 
The ICTY Statute was adopted soon after and this was followed by the ICTR Statute, 
both of which ruled out the possibility of trials in absentia. Antonio Cassesse’s attempt 
to incorporate trials by default under “exceptional circumstances” in the Statute’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence was also unsuccessful.59 Paul Tavernier described 
the absence of TIA as a reflection of the “wishes of countries of the common law 
tradition” and emphasized that this “regrettable rejection” had caused great 
disappointment to the “civil law experts” who had included the concept of in absentia 
trials in the French draft of the ICTY Statute.60 In light of multiple pronunciations by 
the Human Rights Committee confirming that Article 14 does not prohibit trials in 
absentia, Herman Schwartz has argued that the UN Secretary-General’s reasoning in 
1993 was based on a “mistaken understanding” of the ICCPR.61 With regard to the 
ICCPR not ruling out trials in absentia, there is a convergence between the 
assessments of Cassese and Schwartz.62 As a result of pressure from the judges 
belonging to ‘civil’ law countries, the ICTY through Rule 61 of its Rules of Procedure 
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59 Paola Gaeta, ‘Trial in Absentia Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ in Amal Alamuddin, Nidal 
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and Evidence provided an “alternative” to TIA.63 Set in motion when the court fails to 
execute an arrest warrant, Rule 61 allows “an ex parte public hearing of evidence 
against an accused” with a view to ultimately issue an international arrest warrant and 
to stimulate arrests by States.64 Rule 61 does not empower the Tribunal to make a 
determination of the guilt of the accused. Due to an increasing number of arrests have 
been made by States and NATO forces in recent years, this rule has not been relied 
upon by the ICTY apart from five instances in 1995-96.65 The Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY has heard contempt cases in trials by default.66  
 
Trials in absentia were also prohibited in the internationalized panels in Kosovo.67 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) established by the UN Transitional 
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) have also enforced a ‘limitation’ on trials in 
absentia. Section 5 of Regulation 2000/30 allows proceedings to proceed where the 
accused flees or keeps himself voluntarily absent after any stage following the 
preliminary hearing. In addition, proceedings under the Special Panels could also 
continue in the absence of the accused if he conducted himself in a disruptive 
manner.68 Like the SPSC, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also allows for trials in 
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absentia on a ‘controlled’ scale.69 Although the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) does not allow trials in absentia, this position was reached after a 
significant amount of debate. The final form of the ICC Statute does not feature trials 
in absentia because States advocating for and against its inclusion failed to reach a 
compromise because of constraints of time facing them.70  
 
Where the proponents of the traditions of ‘civil law’ failed to accommodate TIA in 
the major UN sponsored tribunals, they succeeded when framing the Statute of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Therefore, the post-Nuremberg era categorized 
by the “uninterrupted custom and practice” of not allowing ‘total’ trials in absentia 
came to an end with the establishment of the STL, the fourth UN created international 
criminal tribunal.71 This was the consequence of the “apparent insistence” of the 
Lebanese delegation72 resulting in a ‘fusion’ of the elements of “civil law and common 
law systems”.73 Alongside the reason that trials in absentia were entrenched in various 
civil legal systems including Lebanon, the UN Secretary-General emphasized on 
ensuring that the legal process was not “unduly or indefinitely delayed” due to the 
absence of the accused.74 In a shift away from the former UNSG’s position in 1991, 
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the Secretary-General in 2006 acknowledged that the ECtHR had “determined the 
regularity of [trials in absentia] in full respect for the rights of the accused.”75  
 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that while the right to be present during trial 
is recognized as a core fair trial guarantee, trials in the absence of the accused can be, 
and have been, held under exceptional circumstances. TIA are employed not just at 
the domestic level, but also by international courts and tribunals prosecuting 
international crimes. Therefore, it would be absurd to suggest that the 
‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome Statute could prohibit national 
criminal jurisdictions from trying alleged perpetrators of international crimes in their 
absence, provided, of course, that TIAs were used for objectively acceptable reasons.  
 
2. Analysing the areas of contention surrounding trials in absentia at the ICTs  
 
The major brunt of criticisms about the in absentia trials before the ICTs focus on the 
extent to which an accused can unequivocally waive his right to be present under the 
existing notification procedure, the right to be effectively defended by counsel in the 
accused’s absence and the deficiency of the right to a retrial if the accused surrenders 
or is apprehended. This part analyses these specific criticisms for the purposes of 
determining whether they have violated the principle of complementarity and rendered 
illegitimate the trials held in absentia and also the justice process in Bangladesh 
created by the ICTA as a whole.  
 
2.1 Trials in absentia before the ICTs – from beginning to end 
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In Bangladesh, although the majority of trials like any other jurisdiction take place in 
the presence of the accused, the right to be ‘present’ during trial is not explicitly 
acknowledged in the Bangladesh Constitution. In 2000 when ratifying the ICCPR, 
Bangladesh expressed a reservation to Article 14(3)(d) which read:  
 
[…] while the existing laws of Bangladesh provide that, in the ordinary 
course a person, shall be entitled to be tried in his presence, it also provides 
for a trial to be held in his absence if he is a fugitive offender, or is a 
person, who being required to appear before a court, fails to present 
himself or to explain the reasons for non-appearance to the satisfaction of 
the court.76  
 
The ICTA, on the other hand, does provide the accused with the right to be present 
during his/her trial, but this right is not an unqualified one.77 Section 10A ICTA 
empowers the Tribunal to carry out a trial in the absence of the accused only if it has 
reason to believe that the accused has “absconded or concealed himself so that he 
cannot be produced for trial”.78 This section also stipulates that during such a trial the 
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Tribunal shall appoint counsel to defend the accused at the expense of the 
Government. Under Rule 29(1) of the Rules of the Procedure (RoP), the ICTs take 
cognizance of an offence against an accused if a prima facie case for trial is revealed 
upon examination of the Formal Charge and other “papers, documents and evidence” 
prepared and submitted by the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. During this process, the 
Tribunal also takes into consideration the Investigation Report (IR) prepared by the 
Investigation Agency (IA). Once the Tribunal has taken cognizance of an offence, it 
follows a two-pronged procedure with regard to notifying the accused of impending 
proceedings.  
 
First, the Tribunal sets a date for the accused’s appearance and issues either a 
summons or a warrant of arrest in his/her name.79 The designated form (ICT-BD Form 
No. 1) issuing a summons states clearly that the attendance of the accused “is 
necessary to answer to a charge of offence punishable under Section 3 ICTA and that 
the accused is “required to appear in person” before the Tribunal at the time and date 
set for appearance.80 Similarly, if a warrant of arrest is ‘issued’, the accused is served 
with a copy of the allegations against him by the law enforcement agency of the area 
where he resides.81  
 
The second prong of notifying an accused comes into play if the summons or the 
warrant is “unserved”, i.e. if the summons or the warrant is not executed because the 
accused is not at his address or cannot be found. The Tribunal under these 
                                                
(2) Where the accused person is tried under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may direct that a Counsel shall 
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circumstances orders for the publication of a ‘notice’ in two daily newspapers, one in 
English and the other in Bengali, asking the accused to appear before the Tribunal on 
the date stated in the newspaper ‘notice’.82 The standard with regard to notification 
adopted at the ICTs is similar to that exercised with respect to trials in absentia under 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.83 If the accused “fails to appear” before the 
Tribunal on the date and time specified in the ‘notice’, coupled with the Tribunal 
having reason to believe that the accused has “absconded or concealed himself” in 
order to evade arrest and face trial and the fact that there is no “immediate prospect” 
of his arrest, a trial in absentia shall commence.84 After the ICTs hand down a 
judgment following the conclusion of a trial in absentia, it is the responsibility of the 
absconding accused to file an appeal before the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh (AD-SC) within 30 days “from the date of conviction and 
sentence, or acquittal or any sentence and no appeal shall lie after the expiry of the 
aforesaid period.”85 
 
2.2 On notification 
 
In a critique of the trial of Abul Kalam Azad, Elizabeth Herath argues that the 
requirement to publish in two national dailies is insufficient “to meet the requirement 
that the accused must properly be informed of the proceedings before absconsion [sic] 
can be concluded.”86 Referring to the HRC and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), Herath asserts that the jurisprudence on the point of ‘notification’ requires 
                                                
82 ibid rule 32.  
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that “the prosecution must clearly demonstrate that the accused has been notified”.87 
While the requirement of ‘clear demonstration’ stands the test of scrutiny, there is 
scope to question the veracity of conclusions Herath reaches about notification 
procedures during trials in absentia at the ICTs.  
 
Notfying an accused of impending prosecution has been a requirement for trials in 
absentia to proceed since the Nuremberg trials and what qualifies as clear notification 
has varied from one jurisdiction to another. Prior to the trial of Martin Bormann, the 
IMT issued a notice trying to inform the accused of impending proceedings and that 
he would be tried in absentia if he did not surrender. The notice was aired over the 
radio once a week over a period of four weeks and was published in four separate 
issues of a newspaper circulated in Bormann’s city of residence.88 In recent times, an 
absconding accused before the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) shall be considered to have 
been properly notified if the warrant of arrest or summons is “pinned up” at his 
residence if known, and published in two local newspapers and announced via radio 
or television depending on the gravity of the crime.89 Under the Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the accused’s possession of actual knowledge of the 
charges can be established indirectly by giving notice “through publication in the 
media or communication to the State of residence or nationality.”90 If the accused 
remains at bay even after the passage of 30 days since the ‘publication’ or 
‘communication’ because he has either waived his right to be present or is yet to be 
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transferred by State authorities or his whereabouts are unknown, the Trial Chamber of 
the STL shall “initiate proceedings in absentia.”91 There are some similarities between 
STL’s provisions on notification and the relevant provisions of the Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure under which trials in absentia have been carried out for nearly a 
century. The rules relating to notifying the accused of the particulars of his impending 
trial are elaborated in Article 585-590 which provide that even if it is not certain 
whether an accused is aware of the existence of the “judicial notice” sent to him, such 
notice will be construed “valid” if attempts were made to have it left at his registered 
address or any other address that the authorities are aware of.92  
 
The HRC and ECtHR have considered cases where the issue of notifying the accused 
of impending proceedings featured prominently and the principles that can be derived 
from those cases assist in explaining when an accused is fully enabed to waive his 
right to participate during trial.93 In Maleki, the HRC clarified that mere ‘assumption’ 
by the State that the accused had been informed of the proceedings by his counsel was 
not enough to justify a decision to move forward with in absentia proceedings. In 
Colozza v. Italy, the ECtHR held that the accused’s status of “latitante” (a fugitive) 
was not sufficient enough basis to infer that that he had waived “his right to appear 
and to defend himself”.94 Emphasising on the importance of informing an accused 
about a posecution, it stressed that the sending of judicial notice to the actual location 
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of the accused was imperative and that the accused possessing “vague and informal 
knowledge” about impending proceedings would not suffice.95  
 
According to the HRC and the ECtHR, an accused will be considered to have been 
notified only when he is fully ‘enabled’ to waive his right to participate during trial.96 
This is guaranteed when the court takes steps to inform the accused of the charges 
against him and to notify him of the spatial and temporal details of impending 
proceedings.97 This ‘notification’ obliges courts to provide ‘actual notice’ to an 
accused giving him the opportunity either to face trial or waive his right to 
participate.98 However, the ‘obligation’ to give ‘actual notice’ does not preclude the 
possibility that an accused may be notified ‘indirectly’. Both the HRC and the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR have maintained that, if the State authorities perform their 
duties relating to notification but fail to ‘actually’ notify an accused, it may still be 
possible to infer that an accused has waived his right to take part in trial if, he publicly 
states or writes that he has no intention to do so; manages to elude an attempted arrest; 
there is irrefutable evidence confirming that the accused is in fact aware of the 
proceedings; or when notice is provided through members of the accused’s family.99  
 
During the pre-trial stage of the Abul Kalam Azad case, the IA filed an application for 
the arrest of the accused on 25 March, 2012 for the purposes of an “effective and 
                                                
95 Shaw (n 27) 127-128. 
96 ibid 127 & 129.  
97 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 32: Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts 
and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial’ (2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32  < 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom32.html > accessed 7 March 2017; Daniel Monguya 
Mbenge et al. v Zaire (Communication No 16/1977) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) 76, para 14.1; 
Maleki v Italy (Merits) (Communication No 699/1996) UN Doc CCPR/C/66/D/699/1966 (1999), para 
9.3.  
98 Maleki v Italy (n 97).  
99 Gaeta (n 59) 241-242; Gardner (n 90) 126-127; Sejdovic v Italy (2004) 42 EHRR 360 cited in Shaw 
(n 27) 128. 
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proper investigation”.100 In response, the Tribunal directed the IA to submit a report 
stating the progress of the investigation against Azad and fixed the 3 April, 2012 for 
disposal of the application. On 3 April, 2012, the Tribunal perused the progress report 
and issued an arrest warrant.101 The Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) was unable to 
execute the warrant because Azad had absconded “on sensing the matter of issuance 
of arrest”.102 Quoting Azad’s sons, law enforcement agencies claimed that he had fled 
to India on 2 April, 2012.103 In the months that followed the IA completed its 
investigation and the Chief Prosecutor on the basis of the Report prepared submitted 
a ‘Formal Charge’ against Azad on 2 September, 2012. The Tribunal took cognizance 
of offences and issued a second warrant of arrest against the accused. The DMP was 
unable to arrest the accused this time as well. The execution report of the DMP 
confirmed that Azad could not be arrested because he had “absconded” and had left 
the country.104  
 
The second ‘notification’ asking Azad to appear before the Tribunal was published in 
two national dailies on 25 September, 2012.105 After he did not respond to the 
notification and attempts to locate him were unsuccessful, the Tribunal on 7 October, 
2012 decided to proceed with a trial in absentia because Azad had either absconded or 
had concealed himself.106 It appointed Abdus Shukur Khan, an Advocate of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh as Azad’s defence counsel who received a copy of the 
                                                
100 Chief Prosecutor v Abul Kalam Azad (Judgment) ICT-2 (21 January 2013) ICT-BD Case No 5 of 
2012 [18] < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/full_judgement_azad.pdf > accessed 12 
August 2017. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
103 ‘Azad flees to India His - 2 sons held’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 10 April 2012) < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-229714 > accessed 1 March 2017.  
104 (n 100) [20]. 
105 ‘Chief Prosecutor v Moulana Abul Kalam Azad’ (International Crimes Database) < 
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/169/Azad/ > accessed 1 March 2017. 
106 (n 100) [21].  
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Formal Charge along with statements of witnesses and other documents submitted by 
the Prosecution on 11 October, 2012. The accused was indicted on eight charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity on 21 October, 2012. The trial commended on 
4 November, 2012. Azad was convicted and sentenced to death on three counts of 
crimes against humanity and one count of genocide on 21 January, 2013.107 Till this 
date, he remains at large and attempts to apprehend him have been unsuccessful.108  
 
In Azad the ICT concluded that the accused had absconded after he managed to evade 
arrest following the issuance of two arrest warrants spread out over a period of seven 
months and had refrained from responding to the notice to appear before the Tribunal 
published in two national dailies. In light of practices covered in this Part which allow 
a court to infer that an accused has waived his right to be present at his trial if he 
manages to evade arrest, there is nothing to suggest that the ICT had acted 
inappropriately in its  attempts to notify Azad of impending proceedings.  In all 
pertinent respects it appears to have followed similar procedures adopted at 
international and domestic tribunals.  
 
In the remaining cases that the ICTs have tried in absentia, the processes adopted to 
issue arrest warrants and publish notice in newspapers were by and large similar to the 
                                                
107 (n 100) [333].  
108 Mohammad Jamil Khan, ‘Convicted 3 years back, Bachchu Razakar still traceless’ Dhaka Tribune 
(Dhaka, 30 March 2015) < http://www.dhakatribune.com/crime/2015/mar/30/convicted-3-years-back-
bachchu-razakar-still-traceless > accessed 1 March 2017; ‘Move on to return Azad’  Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 
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March 2017; Mohammad Zakaria, ‘Government unaware about Azad’s whereabouts: FM’ Dhaka 
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unaware-about-azad%E2%80%99s-whereabouts-fm > accessed 1 March 2017; ‘Where is Bachchu 
Razakar?’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 21 January 2013) < http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/01/21/where-
is-bachchu-razakar > accessed 1 March 2017; ‘Task force for fugitives’ Bdnews24 (Dhaka, 27 March 
2014) < http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/03/27/task-force-for-fugitives;.pre14 > accessed 1 
March 2017. 
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ones adopted in the Azad case. One case that stands out with respect to the issue of 
waiving the right to presence is Chief Prosecutor v Ashrafuzzaman Khan and 
Chowdhury Mueen Uddin. Khan and Mueen Uddin had fled Bangladesh after the end 
of the 1971 war.109 When the trial commenced against them in 2013, they were both 
well-known Muslim clerics residing in the United States and United Kingdom. Khan 
was an active member of the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).110 Mueen 
Uddin, who had played an important role in the setting up of the Muslim Council of 
Britain and served as the Director of Muslim Spiritual Care in the NHS was accused 
of being involved in war crimes in a 1995 Channel 4 documentary called War Crimes 
Files.111 After being indicted by the ICT, Mueen Uddin spoke to the BBC’s Asian 
Network and informed that he had “supported the unity of a sovereign nation” in 1971 
but was not involved in the “kind of crimes alleged” by Bangladeshi Prosecutors.112 
He claimed that he would be “happy to respond” to the charges against him but would 
not do so before the ICT as it was incapable of ensuring a fair trial.113 This position 
was reiterated by the accused’s foreign counsel Toby Cadman on 3 November, 2013 
who claimed that the justice process in Bangladesh was “far below even the minimum 
standards of fairness” and that his client was “prepared to stand trial and establish his 
innocence” before an independent and impartial court.114 Unlike Mueen Uddin, co-
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accused Ashrafuzzaman Khan has tried to steer clear of acknowledging awareness of 
the proceedings against him. When asked about the charges during a brief telephone 
interview, Khan claimed to be unaware of what was going on in Bangladesh and that 
he was not a Bangladeshi citizen.115 However, other facts indicate that Khan may be 
aware of the judicial proceedings that have been initiated against him in Bangladesh. 
In 2012 expatriate Bangladeshis have organised protests outside the Queens Branch 
of the ICNA demanding his extradition to Bangladesh.116 In 2013, the Coordinator of 
the Investigation Agency of the ICTs personally visited the ICNA office at Queens to 
know the whereabouts of Khan.117 Furthermore, a warrant of arrest has been issued 
against Khan by Interpol.118 In light of these facts, there is sufficient scope to argue 
that Chowdhury Mueen Uddin had unequivocally waived his right to be present during 
his trial before the ICT.  
 
On the other hand, an unequivocal waiver cannot be definitively inferred from the 
facts surrounding Ashrafuzzaman Khan’s case. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that 
contrary to the precedents set by multiple cases adjudicated by the ECtHR and 
interpreted by the HRC, the ICTA much like the Statute of the STL and the Dutch 
Code of Criminal Procedure does allow the ICTs to infer awareness of impending trial 
proceedings if the accused does not respond to publications issued in the media, or 
communications made to the State of the accused’s residence or nationality, or judicial 
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notice sent to the accused’s registered address or other addressed the authorities are 
aware of.  
 
2.3 On the right to be ‘effectively’ defended 
 
Critics have raised concerns about the adequacy of time given to prepare the case and 
the ‘quality’ of state appointed defence counsel during the trials in absentia .119 Section 
9(3) ICTA requires the Chief Prosecutor to furnish to the Tribunal, at least three weeks 
prior to the commencement of the trial, all evidence he intends to rely on.120 This 
includes lists of witnesses, their recorded statements and other documents. The 
previous Chapter (VI) demonstrated that the statutory provision stipulating a 
minimum period of three weeks is unlikely to be accepted as an adequate amount of 
time and ought to be increased by an amendment so that the revised time period 
reflects the length of time the ICTs have provided to the accused in practice. The 
timelines of the trials in absentia at the ICTs show that the amounts of time given to 
counsel appointed by the State to prepare were considerably longer than the minimum 
requirement of three weeks. Azad’s counsel Abdus Shukur Khan had seven weeks to 
prepare his defence.121 Counsel appointed by the state in the remaining trials were 
given similar time frames to prepare their cases. In Chief Prosecutor v Md. Abdul 
                                                
119 David Bergman, ‘Azad Judgement Analysis 1; ‘in-absentia’ Trials and Defence Inadequacy’ 
(Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal, 26 January 2013) < 
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Jabbar Engineer, counsel for the accused was appointed on 7 July, 2014.122 The trial 
commenced eight weeks later on September 7, 2014.123 In the end, the Tribunal 
sentenced Jabbar to “imprisonment for life till his natural death”.124 In the case of 
Ashrafuzzaman Khan and Chowdhury Mueen Uddin, the two counsel appointed by 
the state, Abdus Shukur Khan and Salma Haye had roughly six weeks to prepare 
before the trial commenced on 15 July, 2013 when the Prosecution placed its opening 
statement and began to “adduce and examine witnesses”.125 In Chief Prosecutor v 
Zahid Hossain Khokon, the counsel was appointed on 14 August, 2013. Zahid’s trial 
commenced on 19 November, 2013, giving the state appointed counsel over ten weeks 
to prepare for the case.126 In Chief Prosecutor v Syed Md. Hachhan, the defence 
counsel for the accused was appointed on 15 September, 2014. Hearings to frame 
charges began on 22 September, 2014 and the trial commenced with the Prosecution 
making its opening statement on 7 December, 2014, giving Hacchan’s counsel nearly 
ten weeks to prepare for the case.127 Furthermore, the state appointed defence counsel 
were able to cross-examine all of the 224 witnesses relied upon by the Prosecution 
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during the trials were the accused were absent.128  
 
Over the years, States have held divergent views about the necessity of ensuring that 
legal assistance is provided to the absconding accused during trials in absentia. For 
instance, ‘civil’ law countries such as The Netherlands and France did not grant an 
accused the opportunity to be defended by counsel in his absence for the greater part 
of the 20th century.129 After the First World War, leading perpetrators of the Armenian 
massacre from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were represented by 
sixteen lawyers led by Celaleddin Arif, the President of the Turkish Bar 
Association.130 The ‘inquisitorial’ nature of the proceedings based on the French legal 
system proved advantageous to the prosecution because it barred the defence counsel 
from gaining access to their interned clients or “pre-trial styled evidence”.131 The court 
“examined” and “verified” the massacres committed throughout the Ottoman Empire 
to conclude that they had been “organized and carried out” by the CUP leaders.  
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Geoffrey Robertson has described these proceedings as “independent” and “genuine”. 
He emphasized that although the trials in absentia were “deficient by our standards”, 
they were not “unusual or unfair by local standards” and remained a “legitimate 
exercise” which held former leaders and officials accountable under domestic law in 
an era when international law did not offer the means to punish persons liable for mass 
crimes against their own people.132 Although Robertson’s comments describe trials 
that took place a century ago, his analysis is important because it echoes the central 
claim of Chapter III that the principle of complementarity dictates the ICC to be 
receptive towards the ‘diverse’ standards of justice in national criminal jurisdictions 
when assessing the ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘manner’ of those jurisdictions.  
 
The ECtHR faced the question whether the absconding accused’s right under Article 
6 ECHR to receive legal assistance had been infringed in many cases. In Artico v Italy, 
the European Court held that the accused’s request for legal aid which was granted did 
not amount to any “effective assistance” because the newly appointed lawyer was 
“unable to act” because of other commitments and his state of health.133 The Statute 
of the STL also ensures that the accused’s right to counsel is protected. Article 22(2) 
of the Statute guarantees the accused’s right to choose his/her own defence counsel, 
to have the Tribunal remunerate such counsel if the accused is financially unable to 
do so, and finally if the accused “refuses or fails to appoint a defence counsel” the 
right to be assigned one by the Tribunal.134  
 
                                                
132 Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Was there an Armenian Genocide’ (Policy Memorandum, Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office to Minister, 1999) 19-20, paras 40, 42.   
133 Artico v Italy App No 6694/74 (ECtHR, 13 May 1980) 4-5 [13], 13 [33].   
134 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, article 22(2). 
 296 
The ICTs of Bangladesh unconditionally appoint counsel for an absconding accused 
and bear his expenses.135 The question remains whether they were able to provide 
effective assistance. A definite weakness, one which Justice Obaidul Hassan 
acknowledged during the course of the Azad trial, was the inability of the State 
appointed Defence counsel to produce witnesses favoring their clients.136 In the 
absence of available literature on this issue, it is a daunting task to comprehensively 
ascertain what caused this weakness. A British journalist, David Bergman, has 
explored this ‘limitation’ during the course of the Azad trial. When asked why 
“investigations or inquiries on behalf of his client” had not been undertaken, Abdus 
Shukur Khan informed him that his preparation was based on “papers provided by the 
prosecution” because Azad’s family had not offered him any cooperation with respect 
to the trial.137 Furthermore, the accused’s son Zahid Azad had declined Shukur’s offer 
to appear as a defence witness or provide any documents in support of his father.138 
Shukur Khan did not visit the crime scenes because of the lack of cooperation from 
Azad’s family and also because he was unfamiliar with the Faridpur district where the 
crimes in question had been committed.139 In light of these shortcomings, Bergman 
questioned whether Azad had received a “proper defence”.140  
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The failure on the part of defence lawyers to access crime scenes or bring defence 
witnesses to testify is not a problem unique to the ICTs. According to Kai Ambos, the 
experiences of Ad Hoc tribunals also reveal a crisis of ‘equality of arms’ because the 
scarcity of “human resources” make it nearly impossible to “dispatch” persons to 
crime scenes to carry out investigations.141 Although the problem slowly “diminished” 
over time, the ICTY in particular suffered from these problems during its formative 
years when the defence counsel had to secure witness testimonies and evidence in 
environments that were “hostile and uncooperative”.142 However, it needs to be 
pointed out that the context surrounding the inaccessibility of crime scenes during the 
formative years of the ICTY and the circumstances preventing State appointed defence 
counsel of the ICTs from visiting crime scenes are very different, given that crime 
scenes from 1971 still exist, but the evidence there does not. 
 
The inability of the state appointed counsel in Azad and other cases where the accused 
were tried in absentia either has jeopardized the ‘sharpness’ of the defence the accused 
received. However, the contention that this delegitimized the whole trial is likely to 
be interpreted as an exaggeration, especially because defence counsel were able to 
cross-examine and challenge witnesses relied on by the Prosecution.  
 
2.4 On the right to a retrial 
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Critics correctly claim that the ICTs do not provide a right to a retrial after an 
absconding accused is apprehended or if he surrenders himself. However, this position 
does not fully appreciate that the right to a retrial is not an ‘unfettered’ one and that 
pre-requisites and procedures relating to ‘retrial’ vary from one jurisdiction to another. 
There are also differences in opinion as to whether the ‘right’ involves a trial de novo 
or a normal appeal. According to Thilo Marauhn, precedents set by national courts do 
not point to any clear tendencies.143  
 
In November 2012, the Committee of Experts on the Operation of European 
Conventions on Co-operation in Criminal Matters (“PC-OC”) sent out a questionnaire 
relating to trials in absentia to all members of the PC-OC and parties to the European 
Convention on Extradition (“ECE”).144 Replies arrived from a total of 26 States 
including 22 States which had ratified the Second Additional Protocol to the ECE. 
When asked about the scope of retrial in case of a judgment passed in absentia, 18 
States responded affirmatively.145 However, it was clarified that the right to a retrial 
is not ‘automatic’ or ‘unfettered’ and its scope is “restricted to an appeal procedure” 
and specific legal conditions.146 Irrespective of whether the ‘right’ in question 
constitutes a right to appeal or a fresh trial altogether, it is not ‘absolute’. The Council 
of Europe recommends that retrial rights be offered only to those accused who were 
unable to attend trial due to reasons beyond his control. Under the HRC and the 
ECtHR, an accused is entitled to a retrial or a review only if he did not explicitly waive 
his right to take part in the trial. Worth recalling is the reasoning applied in Demebukov 
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v Bulgaria (Demebukov), where the ECtHR found that it would not amount to a denial 
of justice if the court refused to reopen criminal proceedings against an accused tried 
in absentia who had deliberately absconded to avoid prosecution.147  
 
Under multiple national jurisdictions, the right of an accused to submit an application 
for a retrial is subject to time-limits. The fulfilling of various conditions contribute to 
a successful application, which include but are not limited to situations where: the in 
absentia trial was not judicially exercised, i.e. there were errors of judgment; the 
availability of new evidence; the case in question bears ‘public importance’; the 
accused was absent because of reasons beyond his control etc.148 Under the Article 
22(3) of the Statute of the STL, an accused is entitled to a retrial only when he had not 
appointed counsel of his own choosing or finds the judgment passed unacceptable.149 
It is evident, therefore, that an absconding accused’s right to a retrial is by no means 
an unfettered one.  
 
An accused, whether convicted in his presence or tried in absentia by the ICTs, is 
entitled to file an appeal before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh within 30 days of date of “conviction and sentence”.150 Unlike the 
‘conditional’ character of the right to retrial in pronouncements of the HRC, ECtHR 
and the Council of Europe, the right to prefer an ‘appeal’ before the highest court of 
Bangladesh within the stipulated deadline is an ‘unconditional’ right. Provisions 
relating to appeal further stipulate that the accused shall lose the opportunity to lodge 
an appeal upon expiration of the 30 day time limit and that the Appellate Division 
                                                
147 Demebukov v. Bulgaria App No 68020/01 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008) 11 [56], 8-9 [45].  
148 European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) (n 144) 82-85.   
149 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ( n 134) article 22(3).  
150 International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (n 77) s 21(3).  
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shall dispose of the appeal within 60 days of its filing.151 When the appeal is filed, the 
accused is allowed to submit all documents he intends to rely on.152 A parallel may be 
drawn with the relevant British provision which requires an accused to file an appeal 
within 28 days of the passing of a judgment in absentia which may be allowed if the 
court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds of appeal submitted in writing by the 
accused are arguable.153  
 
By engaging in a ‘literal’ interpretation of the time limit to file an appeal, critics of the 
likes of Geoffrey Robertson have reached the conclusion that if the accused tried in 
absentia were to return to Bangladesh “at any time in the future”, they could be 
“immediately marched to the gallows” once a death warrant is issued by the 
International Crimes Tribunal.154 In theory, Robertson’s conclusion is correct. 
However, if one takes into account the norms practiced by the Supreme Court with 
regard to appeal, it is not impossible to reach a different but nonetheless plausible 
conclusion. Although Section 21(5) states clearly that an appeal before the Supreme 
Court shall be disposed of within 60 days of its filing, not a single appeal has so far 
been completed within this ‘clearly defined’ time limit. On average, an appeal before 
the Supreme Court followed by another ‘review’ of the decision of the Appellate 
Division takes at least sixteen months.155 In addition to this, Article 104 of the 
                                                
151 ibid s 21(3)(4). 
152 ibid s 21(5).   
153 European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) (n 144) 90 & 94.  
154 Robertson (n 132) 57.   
155 The Chief Prosecutor v Motiur Rahman Nizami (Judgment) ICT-1 (29 October 2014) ICT-BD Case 
No 3 of 2011, 1 < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT-
BD%20Case%20No.%2003%20of%202011%20dated.....%20.12.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; 
Motiur Rahman Nizami v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 143 of 2014, 
1  < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/808562_Criminal_Appeal_No._143_Of_2014.
pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Delowar Hossain Sayeedi (Judgment) ICT-1 
(28 February 2013) ICT-BD Case No 01 of 2011, 1 < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/sayeedi_full_verdict.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; Delwar Hossain 
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Constitution of the Bangladesh empowers the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court to do virtually ‘anything’ in order to ensure that “complete justice” is served. It 
reads:  
 
The Appellate Division shall have power to issue such directions, orders, 
decrees or writs as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any 
cause or matter pending before it, including orders for the purpose of 
securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or production of 
any document.156 
 
                                                
Sayeedi v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 39-40 of 2013, 1  < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/617564_CRIMINAL_APPEAL_NO.39-
40_OF_2013_2.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Salauddin Quader Chowdhury 
(Judgment) ICT-1 (1 October 2013) ICT-BD Case No 2 of 2011, 1 < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict1/ICT1%20Judgment/ICT-
BD%20Case%20No.%2002%20of%202011%20Delivery%20of%20judgment%20final.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; Salauddin Qader Chowdhury v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) 
Criminal Appeal No 122 of 2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/700203_Criminal_Appeal_No.122_of_2013.p
df > accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali (Judgment) ICT-2 (2 November 
2014) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2013, 1 < < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/Mir%20Quasem-judge-02.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; Mir 
Quasem Ali v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 144 of 2014, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/824674_Crl_A_No_144_2014_final.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid (Judgment) ICT-2 
(17 July 2013) ICT-BD Case No 4 of 2012, 1 < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/AAMMujahid.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; Ali Ahsan Muhammad 
Mujahid v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/675857_Crl._A.No.103_of_2013.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Muhammad Kamaruzzaman (Judgment) ICT-2 (9 
May 2013) ICT-BD Case No 3 of 2012, 1 < http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/MKZ.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; Muhammad Kamaruzzaman v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) 
Criminal Appeal No 62 of 2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/650628_CRIMINALAP62_of_2013.pdf > 
accessed 12 August 2017; The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla (Judgment) ICT-2 (5 February 
2013) ICT-BD Case No 2 of 2012, 1 < http://www.ict-
bd.org/ict2/ICT2%20judgment/quader_full_verdict.pdf > accessed 12 August 2017; Abdul Quader 
Molla v The Chief Prosecutor (Appellate Division) Criminal Appeal No 24-25 of 2013, 1 < 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.bd/resources/documents/601845_CrlA_24_25_2013.pdf > accessed 12 
August 2017.  
156 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, article 104. < 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=367 > accessed 12 August 2017.  
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Therefore, an accused tried and convicted in absentia who misses the 30-day deadline, 
may subsequently file an application before the Appellate Division explaining the 
reasons causing the delay. This was asserted by the state appointed counsels of Abdul 
Jabbar Engineer and Zahid Hossain Khokon when they were found guilty and 
sentenced by the ICT.157 The discretion, would of course, remain with Bangladesh’s 
“apex court” to allow or reject the accused’s application to file an appeal.158 If allowed, 
the ‘appeal’ due to its comprehensive nature would potentially remedy any 
shortcomings of the previous trial in absentia relating to ‘notification’ or 
‘effectiveness’ of counsel. The fact that the appeal at the Appellate Division would be 
tried by a panel of ‘new’ judges who had the case before, gives organizations like 
Amnesty and Human Rights Watch one less reason to worry about because the judges 
would be in a much better position to presume the ‘innocence’ of the accused.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter analysed the core criticisms of the ICTs trials in absentia against Article 
14(3)(d) ICCPR which asserts the right of an accused to be tried ‘in his presence’ and 
the principle of complementarity which requires the ICC to be receptive towards 
diverse standards of justice. It identified the weaknesses of these trials and the areas 
where the rights of an absconding accused may be improved. More importantly, it 
showed that these trials possess the minimum safeguards necessary (i.e. notifying an 
accused of impending proceedings, ensuring that the State appoints and pays for legal 
                                                
157 Mahbubur Rahman Khan, ‘JAIL Until Death for Ex-JP Lawmaker Jabbar’ The Daily Star (Dhaka, 
15 March 2015) < http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/jail-until-death-3855 > accessed 1 June 2017; 
‘Khokon Razakar’s Appeal Period Expires Today’ New Age (Dhaka 12 December 2014) < 
http://newagebd.net/75859/khokon-razakars-appeal-period-expires-today/ > accessed 1 June 2017.  
158 Khan (n157). 
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counsel, and provides an absconding accused the right of appeal) to not violate the 
principle of complementarity.  
 
According to Michail Wiadimiroff, the lawyer who represented Dusko Tadic at the 
ICTY, “the concept of a fair trial should and can only be understood in the context of 
the system in which it functions.”159 The context and climate in which trials in 
absentia have been held before the ICTs deserve attention. Under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, the Government of the United Kingdom has for many years 
been in a position to investigate the case of Chowdhury Mueen Uddin. It is in this 
environment that the ICTs have carried out trials in absentia. All of the twenty-eight 
accused who were tried in absentia at the International Crimes Tribunals of 
Bangladesh had either managed to evade arrest or stated in clear terms that they had 
no intention to face ‘ICT justice’ because of its apparent lack of ‘fairness’. The ICTs 
utilized the concept of trials in absentia as one of several tools to break that cycle 
which was being perpetuated by twenty-eight individuals who voluntarily absented 
themselves “in defiance of their obligations under international law”.160 If the 
objective and purpose is to serve ‘justice’ through the collection of evidence, 
establishment of truth, the punishment of wrongdoers and the vindication of victims 
or family members of victims, the trials in absentia discussed in this chapter may not 
have been far off the mark.
                                                
159 Michail Wiadimiroff, ‘The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic’ (1998) 13 American University International 
Law Review 1441, 1449.   
160 Schwartz and Cutler (n 29). 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the legality and the legitimacy of the 
International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) of Bangladesh through the prism of the 
principle of complementarity with particular reference to the “principles of due 
process recognized by international law”.1 This final Chapter is structured into three 
parts. Part I provides an overview of the thesis by weaving together its core findings. 
On the basis of these, Part II states the key propositions concerning the legality and 
legitimacy of the ICTs. Finally, Part III sheds light on the future scholarship of the 
principle of complementarity by identifying some of its points of tension which were 
revealed while writing this thesis. 
 
1. An overview of the thesis and its core findings 
 
The ICTs were established for the purposes of trying the perpetrators of international 
crimes committed during the war of 1971. In order to comment on the legality and 
legitimacy of the ICTs, it is imperative to understand the context in which they were 
established. This context was explored in the first two chapters. Chapter I detailed the 
nature and extent of mass atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army and its local 
auxiliaries against the Bengali population. It found that although the extent of crimes 
has been disputed in some quarters, this is not something that is seriously denied in 
academia. Chapter II traced a host of local and international factors which thwarted 
the implementation of any meaningful and effective judicial mechanism aimed at 
                                                
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90, article 17(2). 
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delivering justice to the victims for the greater part of four decades. This absence of 
justice came at a great cost; the rise of a culture of impunity and a continuing failure 
to provide redress for those victims of the atrocities.  
 
In the ‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome Statute, national 
criminal jurisdictions are entrusted with the primary responsibility of prosecuting the 
most serious crimes, leaving the ICC with the ability to intervene “only where a State 
is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation and prosecute the 
perpetrators.”2 Noting that the crimes committed during the war of 1971 were beyond 
the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, Bangladesh as a State Party of the Rome Statute 
established the first ICT in 2010 to challenge the culture of impunity. Concerns that a 
justice process initiated through the ICTA “may not meet international fair trial 
standards” were raised on the eve of the establishment of the Tribunal.3 As the trials 
went through the hurdles of completion and judgements began to be handed down and 
enforced, stakeholders from the international community comprising of prominent 
human rights and non-governmental organisations, foreign States, international 
lawyers and several academics, managed to capture the narrative that has defined the 
justice process ongoing in Bangladesh, that there is a deficit in the legality and 
legitimacy of the ICTs because they have failed to uphold international standards of 
justice.4 Chapter III of this thesis identified the principle of complementarity and the 
“principles of due process recognized by international law” as the standards against 
                                                
2 ‘Understanding the International Criminal Court’ (International Criminal Court) 1 < https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf > accessed 25 September 2017. 
3 Henrik Alffram, Ignoring Executions and Torture Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces (Human 
Rights Watch 2009) 12 <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0509web.pdf> 
accessed 12 August 2017.  
4 Abdus Samad, ‘The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh and International Law’ (2016) 27(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 257, 262  
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which this alleged deficit would and should be assessed. It demonstrated that while 
the Rome Statute requires the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC to be receptive 
towards the “diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures” when assessing the 
efforts of national criminal jurisdictions to investigate and prosecute crimes, domestic 
proceedings of an individual case may be regarded as incapable of providing “any 
genuine form of justice” and hence be deemed to be “inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person to justice” if the “violations of the rights” of the accused were of 
“egregious” nature.5  
 
The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh chapters then identified and analysed the most 
contentious criticisms of the statutory provisions of the ICTA and trial process of the 
ICTs in terms of the principle of complementarity and the “principles of due process 
recognized by international law”. Chapter IV analysed three specific criticisms related 
to the principle of legality, otherwise known as nullum crimen sine lege. Firstly, it 
found that Section 3(1) of the ICTA which empowers the ICTs to prosecute “any 
individual or group of individuals, […] whether before or after the commencement of 
this Act” does not violate Article 35(1) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh which protects persons from facing retroactive prosecution of crimes 
by prohibiting ex post facto laws. Secondly, the definitions of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ and ‘genocide’ in the ICTA by and large reflect the customary international 
law surrounding those definitions in 1971 and that variations in the definitions 
                                                
5 Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’ 
(International Criminal Court, September 2003) 5 < https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-
de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf > accessed 24 September 2017; 
Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah 
Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”) ICC-O1/11-01/11OA6 (24 July 2014) [3] < 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_06755.PDF > accessed 15 March 2016. 
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provided for in the ICTA fall within the boundaries of reasonable discretion exercised 
by a national legal system. Finally, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh relied on 
established judicial principles and precedents while justifying the enhancement of 
Abdul Quader Molla’s punishment on appeal from life imprisonment to the death 
penalty. However, the enhancement of Molla’s sentence in the aftermath of the 
Shahbag movement revealed an important point of tension in the principle of 
complementarity. Courts of national criminal jurisdictions in the ‘complementary’ 
system of justice may succumb or be perceived to succumb to populist demands of 
justice made in the national context prevailing at the time of judgment. Chapter V 
showed that despite clear trends showing that the global community is moving away 
from practicing the death penalty, contemporary standards of international law are still 
permissive of the passing of the death penalty for the ‘most serious crimes’ which are 
limited to murder or intentional killing. More importantly, Article 80 of the Rome 
Statute confirms that the ‘complementary’ system of justice does not preclude 
domestic courts such as the ICTs and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh from applying 
the death penalty as punishment for international crimes.  
 
Chapters VI and VII analysed three key objections relating to the trial process of the 
ICT’s. Chapter VI found that apart from a few omissions concerning the statutory 
provision allowing an accused a minimum period of three weeks to prepare his 
defence, the inability of foreign counsel to physically place their arguments before the 
ICTs and the absence of the right of compensation to victims of miscarriage of justice, 
an accused charged with international crimes under the ICTA enjoys a range of fair 
trial safeguards which mirror most of the rights enshrined in ICCPR. The ‘scheme’ 
created by Articles 47(3) and 47A of the Bangladesh Constitution does not deprive 
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those charged with international crimes of their fair trial rights under the ICTA, nor 
does it alter the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution. While the criticisms of this 
‘scheme’ may have some weight because they create an ‘image’ crisis of the ICTs, it 
is argued that they remain insufficient to cause concern under the principle of 
complementarity. This Chapter also examined the ICTs practice of imposing caps on 
the number of defence witnesses on the basis of the case presented by the defence and 
from the trends of cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses carried out by the 
defence counsel. Although the practice of limiting the number of defence witnesses is 
not uncommon in international criminal justice and other local jurisdictions, the 
process through which this is done at the ICTs is not perfect. Furthermore, the ICTs 
can allow the defence to introduce more witnesses if they are convinced that more 
defence witnesses are not being prayed for as a delaying tactic. However, the claim 
that this practice is systematic, arbitrary and unreasonable appears to be an 
exaggeration. Chapter VII found that the ‘complementary’ system of justice does not 
prohibit national criminal jurisdictions from trying alleged perpetrators of 
international crimes in their absence, provided, that trials in absentia were used for 
objectively acceptable reasons. It showed that trials in absentia under the ICTs ensure 
the minimum safeguards necessary (i.e. notifying an accused of impending 
proceedings, ensuring that the State appoints and pays for legal counsel, and provides 
an absconding accused the right of appeal) to not violate the principle of 
complementarity. However, the failure on the part of State appointed defence counsel 
to access crime scenes or bring defence witnesses to testify, though not a problem 
unique to the ICTs, is a weakness.  
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2. The legality and legitimacy of the International Crimes Tribunals of 
Bangladesh 
 
Conducting an assessment of the legality of a judicial proceeding can be a fairly simple 
and uncomplicated exercise. The justice system in Bangladesh created by the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 was designed to break the cycle of impunity 
by detaining, prosecuting and convicting persons responsible for the commission of 
international crimes during the war of 1971. To suggest that this exercise is ‘illegal’ 
in terms of either municipal or international law would be hard if not impossible to 
substantiate. However, conducting an assessment of the legitimacy of the International 
Crimes Tribunals is a slightly harder task.  
 
The search for legitimacy is a theoretical question the answer to which is intertwined 
with the ideas of what is perceived as moral and fair. It would be difficult to argue that 
the observance of human rights are of secondary concern to the idea of justice, which 
is why there is a general consensus that during the pursuit of justice, the principles of 
due process must be observed out of respect to morality and fairness. In the 
‘complementary’ system of justice created by the Rome Statute, the legitimacy of a 
trial process taking place within a national criminal jurisdiction is determined by 
assessing its judicial standards. In order to make this determination, one must unearth 
the extent to which the standards adopted during a domestic trial process deviate from 
the “principles of due process recognized by international law” and determine whether 
that deviation can be accommodated within the need to respect “diversity of legal 
systems, traditions and cultures” or not be accommodated because the “violations of 
the rights” of the accused which came about through those deviations were of the 
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“egregious” kind.  
 
It is difficult to ascertain the moment when the principle of complementarity might be 
violated giving reason for the ICC to step in; the Rome Statute or the cases tried by 
the ICC offer limited guidance on what constitutes egregious violations of the rights 
of an accused. The norms of common sense dictate that summary trials, trials that 
deprive the accused of knowing the charges against him/her, trials that do not offer the 
accused access to counsel, any time to prepare his case or the right to appeal to a higher 
court, will be deemed as trials where the rights of the accused have been egregiously 
violated, necessitating the intervention of the ICC. Such trials in academia are often 
identified as ‘show trials’. To what extent did the standards of justice adopted at the 
ICTs deviate from the “principles of due process recognized by international law”? To 
what extent were they ‘show trials’?  
 
To answer these questions, the model adopted in this thesis has been to engage in a 
detailed exploration of the historical context behind the ICTs and a comprehensive 
unpicking of the major areas of contention surrounding Bangladesh’s struggle against 
impunity. This assists in identifying the genuine weaknesses of the ICTs and seeing if 
those weaknesses translate to egregious violations of the rights of an accused. Of 
course, every trial whether they are conducted internationally or at the domestic level 
can be critiqued for breach of principles of due process. The idea to seek perfection, 
remains illogical. The quality of justice that a legal system will be able to offer is 
dependent on the legal traditions and cultures of that system. This is why the declared 
goal of the ‘complementary’ system of justice is not to achieve ‘perfect’ justice that 
upholds the highest standards, but to end impunity by prosecuting the perpetrators of 
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international crimes in a manner that does not egregiously violate the rights of the 
accused.  
 
Many criticisms have been directed towards the statutory provisions of the ICTA and 
the trial process of the ICTs. Due to constraints of space this thesis analysed the major 
criticisms and its key proposition is that while the judicial standards of justice adopted 
at the ICTs are not in harmony with the highest international standards, they are 
followed to a reasonable degree. If it is possible to reach a consensus that the word 
egregious means ‘gross’, ‘outrageous’, ‘notorious’, ‘shocking’ or ‘outstandingly bad’, 
then it is unlikely that the genuine weaknesses of the ICTs will qualify as egregious 
violations. The extent of the deviations of the standards of justice adopted by the ICTs 
do not appear sufficient for the trials before the ICTs to be described as show trials. 
This is why the justice system in Bangladesh that was created by the ICTA and 
comprises of the ICTs cannot be deemed as illegitimate from the perspective of 
international criminal law, because it does not overthrow the principle of 
complementarity.  
 
The question that remains though, is whether the ICTs are ‘legitimate’. The answer to 
this question cannot be answered immediately, simply because any assessment of 
legitimacy requires that the subject of the assessment has reached the stage of 
completion. The justice process initiated through the ICTs is a living entity and its 
trials are ongoing. The ICTs are not ‘illegitimate’, but in order to provide a definitive 
answer on whether they are ‘legitimate’, we may have to wait till the trials come to a 
complete close and stakeholders will have the chance to assess the ICTs from a healthy 
distance which is something only the passage of time can ensure. On this matter of the 
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legitimacy of the International Crimes Tribunals, the jury is still out. Of course, the 
constant evaluation of national criminal jurisdictions prosecuting the most serious 
crimes is a necessity and should be welcomed because it assists in improving the 
quality of justice and documents important lessons for future justice processes. 
However, criticisms that do not take into account the context within which a judicial 
system operates and fumbles in appreciating the rules of assessing the legality and 
legitimacy of domestic courts functioning within the ‘complementary’ system of 
justice, may end up shielding the culture of impunity. In the future, after the 
proceedings of the ICTs have come to a close, perhaps this is what should guide the 
final assessment of the legitimacy of Bangladesh’s struggle against impunity.  
 
3. The tension points of the principle of complementarity  
 
As this thesis strived to assess the legality and legitimacy of the ICTs, it revealed 
certain points of tension that prevail within the principle of complementarity. These 
points of tension deserve attention during future scholarship that focuses on 
complementarity as a principle and the ‘complementary’ system of justice as a whole.  
 
One of the reasons why the principle of complementarity identifies national criminal 
jurisdictions as the first line of attack against the culture of impunity is because it 
allows justice not just to be done, but be seen to be done by those who were directly 
and indirectly affected by the most serious crimes. The first point of tension is that 
complementarity does not account for the possibility that the processes of local justice 
are prone to be influenced by the sentiments of victims. By demanding what it 
understood as ‘justice’, the Shahbag movement which sparked off in February 2013 
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put to the test the very notions of independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh. If more 
movements like Shahbag emerged after the judgments failed to satisfy the victims idea 
of justice following which laws were amended and punishments enhanced, the 
political interference to ongoing justice processes would be apparent and such events 
would certainly derail the whole justice process and strip itself of any legitimacy.  
 
While the death penalty is not practiced by the ICC, the Rome Statute does not prevent 
State Parties from prosecuting the most serious crimes at the domestic level and 
punishing the guilty by handing down the death penalty. This brings us to the second 
point of tension that the principle of complementarity cannot make a State Party that 
has abolished the death penalty to extradite an accused to another State Party where 
he/she has been sentenced to death through a trial conducted in absentia. This is the 
main reason the United Kingdom has not extradited Chowdhury Mueen Uddin to 
Bangladesh. This begs a deeper question of how far an unenforced sentence fulfils the 
goal of fighting impunity.  
 
What do these points of tension reveal about the principle of complementarity? The 
objective behind creating a ‘complementary’ system of justice was to bring an end to 
impunity. However, the above-mentioned points of tension reveal that the principle 
enshrined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute is trying to marry several competing 
interests. The first relates to challenging impunity by prosecuting the perpetrators of 
the most serious crimes. The second converges on the need to ensure that the trials 
taking place within a national criminal jurisdiction observe the principles of due 
process recognized by international law so that egregious violations of the rights of 
the accused do not take place. The third competing interest is the need to respect the 
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“diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures” while carrying out the assessment 
listed in the second interest. Juggling these competing interests is by no means an easy 
task, and currently there is insufficient clarity on the principle of complementarity in 
international criminal law to answer how all three can be achieved collectively without 
upsetting any of them individually. The fact remains that the Rome Statute does not 
envision the International Criminal Court to be a court that assesses human rights. The 
question that stems from this reality is to what extent should the ICC compel national 
criminal jurisdictions to improve their principles of due process? If the objective of 
the principle of complementarity is to end impunity, how will the ICC balance this 
objective against the need to observe the fair trial rights of individuals? If the ICC 
attempts to marry these competing principles as opposed to prioritising the ending of 
impunity and due process criticisms are allowed to weigh in at every level of a national 
trial, the possibility exists that the principle of complementarity will be perceived as a 
weak defender of State Parties trying to prosecute their own. 
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